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On April 20, 2006, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm signed 
legislation that set the most demanding high school graduation require-
ments in the nation. These standards, effective for all students in the 
2011 graduating class, require four years of English language arts; four 
years of mathematics, including algebra II; three years of science; and 
three years of social studies. Additional requirements in world languages 
take effect with the class of 2016. These ambitious standards, typically 
required only for the college bound, were motivated by concerns over 
Michigan’s struggling economy and workforce, concerns brought to 
public attention by the Lt. Governor’s Commission on Higher Educa-
tion and Economic Growth (the so-called Cherry Commission). The 
Cherry Commission’s 2004 report issues this challenge:
Michigan’s residents, businesses, and governments can either 
move forward to a future of prosperity and growth fueled by the 
knowledge and skills of the nation’s best-educated population, 
or they can drift backward to a future characterized by ever- 
diminishing economic opportunity, decaying cities, and popula-
tion flight—a stagnant backwater in a dynamic world economy. 
(Cherry Commission 2004, p. 3) 
These standards, prompted by concerns over a state economy that 
has shrunk steadily since 2001, are the most recent in a series of sub-
stantial K–12 education policy reforms dating back to 1990, when the 
Michigan legislature passed Public Act 25, a sweeping reform that 
established a state model curriculum, a state accreditation program for 
all elementary and secondary schools, and formal processes for improv-
ing schools and publishing school reports on a regular basis. 
The pace of Michigan’s education reform accelerated dramatically 
during Governor John Engler’s first term, 1991–94, with new legisla-
tion on teacher tenure, charter schools, interdistrict school choice, and, 
most notably, comprehensive tax reform and a complete overhaul of 
K–12 school finance. Passage of these sweeping reforms was aided 
by a generally robust state economy and some measure of bipartisan 
cooperation in the legislature. The cumulative impact of these reforms 
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eventually came to be nothing less than a new landscape for public 
schools in Michigan, with more centralized and less stable funding, 
volatile district enrollments, and, with charter schools, the advent of 
nonunionized teachers.
But the pace of education reform slowed dramatically during 
Engler’s third term in 1999–2002 as policymakers, recognizing the 
apparent limits of many of the measures they so quickly had enacted, 
began to evaluate and fine-tune their dramatic innovations. Constraints 
were placed on charter school growth, school choice options were 
broadened to allow cross-county student movement, and local district 
options for enhanced operating funds were curtailed. However, the bulk 
of the Engler-era reforms remained essentially unchanged during the 
administration of Governor Granholm, perhaps owing to popular sup-
port for the charter and choice initiatives and a faltering state economy 
that has generated little new revenue with which to facilitate further 
school finance reforms. However, while choice and charters continue 
to enjoy popular support, a growing number of educators, parents, and 
other school advocates have expressed concern over the state’s dwin-
dling financial support, measured in real terms, for most school districts 
in Michigan.
COnCuRREnT nATIOnAL REFORMS
With the notable exception of the state’s dwindling financial support 
for public schools, Michigan’s K–12 education reforms have paral-
leled recent nationwide trends. Here we need to distinguish between 
nationwide reform movements and reforms advanced under federal leg-
islation. While some reforms, such as school choice and charter schools, 
become nationwide movements as they are adopted in state after state, 
fewer initiatives of comparable scope are instituted by the U.S. Con-
gress. The U.S. Constitution makes no mention of education, leaving 
such matters “to the States . . . or to the people.”1 Indeed, it was not 
until 1958, following the Soviet Union’s launch of the satellite Sputnik, 
that Congress entered the education policy arena in any substantial way, 
with passage of the National Defense Education Act, a federal financial 
aid program designed to improve education in mathematics, science, 
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and foreign languages. The next important piece of federal education 
legislation was passed a few years later as part of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s War on Poverty, with the educational centerpiece being the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). This act sig-
naled for the first time a broadly conceived federal program of financial 
assistance to the nation’s elementary and secondary schools, with its 
central thrust being the provision of funds to local school districts to 
design and implement new compensatory education programs for low-
income children.
A few short years later, concern over the performance of public 
schools rose appreciably across the nation following the 1983 pub-
lication of A	Nation	at	Risk (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education 1983), a controversial report highly critical of U.S. public 
schools. Despite its faulty conclusion that the stagflation plaguing the 
U.S. economy at that time was attributable to poor performance by our 
public schools (our economy prospered in the 1990s without dramatic 
school improvement), the report ignited a flurry of education policy 
reforms across the states. These reforms—which included teacher 
certification tests, early childhood education initiatives, high school 
graduation requirements, and more statewide standardized student test-
ing—emphasized student and school performance, in contrast to the 
concerns of equity and access that had dominated school policy debates 
in the 1970s. Public schools were now expected to be adequate or even 
excellent, not just equal.
This debate over public school performance and the accompany-
ing cries for accountability have risen several more decibels since the 
2001 reauthorization of ESEA, commonly known as the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB). Under NCLB, schools and districts that fail to 
make “adequate yearly progress” for two consecutive years are subject 
to a set of reforms and sanctions designed to improve school perfor-
mance. As a school continues to fall short of adequate yearly progress, 
the scope of the required remedial measures widens to include offer 
of transfer to children who wish to leave the school, the provision of 
supplementary educational services outside the normal school day, the 
replacement of school staff, and the conversion of the school to charter 
status.
Further, the school accountability movement, with its emphasis on 
educational outcomes, has changed the focus of school finance policy 
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analysis and litigation from equity and the relative spending levels of 
local school districts to the more fundamental matter of student achieve-
ment. That is, school funding should now address adequacy as well as 
equity. More specifically, a state’s school finance system should provide 
all schools with resources sufficient to support high levels of achieve-
ment by all students, regardless of their social or economic background. 
This concept of educational adequacy, which received its first explicit 
judicial expression in a notable 1989 Kentucky case (Rose	v.	Council	
for	Better	Education	1989), has been applied by courts in more than 
a dozen states to declare school finance systems unconstitutional and 
has prompted school finance reforms in other states as well, including 
Michigan.
This confluence of reform efforts has led to the proliferation of 
a vast array of new and revised education policies at both state and 
national levels, policies aimed at producing a veritable renaissance in 
American public education. As the problems abound, the policies keep 
pace, but the answers and solutions—for a variety of reasons—con-
tinue to come hard. If we have learned anything over these past years, 
we have learned that there are definite limits to policy, limits to imple-
menting even well-constructed reforms, and limits to what reforms can 
accomplish. Yet we soldier on, experiencing both victories and defeats, 
and ever striving to better understand and overcome the constraints and 
limits we face in attempting to fashion and effect substantive reforms in 
our nation’s public schools. While there is no doubt that an abundance 
of newly enacted education policies abounds across the state and across 
the nation, more fundamental questions remain. What is the nature of 
these reforms? What do they hope to accomplish? How successful have 
they been? 
In this book, we attempt to provide some answers to these questions 
by examining a set of major education policy reforms undertaken in 
Michigan and across the country over the past 20 or more years, a time 
of unprecedented educational innovation in the United States. These 
innovations include finance reform, state assessment of student per-
formance, a series of school accountability measures, charter schools, 
schools of choice, and, for Detroit, a bevy of oft-conflicting policies and 
reform efforts that have belabored but seldom helped its public schools. 
In the pages that follow, we examine the decidedly mixed outcomes 
and effects of this large array of reform policies and programs. Each 
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chapter addresses a specific policy area, outlining reform activity across 
the nation with an emphasis on Michigan’s efforts as well as on one or 
two states that led these changes. 
In Chapter 2, we examine the seemingly endless controversy over 
money and schools: Does more money make schools better? We then 
look at the financing of Michigan’s public schools, setting out a brief 
history of past attempts at reform prior to the enactment of Proposal 
A in 1994–95 and its promise of increased equity for both taxpayers 
and students, as well as an adequate and stable revenue source to sup-
port quality programs in the schools. We review the factors that led 
to the reform, the principal components of the reform, and the conse-
quences or effects of the reform, with a particular focus on its fiscal 
equity effects. But we also include in our discussion the closely related 
issue of adequacy, for in addition to the question of justice and fairness 
in the state’s distribution of resources, we ask whether the resources are 
adequate to provide a quality education for all Michigan students, and 
whether they are supported by a stable revenue stream.
In Chapter 3, we describe and comment on past and particularly 
more recent efforts to develop a state accountability system for the 
schools of Michigan, so that, in the words of the U.S. Congress, no 
child is being left behind, and that all children, all schools, and all 
school districts are making adequate yearly progress in bringing all 
students to acceptable levels of academic proficiency by the federally 
mandated target date of 2013–14. We examine in some detail the nature 
of Michigan’s accountability program, initially entitled EducationYes! 
and subsequently MI-SAS and later MI-SAAS,	and how it meets—or 
fails to meet—the federal directives of NCLB and its requirements for 
adequate yearly progress. 
In Chapter 4, we address an important corollary to the building of 
accountability systems, the 40-year effort to develop and implement 
both a state assessment program, the Michigan Educational Assessment 
Program (MEAP), and the National Assessment of Educational Prog-
ress Program (NAEP). Both efforts are aimed at rigorous measurement 
of the academic achievement of the students in our public schools, and 
the public reporting of that information to the citizenry, often to the 
chagrin of school people. Our examination includes an in-depth look at 
educational achievement in Michigan over the past four or more years 
using data from the MEAP and the NAEP, high school graduation rates, 
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and other evidence. In this examination, we also compare Michigan’s 
performance to that of other states as well as the more demanding stan-
dards of the NAEP program, and comment on the substantially lower 
performance levels reported for Michigan by the NAEP. 
In Chapter 5, we introduce the issue of school choice and the increas-
ing attention that policymakers, in Michigan and across the nation, 
are paying to parents’ desires to choose the type and the setting of the 
school their children will attend. In Michigan, this increasing attention 
to school choice led initially to the legislature’s 1993 establishment 
and the rapid growth of charter schools, or public school academies, of 
which there are now some 240 enrolling over 100,000 Michigan pupils. 
These charter schools are fast becoming a significant force in Michigan 
public education, but also a force reflecting both successes and failures, 
and somewhat mixed hopes for the future.  
In Chapter 6, we further develop this issue by turning to the sec-
ond of Michigan’s school choice reforms. In 1996, the legislature 
enhanced parental and student choice with its enactment of the schools 
of choice program, allowing students to leave their home districts to 
enroll in neighboring districts with public funding following automati-
cally. Again, we see both benefits and costs—benefits to students who 
matriculate and to the school districts that receive them, but significant 
costs and few benefits to the school districts that lose students to their 
neighboring districts. We also address a serious and increasing problem 
brought on by the reform, namely, the danger of further segmentation 
and the “creaming” of more able students from “losing” districts such 
as Detroit and Benton Harbor. 
In Chapter 7, we turn our lens on Detroit Public Schools and its 
sad history of continuing failure, going from being one of the nation’s 
more prestigious, big city, urban school districts of the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s, to literally one of the worst in the country by 2011. The 
picture we present of Detroit Public Schools is one marked by general 
socioeconomic decline, unrelenting political conflict, fiscal misman-
agement, revolving-door leadership, and broken promises. It is a sad 
but instructive story, particularly with respect to the future of big city, 
urban education in the United States. We portray a public school sys-
tem in Detroit that is evolving from a district-based system to a hybrid 
consisting of traditional district schools, recently subject to dramati-
Introduction   7
cally increased state oversight, a diverse and growing array of charter 
schools, and increased private and philanthropic activity.  
We conclude our treatise in Chapter 8 with a discussion of what has 
been accomplished and learned during this period of dramatic change 
in American public education. Then, on the basis of these lessons, we 
pose our thoughts and ideas about the years ahead. We believe now 
is an opportune time for taking stock of our state’s K–12 educational 
system, and we hope this book will enhance our understanding of the 
limits of our current state policies as a means of improving outcomes in 
our public schools. Such understanding is essential as, in the words of 
the Cherry Commission (2004, p. 3), we “move forward to a future of 
prosperity and growth fueled by knowledge and skills,” or become “a 
stagnant backwater in a dynamic world economy.”
note
1. The 10th amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-




A Fiscal and Educational 
System under Stress
As the opening days of school approached in the fall of 2011, Michi-
gan and its public schools in particular faced an uncertain future. While 
the national economy struggled to show some signs of lasting recovery 
from the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, the state’s economy con-
tinued its unremitting decline. For the fiscal year beginning October 1, 
2011, Governor Rick Snyder and the legislature eliminated a $2 billion 
budget deficit, partly through draconian cuts in education at the K–12 
and postsecondary levels. As a consequence of the state’s deteriorating 
revenues and passage of a substantial business tax cut, Michigan’s local 
school districts sustained an unprecedented cut in state aid for school 
year 2010–11, compounding a shortfall in their local revenues. As of 
this writing, more than 40 districts in Michigan are in deficit, and many 
more across the state face the prospect of a budget deficit or severe 
spending cuts in the year to come. 
In this chapter we turn first to the question of whether money 
makes a difference. We look next at the financing of Michigan’s public 
schools, offering a brief history of past attempts at reform prior to the 
advent of Proposal A in 1994–95 and its promise of equity for both tax-
payers and students, as well as an adequate and stable revenue source to 
support quality programs in the schools. We review briefly the factors 
that led to the reform, the principal components of the reform, and the 
consequences or effects of the reform, with a particular focus on its fis-
cal equity effects. Our discussion includes the closely related issue of 
adequacy. For not only are justice and fairness of the state’s distribution 
of resources among schools and school districts called into question, 
but also whether the resources are adequate to provide a quality edu-
cation for all Michigan students, and whether they are supported by a 
stable revenue stream. 
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MOnEy AnD SCHOOLS: FACTS, MyTHS, AnD RECEnT 
HISTORy In PubLIC SCHOOL FInAnCE 
Does more money make schools better? No other question has 
attracted more attention and generated more controversy among educa-
tion researchers over the last 40 years. The two sides in this long-running 
debate are nicely summed up by noted economist Eric Hanushek and a 
highly regarded team of scholars from the University of Chicago:
Schools as a whole demonstrate an inability to use available 
resources effectively. There is little reason to believe that an addi-
tional dollar put into a school will improve student achievement. 
(Hanushek 1981, p. 37)
The general conclusion of the meta-analysis presented in this 
article is that school resources are systematically related to stu-
dent achievement and that these relations are large enough to be 
educationally important. Global resource variables such as [per 
pupil expenditures] show strong and consistent relations with 
achievement . . . Instead of reform without the possibility of 
enhanced resources, policymakers should advocate reform which 
incorporates high standards, continuing assessment, and adequate 
resources. (Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine 1996, pp. 384, 386)
This debate has raged since the publication of the well-known 
Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966), which found that school 
resources had a surprisingly small effect on measured student achieve-
ment (specifically, reading scores). This report, undoubtedly one of 
the most influential in the history of U.S. education and social policy 
making, has inspired a mountain of research seeking to estimate the 
relationship between school resources and student learning. This line 
of research has drawn heightened interest since the publication of A	
Nation	 at	 Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education 
1983)—a controversial report that was highly critical of U.S. public 
schools and ignited a flurry of educational policy reforms at the state 
and federal levels.1
Most of the studies of school resources and student achievement 
have modeled standardized test scores, aggregated to the school or 
district level, as a function of student and family background charac-
teristics (e.g., parental education level and family income), peer effects, 
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and school resources. In many of these studies, the effects of such 
school resources as per pupil expenditures, pupil-teacher ratios, and 
teacher characteristics—generally, degree level and years of teaching 
experience—have been found to be small and inconsistent (Hanushek 
1986). More recently, however, researchers have found evidence that 
school resources do matter and that increased spending can raise 
student achievement (Ferguson and Ladd 1996; Krueger 2003). In par-
ticular, researchers have constructed more valid measures of teacher 
quality (e.g., certification test scores, college course work, competitive-
ness of undergraduate college, and impact on student achievement test 
scores) and have found significant teacher effects on student achieve-
ment (Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994; Ferguson and Ladd 1996; Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain 2005). 
School Accountability and Educational Adequacy 
 The debate about money and schools has risen several decibels 
since the advent of the school accountability movement in the early 
1990s and the 2002 reauthorization of the federal No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB). Under NCLB, schools and districts that fail to make “ade-
quate yearly progress” (AYP) for two consecutive years are subject to 
a set of reforms and sanctions designed to raise student achievement. 
These interventions become more substantial as a school continues to 
fall short of AYP requirements, including the offer of transfer to chil-
dren in failing schools, the provision of supplementary educational 
services outside the normal school day, the replacement of school staff, 
and the conversion of the school to charter status. Sanctions may also be 
imposed on failing school districts, including the withholding of funds, 
replacement of district staff, and the reorganization or dissolution of 
the district. As schools are held more accountable for the measured 
achievement of their students, questions of school resource levels and 
efficiency receive new emphasis.
The role of the courts
The school accountability movement, with its emphasis on educa-
tional outcomes, has moved the focus of school finance litigation from 
equity to adequacy; that is, from comparisons of per pupil property 
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wealth and school spending levels across local districts to the more fun-
damental matter of student achievement. In so-called adequacy lawsuits, 
plaintiffs allege that their state’s constitution obliges the legislature 
to provide all students, regardless of background or degree of socio-
economic disadvantage, with an education that ensures their achieve-
ment at high levels, generally defined by a passing score on a standardized 
achievement test. Moreover, plaintiffs seek a	 court-ordered	 funding	
level determined by a “costing-out” study in which a plaintiff’s expert 
or court-appointed master identifies the educational programs and ser-
vices required for state achievement goals and calculates their dollar 
costs.
This legal strategy, first applied in the groundbreaking Kentucky 
case Rose	v.	Council	for	Better	Education	(1989), has proved to be a 
winning one, with plaintiffs’ success rates substantially exceeding their 
winning percentages in earlier “equity” lawsuits dating from the land-
mark 1971 Serrano	v.	Priest decision of the California Supreme Court. 
The use of these costing-out studies by many state courts has gener-
ated fierce controversy among both legal scholars and school finance 
experts. Some in the legal community see the courts’ enforcement of 
these studies as judicial usurpation of the legislature’s powers of the 
purse, while some economists challenge the validity of the studies 
themselves.2 Nevertheless, despite legitimate concerns over whether 
these judicial excursions into school finance policy making are founded 
on an ephemeral link between school spending and school quality and 
violate basic principles of separation of powers, plaintiffs will continue 
to file these adequacy lawsuits given their success to date.   
Money and Schools: Lessons Learned
The long-running debate over school funding has generated more 
heat than light, but some useful conclusions have emerged. First, 
while more money is clearly no guarantee of school improvement, real 
improvement is much less likely without it. That is, money is neces-
sary but not sufficient for school quality. Second, figuring out how to 
spend money so as to improve student learning is the right question, 
one that is more daunting than many school advocates care to admit. 
But careful research has been helpful here. Princeton economist Alan 
Krueger has identified several education initiatives that are well sup-
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ported by research evidence: fully funding Head Start and Early Head 
Start; increasing the school year by 30–40 days, especially in inner-
city areas; lowering class size in schools with large concentrations of 
low-income students; and improving the quality of teachers, especially 
in low-income areas, through merit-pay and other incentive programs 
(Krueger 2003). Obviously, these and other reforms cost money. As 
Harvard researcher Timothy Hacsi (2003, p. 203) observes, “We need 
to know which [reforms] have the most impact on what kind of student, 
and we need to know how various reform possibilities interact. To have 
the kind of quality schooling many of us claim we want for all children, 
we will need to spend more money than we do now” (emphasis in the 
original).
In theory, then, schools can be improved by spending more money 
wisely, and some reliable research evidence is available to guide 
these spending decisions. At the same time, however, it is clear that 
school funding decisions, as to both overall level and particular spend-
ing categories, are driven mostly by politics, not science. University 
of California at Berkeley Professor Norton Grubb cites political and 
historical forces that shape school spending decisions: “ . . . public edu-
cation (like most public activities) is driven by conventional interest 
group politics—a struggle for scarce resources based on the power of 
interest groups rather than on the rightness of the cause. The constitu-
ency for jobs is often more powerful than that for improved educational 
performance, and so battles over the level and distribution of spending 
(on teachers, for example) rather than over the promotion of learning 
often dominate educational politics . . . ” (Grubb 2009, p. 33).
As for the historical inertia of public school spending, Grubb 
observes that “most revenues (more than 80 percent of total expendi-
tures) are locked up in salaries and benefits covered by contracts and 
cannot be changed at all in the short run; even in the long run, changes 
cannot take place without bitter political battles (especially battles with 
unions)” (p. 35).
To sum up, money is necessary but not sufficient for improving our 
public schools. It must be used wisely to support education programs 
that are based on sound evidence. Moreover, the funding of public 
schools is essentially a political process in which schools compete 
with other programs and priorities for limited tax dollars, and the most 
effective uses of school resources are themselves often compromised 
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by competing and frequently hidden agendas. In light of all this, it is 
not surprising that school funding levels and school performance are 
not consistently aligned. Some schools determine how to use resources 
effectively given their people’s talents and needs while other schools 
squander their money. As a result, a consistent link between money and 
school quality remains elusive.
FInAnCIng MICHIgAn’S PubLIC SCHOOLS
State aid for local public schools in Michigan dates back to the 
establishment of statehood in 1837. In those early years, the proceeds 
of the state’s Primary School Fund were apportioned among schools 
according to the number of pupils in each township, and the townships 
were authorized to levy local taxes to support their schools. Schooling 
was “free” for residents but only for three months each year. Beyond 
that, a tuition fee was charged to parents.3
Prior to 1973–74, Michigan distributed general aid to local schools 
through a foundation aid system that guaranteed a minimum expendi-
ture per pupil in every district. However, by 1973 Michigan’s highest 
spending district tripled the per pupil expenditure of the state’s lowest 
spender. Facing disparities of this magnitude, as well as a court chal-
lenge of the constitutionality of the school funding system, the Michigan 
legislature replaced the foundation formula with a guaranteed tax base 
(GTB) system, effective with the 1973–74 fiscal year (Milliken	v.	Green 
1972, 1973). In that first year, more than 90 percent of Michigan’s school 
districts received GTB aid, assuring all of them equal revenue per pupil 
for equal tax effort. However, by 1993–94, this percentage had fallen to 
approximately two-thirds, and the ratio of per pupil spending between 
the highest—and lowest—spending districts had risen to the levels of 
the early 1970s (Wassmer and Fisher 1996, p. 92). Further, school prop-
erty tax rates had risen to politically unpopular levels in many localities, 
with 122 school districts within four mills of the state’s constitutional 
50-mill limit (Citizens Research Council of Michigan 1992).4 Unhappi-
ness with the local property tax received its most dramatic expression 
in the Kalkaska School District, where voters’ repeated rejections of a 
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millage renewal resulted in the closing of public schools on March 15, 
1993, after a mere 135 days of class!
A brief History of Attempted Reforms
Taxpayers and legislators had hoped the 1973 statutory change to a 
GTB formula would substantially eliminate school spending disparities 
between property-rich and property-poor districts and reduce the over-
all reliance on the property tax for school funding (Caesar, McKerr, and 
Phelps 1978). These hopes were never fulfilled, however, and reform 
efforts continued. Indeed, from 1972 to 1989 Michigan voters were 
presented with no fewer than nine opportunities, either statutorily or 
constitutionally, to reduce property taxes and change the way schools 
are financed. All of these proposals were soundly defeated (Public 
Sector Consultants 1992). 
Prelude to reform5
In Michigan’s 1990 gubernatorial campaign, Republican candidate 
(and soon-to-be-governor) John Engler promised a hefty cut in property 
taxes if elected. Once elected he launched an initiative petition drive to 
place on the November 1992 ballot a proposed constitutional amend-
ment—known as Proposal C—aimed at providing an across-the-board 
cut in local property taxes, accompanied by a cap on future increases in 
assessments (Citizens Research Council of Michigan 1992). The legis-
lature, through its own action, also placed a plan on the ballot. Proposal 
A would limit annual assessment increases on homestead property to 
the lesser of 5 percent or the inflation rate. Both proposals were soundly 
defeated by the voters, bringing the total number of consecutive failed 
reform attempts to 11.6
The voters’ rejection of proposals A and C of 1992 was followed by 
one more ill-fated reform effort: a constitutional amendment that would 
provide both property tax relief and school finance reform. Following 
extensive bipartisan deliberations in the Michigan House before and 
after the November 1992 elections, and an ensuing round of marathon 
negotiations between lawmakers and Governor Engler, both houses 
of the legislature garnered the two-thirds votes necessary to place yet 
another reform proposal before the Michigan voters. However, on 
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June 2, 1993, voters defeated Proposal A by a 55–45 percent margin.7 
Reformers were now batting a pathetic 0 for 12.    
The breakthrough: Senate bill 1
Despite the voters’ rejections of Proposal C in November 1992 and 
Proposal A in June 1993, Governor Engler and Republican leaders in the 
Senate remained committed to seeing a property tax reduction enacted 
during the governor’s first term. Accordingly, in mid-July 1993, they 
introduced SB 1, a relatively modest property tax relief plan that would 
have lowered assessment ratios over several years. It was at this point 
that State Senator Debbie Stabenow, an avowed Democratic gubernato-
rial candidate, stepped to center stage and challenged the governor and 
the Republican majority by introducing a most radical amendment: the 
total elimination of the local property tax as a source of funding for 
school operations.
Whether it was a bold stroke by Senator Stabenow to break the 
20-year logjam on school finance reform (as she later claimed), or a 
somewhat foolhardy bluff aimed at forcing Governor Engler and Senate 
Republicans to moderate their proposal (as others argued and political 
Reprinted with permission.
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cartoonist Gary Packingham vividly illustrated), the result was star-
tling. The governor and Senate Republicans leapt to the challenge, and 
in a quick 29–5 postmidnight vote on July 21, 1993, adopted SB 1 as 
amended. The next day, the House, on a 69–35 vote, quickly followed 
suit. So in one fell swoop, the legislature had eliminated entirely local 
property taxes for school operations—about two-thirds of the schools’ 
total operating funds! In mid-August, the governor signed SB 1 into 
law, becoming Public Act 145 of 1993.
Public Act 145 reduced K–12 operating revenue by more than $6.5 
billion. Additional revenue losses of $180 million accrued to other local 
governments that had relied on local school millage to fund economic 
development projects. Moreover, full replacement of this revenue by 
state taxes was prohibited by the Michigan Constitution. Specifically, 
the state is prohibited from collecting total tax revenues in excess of a 
fixed proportion of total state personal income.8 Consequently, it was 
clear to the governor and the legislature that any new revenue structure 
would necessarily combine state taxes allowable under the constitu-
tional limit with a partial restoration of local property taxes.
Following extensive negotiations among Governor Engler and leg-
islative leaders, the Michigan legislature capped a marathon 26-hour 
session by passing a compromise reform package on Christmas Eve 
morning in 1993. The package offered two alternative revenue plans, 
each calling for partial restoration of the local property tax. One plan 
featured a constitutional amendment to raise Michigan’s sales tax rate 
from 4 to 6 percent, while the alternative statutory plan would raise the 
Michigan personal income tax rate from 4.6 to 6 percent.9 Both plans 
included a state tax on all property.10 On March 15, 1994, Michigan vot-
ers approved the constitutional amendment, Proposal A, by a resounding 
69–31 percent margin. The 20-year reform drought was over.
The Foundation Formula  
A proposal crafted by a bipartisan 14-member House task force 
formed the basis of the new school funding program.11 The new leg-
islation took Michigan from a GTB aid formula back to a foundation 
program as the core of school funding. Unlike the pre-1974 foundation, 
however, Proposal A imposed strict limitations on local district options 
for revenue enhancement. With these reforms, the state had essentially 
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removed the school tax and spending decision from local district voters 
and claimed it for itself.
Detailed explanations of the workings of the new school aid pro-
gram are published elsewhere (e.g., Addonizio, Kearney, and Prince 
1995; Kearney and Addonizio 2002; Addonizio and Drake 2005) and 
are briefly summarized here. The new law provided that every district 
have a foundation of at least $4,200 per pupil. In addition to establishing 
a minimum local foundation allowance, the legislation set a statewide 
basic foundation allowance at $5,000 per pupil for 1994–95. The maxi-
mum (or “hold harmless”) level of state-guaranteed foundation revenue 
per pupil was set at $6,500. Thus, districts spending less than $3,950 
per pupil in 1993–94 were increased to $4,200 for 1994–95, and dis-
tricts between $3,950 and $6,500 in 1993–94 received increases ranging 
from $160 and $250 according to a sliding scale with increases inversely 
related to prior year spending. The 52 districts spending more than 
$6,500 in 1993–94 were allowed to levy additional hold harmless mill-
age to realize a $160 increase in 1994–95. 
The basic foundation allowance was recalculated annually accord-
ing to indices of revenue and enrollment growth through the 1997–98 
fiscal year. Districts spending more than the basic allowance received 
per pupil increases equal to the annual dollar increase in the basic allow-
ance, while districts below the basic allowance received increases up to 
twice that amount. Beginning in 1998–99, the legislature jettisoned the 
indexing formula and directly determined annual changes in the basic 
allowance. By 1999–2000, all Michigan districts had been raised to at 
least this basic level and, under current law, now receive equal annual 
increases in per pupil funding. In this way, current interdistrict differ-
ences in per pupil spending, while much lower than they had been under 
the prereform regime, are locked in by statute. This “range-preserving 
effect” is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which compares the foundation 
grants in four local districts and the state basic allowance.
Because their local foundation allowances have exceeded the state 
basic allowance since the inception of the foundation program in 1994–
95, Grand Rapids, Ypsilanti, and Bloomfield Hills have each received 
annual revenue increases per pupil equal to the dollar increase in the 
state basic allowance.12 Onaway, on the other hand, had a 1994–95 
local foundation allowance that was below the state basic level. Accord-
ingly, this district received annual per pupil increases equal to twice the 
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increases in the state basic allowance until 1999–2000, when Onaway 
caught up with the state allowance level. At that point, Onaway’s annual 
foundation increases were equal to the increases in the basic allowance 
and the local allowances of every district above the state basic level, 
hence, the range-preserving effect.
In 2007–08, the legislature reset the basic foundation level to the 
maximum or hold harmless level and reinstituted the earlier foundation 
formula whereby districts below the basic level receive twice the annual 
dollar increase of those districts above the basic level. Essentially, this 
adjustment is designed to eventually equalize the foundation allow-
ances of all but Michigan’s 52 hold harmless districts and reduce the 
disparity between these districts and the rest of the state. To date, this 
potentially significant adjustment has had little effect due to the lack of 
new foundation aid. The annual foundation levels since the inception of 
Proposal A are depicted in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1  Foundation growth, 1993–94 Pre–Proposal A Foundation 
base through 2008–09 ($)
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Now in its fifteenth year, Michigan’s foundation formula has “lev-
eled up” the distribution of general per pupil revenue across local 
districts, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Interdistrict disparities in 
general per pupil revenue have been reduced, and the formula adjust-
ment adopted in 2007–08 could dramatically reduce existing disparities, 
potentially equalizing per pupil foundation levels for all but Michigan’s 
52 hold harmless districts. The adequacy of formula funding, how-
ever, is another matter. The rate of growth in the benchmark state basic 
allowance has varied due to state policy decisions, litigation over state 
funding for special education, state and local revenue collections, and 
fluctuations in statewide K–12 enrollments. Following three consecu-
tive annual increases, the basic allowance saw no increase in 1998–99, 
when the state substantially increased payments to districts for special 
education in response to the 1997 decision of the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Durant	et	al.	v.	State	of	Michigan.13
Figure 2.2  Per Pupil Foundation Levels, 1994–95 through 2008–09 ($)
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For the period 1994–95 through 2002–03, the basic allowance 
rose at a compound annual rate of just under 3 percent, exceeding the 
average annual inflation rate of 2.52 percent over this period as mea-
sured by the Detroit Consumer Price Index (CPI). More importantly, 
these increases in the basic per pupil allowance were appropriated by 
the legislature during a period of steadily rising enrollments (see Fig-
ure 2.3). Statewide K–12 enrollment peaked at just over 1.75 million 
in 2002–03. Enrollments then began a steady decline, falling to just 
over 1.66 million in 2007–08, the lowest level in 14 years. Despite this 
steady enrollment decline statewide, however, Michigan’s deteriorating 
economy and revenue collections have constrained growth in the basic 
allowance since 2002–03. Annual growth in the basic allowance aver-
aged a mere 1.4 percent between 2002–03 and 2008–09, well below the 












Figure 2.3  State K–12 Membership History
SOURCE: MDE Bulletin 1014, various years.
22   Addonizio and Kearney
Aggregate Funding Levels
The resource levels and financial condition of a school district are 
often described in terms of the district’s per pupil funding level. For 
example, in Michigan much attention is paid, understandably, to each 
district’s foundation allowance. By itself, however, this statistic gives a 
very incomplete picture of a local school system. Consider, for exam-
ple, a district whose per pupil revenue rises 2 percent in a year, while 
its enrollment falls 3 percent over the same period. Despite the increase 
in per pupil revenue, such a district would sustain a 1 percent revenue 
loss, necessitating spending cuts, withdrawals from fund balance, or 
some combination in order to avoid an operating budget deficit. Such 
scenarios have been commonplace in Michigan this decade, as unprec-
edented enrollment shifts have resulted from the workings of the state’s 
interdistrict choice and charter school initiatives and population loss 
stemming from economic and demographic trends.
Consequently, state school finance systems must be concerned not 
only with issues of equity—that is, ensuring that differences in per 
pupil funding are not excessive across local communities—but also 
with issues of the adequacy and stability of public school funding. The 
issues are related but separable and qualitatively different. Put simply, 
revenue stability concerns the ability of a tax system to maintain rev-
enue yield year after year as economic activity and personal income 
fluctuate over the economic cycle. Policymakers and educators want 
some assurance that sufficient aggregate revenue will be available for 
our public schools as the economy goes through its inevitable cycles of 
boom and bust. Alongside this issue of aggregate school revenue level 
are district- and school-level concerns about the adequacy of educa-
tional resources. That is, does the finance system provide every local 
district with resources sufficient to enable all students in every school 
to meet the state’s standards of educational achievement? 
Certainly, the attainment of educational adequacy is complicated 
by a myriad of issues, including enrollment fluctuations across dis-
tricts, the incidence of children with exceptional needs, variation in 
the prices of educational resources (especially classroom teachers), 
family and community influences on student learning, changing edu-
cational standards, and the efficiency with which schools employ their 
resources. Nevertheless, this issue has gained considerable traction 
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in school finance debates since the early 1990s, when states began to 
adopt school accountability programs, which the federal government 
tacitly endorsed with the 2001 reauthorization of the Title I legislation. 
commonly known as the No Child Left Behind Act. 
Under NCLB, schools and districts that fail to make AYP toward 
their respective state achievement goals for two consecutive years are 
subject to a set of reforms and sanctions designed to improve student 
achievement. As we noted at the outset of this chapter, the scope of 
these reforms and sanctions widens as a school or district continues 
to fall short of AYP requirements. Schools may be subject to student 
transfers, the replacement of staff, or conversion to charter school sta-
tus, while districts may sustain funding reductions, staff replacement, 
or reorganization. This sharp focus on measured student achievement 
and school accountability has prompted more than 30 states to under-
take “education adequacy studies,” which seek to determine, or at least 
approximate, the amount of funding needed to provide all students with 
a reasonable opportunity to meet state achievement goals.14
No such study has been undertaken in Michigan, despite growing 
concern on the part of educators, parents, and some policymakers over 
the deteriorating financial condition of many of our public schools and 
declining levels of real state support. A history of Michigan’s aggregate 
school funding levels is depicted in Figure 2.4. The top line represents 
nominal dollars while the bottom depicts constant (1979) dollars, dis-
counted using the Detroit CPI.15 Our discussion will focus on constant 
dollars. Over the seven-year period from fiscal year 1978–79 through 
FY 1985–86, total real state and local revenue for public schools rose 
a mere 2.5 percent, an average annual compounded growth rate of less 
than 0.4 percent. This period was notable for the severe “double dip” 
recession spanning the period from 1979 to 1983. In the eight years 
preceding Michigan’s Proposal A reforms, FY 1986–87 through FY 
1993–94, total real revenue grew 19.7 percent, for an average annual 
growth rate of 2.27 percent. In the eight years following Proposal A, 
FY 1994–95 through FY 2002–03, total real revenue grew only 14.0 
percent, or an average annual growth rate of 1.66 percent.16 
Financing schools as jobs disappear
Aggregate revenue growth has slowed dramatically in recent years, 
with total real state and local revenue actually falling by 7.6 percent 
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between 2001–02 and 2007–08, an average annual loss of just over 1.1 
percent. Indeed, in recent years Michigan public schools have expe-
rienced fiscal pressures of a magnitude not seen in the state since the 
early 1980s. For districts beset by dramatic enrollment declines, rev-
enue losses are unprecedented. Some examples of urban school districts 
sustaining dramatic enrollment losses are given in Table 2.1.
This loss of real revenue for schools is attributable to two major 
factors. First, changes in Michigan’s tax system enacted since the adop-
tion of Proposal A have eroded the tax base and reduced school funding. 
These changes included the lowering of the state personal income tax, 
sales and use tax changes, changes in the state and local property tax, 
and economic development incentives. Drake (2002) estimated the 
cumulative revenue loss for schools resulting from these changes in our 
tax laws at nearly $2 billion between 1994 and 2002.17 Second, public 
school funding has suffered as Michigan’s manufacturing economy has 
slumped and collapsed. One telling indicator of this collapse is Michi-
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations and MDE Bulletin 1011, various years.
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Detroit 176,432 163,702 106,164 12,730 70,268 7.2 39.8
Flint 25,395 21,593 15,664 3,802 9,731 15.0 38.3
Pontiac 12,802 11,529 8,149 1,273 4,653 9.9 36.3
Saginaw 12,891 12,141 9,559 750 3,332 5.8 25.8
Grand Rapids 27,521 25,882 20,276 1,639 7,245 6.0 26.3
Lansing 19,268 17,808 15,452 1,460 3,816 7.6 19.8
Benton Harbor 5,810 5,146 3,751 664 2,059 11.4 35.4
Battle Creek 8,607 8,011 6,569 596 2,038 6.9 23.7
Marquette 4,510 3,765 3,295 745 1,215 16.5 26.9
Muskegon 7,140 6,655 5,665 485 1,475 6.8 20.7
SOURCE: MDE Bulletin 1014, various years.
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gan’s declining employment level. The state’s job figures since 1999 are 
given in Figure 2.5.
Between May 2000 and July 2009, the Michigan economy shed 
880,000 jobs, including an astounding loss of 386,000 jobs during the 
last 12 months of this long decline. Well over half of these losses were 
well-paid manufacturing jobs. As a result, 2009 was the worst year of 
real loss in gross domestic product (GDP) in our decade-long slide. And 
while the steep job loss abated somewhat in 2010, Michigan’s unem-
ployment rate continues to exceed the national rate by a wide margin.
In Figure 2.6, we compare the Michigan and U.S. unemployment 
rates during the state’s “lost decade.” The unemployment rate is the 
percentage of people in the labor force (i.e., people working or actively 
looking for work) who cannot find work. This means, of course, that 
this statistic understates the unemployment problem because it over-
looks the “discouraged workers,” who have given up their job search. 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
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Keeping this limitation in mind, we can see that Michigan’s unemploy-
ment rate tends to move in the same direction as the national rate but 
is more volatile, peaking at 13.3 percent in 2009, a full four percentage 
points above the national rate. And although Michigan’s rate dropped 
to 12.5 percent in 2010 while the national rate continued to rise, Michi-
gan’s economy continues to struggle and the short-term outlook remains 
gloomy. Some manufacturing may return, but most of Michigan’s new 
jobs will be lower paid (O’Conner 2009). Decreased wages, along with 
tighter credit, will mean lower sales and income tax revenues for the 
state, while lower real estate values will depress property tax collections 
for the state and local governments. Finally, the state can expect fewer 
taxpayers to fund state and local treasuries. About 376,000 residents 
have left the state since 2000, and the exodus is expected to continue 
in the coming years as other states, less tied to auto manufacturing, 
rebound more quickly from the great recession.
Figure 2.6  u.S. and Michigan unemployment Rates, 2000–09 (%)
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Fund balances
As we noted earlier, a school district’s financial condition cannot 
be neatly summed up in a single statistic. For example, per pupil rev-
enue, an oft-cited figure in school finance discussions, may conceal the 
true condition of a district if not supplemented by data on enrollment 
trends. A district with high per pupil revenue may well find itself in a 
precarious financial position if beset by substantial enrollment declines. 
A more revealing indicator is a school district’s fund balance; that is, 
the district’s savings account or financial reserves (the proverbial rainy 
day fund). Generally expressed as a percentage of a district’s annual 
operating expenditures, the fund balance indicates a district’s ability to 
maintain educational programs in the event that operating revenue falls, 
whether through reductions in per pupil state aid, enrollment loss, or a 
precipitous rise in costs, such as health care, pension, or energy costs. 
These funds have been particularly important for school districts in 
recent years as state “executive orders” have reduced school aid in mid-
year, after budgets have been adopted, contracts signed, and programs 
initiated. The availability of a fund balance to offset such midyear cuts 
in state support allows districts to maintain programs and services to 
year’s end, thus avoiding disruptive layoffs and program cancellations. 
Since the 1994 finance reforms, which essentially eliminated local mill-
age increases, fund balance has played a more important role in K–12 
school finance. Statewide aggregate fund balances for traditional dis-
tricts and public school academies (PSAs) are given in Figure 2.7 for 
the years 1993–94 through 2007–08.
As the figure shows, fund balances of Michigan school districts 
began rising immediately following the Proposal A reforms and reached 
record levels in 1998 and 1999. The substantial increase in fund bal-
ances in 1998 was partly attributable to the state settlement of Durant	
et	al.	v.	State	of	Michigan	(1997).18 More importantly, however, school 
leaders understood that the Proposal A reforms compelled districts to 
retain larger fund balances than those of the pre–Proposal A era. First, 
implementing legislation virtually eliminated the authority of local 
districts to ask voters for additional operating millage. Second, this leg-
islation also established a state aid payment schedule that called for 11 
equal monthly allocations to the districts, with no payment in Septem-
ber. In order to limit borrowing costs, districts try to build fund balances 
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in advance of their fall school opening. Finally, school districts now 
rely on the state for about 80 percent of their operating funding, making 
them much more vulnerable to the vagaries of state revenue collections, 
appropriations, and payment schedules. Prudent financial management 
under such uncertain circumstances requires bigger bank balances to 
absorb state funding cuts and lower borrowing costs. Indeed, the Michi-
gan School Business Officials Web site recommends a fund balance of 
between 15 and 20 percent for local districts.19
As Figure 2.7 reveals, district fund balances have fallen steadily 
since 2002, as districts have sought to protect their educational pro-
grams in the face of declining state support. At the same time, however, 
while some districts have drawn down their fund balances to main-
tain academic programs, others have done the reverse, cutting back on 
school programs in order to preserve fund balances as protection against 
Figure 2.7  Total Fund balance as Percentage of Current Operating 
Expenditures—Traditional Districts and Public School 
Academies
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the possibility of more draconian aid reductions in the future. Even a 
substantial fund balance, by itself, is hardly conclusive evidence of an 
educationally thriving school district. On the contrary, high balances 
may reflect the pessimism of local educational leaders over the state’s 
ability or willingness to support their schools. And fund balances are 
undoubtedly smaller today as schools enter the 2011–12 academic year. 
Addonizio and Drake (2005) find that the best predictor of changes in a 
district’s fund balance is enrollment change.
Deficit Districts
Another rough indicator of the financial condition of Michigan’s 
public school districts is the number of districts ending each fiscal year 
with an operating budget deficit. Although perhaps less telling than 
trends in district fund balances, the annual lists of deficit school districts 
trigger state oversight of the financial management of these districts. 
Specifically, deficit districts must submit a deficit elimination plan and 
monthly budget control reports to the Michigan Department of Educa-
tion (MDE). 
A history of the number of deficit districts is given in Figure 2.8. 
Separate totals are given for traditional districts and PSAs. Several 
observations can be made on these data. First, although the rise in the 
number of traditional deficit districts reflects the declining enrollments 
and revenues experienced by some districts since the advent of Michi-
gan’s current economic slide in 2001, these recent deficit district counts 
are much lower than those experienced during the 1979–83 recession. 
Second, the numbers for PSAs are particularly difficult to interpret; 
many are quite small and comparatively new. The spike in deficit PSAs 
in 1996–97 may well reflect an abundance of new schools facing rela-
tively large start-up costs, which must often be covered with operating 
revenue since PSAs cannot levy property taxes for either capital or 
operating expenses.
Ultimately, the number of deficit districts provides only limited 
insight into the financial condition of Michigan public schools. Cer-
tainly, districts in deficit are experiencing serious financial stress, but a 
balanced operating budget is no proof of financial health. Rather, it may 
well reflect sound management of declining resources. The books are 
balanced through reductions in educational programs and other oper-
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ating expenditures, but the educational costs of these cutbacks, while 
rarely estimated, may be substantial. 
Financing the Retirement System: A Looming Crisis
Among the major changes in K–12 finance ushered in with Proposal 
A was a reassignment of responsibility for funding the school retirement 
system. Prior to the implementation of Proposal A in 1995, state govern-
ment and local school districts shared the cost of the employer portion 
of contributions to the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement 
System (MPSERS). These contributions, expressed as a percentage of 
employee payroll, prefunded the actuarial costs of the defined benefit 
plan of public school employees and covered the costs of retiree health 
benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis.20 After Proposal A, full responsibil-
ity for retirement costs was assigned to local districts. So, just as local 
Figure 2.8  History of Deficit Districts
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school districts essentially lost their authority to raise operating revenue 
on their own, they were given additional financial responsibility for a 
large and rapidly rising cost.
After falling from 1996–97 through 1998–99, retirement costs as a 
percentage of current payroll have risen significantly, from 10.77 percent 
in 1998–99 to 16.5 percent in 2008–09. This rate history is presented 
in Figure 2.9. Indeed, the escalation in contribution rates would have 
been even more precipitous had it not been for an accounting “sleight 
of hand” executed in 1997 and again in 2007, when the state, follow-
ing several years of strong investment earnings, reset the valuation of 
MPSERS assets to market value. These “mark to market” adjustments 
substantially reduced required pension payments by school districts, 
but provided only temporary relief. Following the 1997 and 2007 cal-
culation changes, the state resumed its standard five-year “smoothing” 
Figure 2.9  Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System 
School District Contribution Rates, Fy 1995–96 through Fy 
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calculation of valuation assets, a practice designed to attenuate annual 
fluctuations in the contribution percentage. And the schools’ pension 
and health care costs will continue to climb faster than their revenues 
in the foreseeable future. According to the Citizens Research Council 
of Michigan (2004), the schools’ combined contribution rate will rise to 
about 32 percent of payroll by 2020.
Impact on school district budgets
In the absence of reforms designed to curb the district’s spiral-
ing retirement costs, the outlook for K–12 education budgets is bleak 
indeed. As noted earlier, increases in the state foundation grant have 
been very modest in recent years. Indeed, since 2003, much of these 
increases have been claimed by rising pension and health care obliga-
tions. The result, of course, is mounting pressure on school districts’ 
instructional budgets. Contribution costs from MPSERS expressed in 
per pupil terms are presented in Figure 2.10. 
Measured in per pupil terms, school district retirement costs 
have nearly doubled over this nine-year period, rising from $538 in 
1998–1999 to $992 in 2007–08. Over this same period, the state basic 
foundation allowance rose $1,742. By this measure, fully 26 percent of 
the foundation increase has been consumed by rising retirement costs. 
And while future annual increases in the foundation allowance are far 
from certain, particularly in the near term, school district retirement 
costs are projected to rise steadily (Citizens Research Council of Michi-
gan 2004).
Capital Funding
In recent years, there has been growing concern over the conditions 
of public school facilities and the ability or willingness of states and local 
districts to ensure that all children have access to adequate school build-
ings in the United States (Plummer 2006). A series of reports reveal a 
substantial and growing deficit in our elementary and secondary school 
capital stock across the nation. For example, a study by the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in 2000 finds that three-quarters 
of schools in the United States reported that repairs, renovations, and 
modernizations were required to bring their school buildings up to good 
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condition. And in recent years, school finance litigation across the states 
has cited inequities in school facilities when challenging the constitu-
tionality of school funding systems (Plummer 2006). The problem of 
financing school capital expenditures is particularly acute in Michigan. 
In a 2005 study, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan and the 
Educational Policy Center estimate the cost of unmet capital needs in 
Michigan public schools at $8.9 billion, with about one-fourth of this 
need found in five low-income, central-city school districts: 1) Battle 
Creek, 2) Detroit, 3) Flint, 4) Muskegon, and 5) Saginaw (Arsen et al. 
2005).21 
It is no coincidence that the greatest unmet capital needs are in our 
state’s most property-poor districts. Michigan is 1 of only 12 states that 
provide no aid to local school districts for capital projects (Duncombe 
and Wang 2009).22 The state did provide aid to partially equalize local 
Figure 2.10  Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System 
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district capital millage until 1980, when this aid program fell victim to 
state budget cuts, and has given no such grant support since then. And 
this issue was not addressed by the Proposal A reforms of 1994. Conse-
quently, school districts are obliged to fund capital projects from local 
resources: cash reserves, building and site sinking funds, or, most com-
monly, the sale of long-term general obligation bonds. In the case of 
sinking funds or bond sales, the local district must rely exclusively on 
local property taxes to directly finance their school construction proj-
ects or cover debt service payments. In the absence of any equalization 
aid from the state, property-poor districts face exceptionally high tax 
burdens when servicing bonds. 
The sole form of assistance from the state is provided through the 
School Bond Loan Program, wherein eligible districts can borrow from 
the state to help make principal and interest payments on their bonds. 
This state assistance, however, does not become available until a dis-
trict’s taxpayers are levying fully 13 mills to service their bonds, and 
because these funds must be paid back to the state, eligible districts 
must continue to levy this 13-mill rate until the loan is repaid. Tax-
payers in Detroit, for example, will be paying 13 mills annually for 
capital spending over a period of no less than 25 years as a result of 
local voters’ passage of a $1.5 billion bond issue in 1994. This debt was 
extended in November 2009 with voter approval of another bond issue 
for school rebuilding in Detroit.
The inequity in Michigan school capital funding cannot be over-
stated. Duncombe and Wang (2009), using two different measures of 
funding inequality, rank Michigan 39th and 40th, respectively, among 
48 states. Their analysis fails to capture another important dimension of 
Michigan’s capital spending problem: property-rich districts are able to 
finance new school buildings while levying relatively modest millage 
rates and	then	add	to	their	enrollments	and	operating	revenue	through	
Michigan’s	 “schools	 of	 choice”	 program. Conversely, property-poor 
districts with inferior school facilities are drained of enrollments and 
operating revenue as their resident students are lured away by the new 
facilities in neighboring districts. These compounding inequities render 
our school capital funding system indefensible. Standard formulas for 
state participation in school capital funding are well known, since the 
great majority of states employ them. Michigan needs to join the main-
stream and provide every child with a decent public school.    
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SuMMARy AnD COnCLuSIOnS
Michigan’s major school finance reforms began dramatically in 
1993 with the elimination of local property taxes for school operations, 
and culminated in 1994 with voter approval of a constitutional amend-
ment (Proposal A) that increased the state sales tax and earmarked the 
added revenue for the schools. These and other reforms, including the 
replacement of a guaranteed tax base aid formula with a foundation 
formula, succeeded in reducing both property tax burdens and differ-
ences among districts in per pupil funding. For a time, the changes were 
applauded by both taxpayers and educators alike.
The promise of Proposal A, however, has come and gone. In recent 
years, public schools in Michigan have experienced fiscal pressures of 
a magnitude not seen in the state in more than 40 years. One source of 
fiscal pressure was the 1999 passage of a series of rate cuts in the indi-
vidual income tax and business taxes. These tax cuts, passed during a 
period of robust economic growth, were partially offset by increases in 
the cigarette tax and the expansion of state lottery games. Nevertheless, 
the tax cuts had two important effects on the state’s ability to support 
public services, including education. First, the cuts made the state’s tax 
structure more regressive, with effective tax rates rising for low-income 
households and falling for high-income households. Second, they 
opened a structural gap between state revenues and state spending. This 
gap will not be closed by a return to a “full employment” economy—it 
can be closed only by budget cuts, tax increases, or some combination 
of the two.
A more potent source of fiscal pressure, however, has been the unre-
lenting decline in the Michigan economy. Between May 2000 and July 
2009, the Michigan economy shed 880,000 jobs, including an astonish-
ing 386,000 jobs during the last 12 months of this period. More than 
half of these losses were well-paid manufacturing jobs. The impact of 
this economic decline on state tax collections and K–12 support has 
been severe. Real, inflation-adjusted aggregate revenue for our public 
schools fell by 7.6 percent between 2001–02 and 2007–08. Urban dis-
tricts, beset by severe enrollment declines, have been particularly hard 
hit. District fund balances, which had been built up in the late 1990s, 
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have steadily declined since 2002, while district retirement costs have 
spiraled upward.
The Impending Financial Storm
As this book is being written and schools approach the midpoint 
of their 2010–11 fiscal year, school administrators confront mount-
ing financial pressures unprecedented in their professional experience. 
A $165 cut in per pupil foundation funding imposed in FY 2009–10 
essentially remains in effect, as the regular FY 2010–11 appropriation 
restored a mere $11 per pupil for this year and last. This legislation also 
raised the districts’ retirement rate from 16.94 percent to 19.41 per-
cent of payroll, costing schools an additional $255 million. And while 
a supplemental appropriation reinstated the remaining $154 per pupil 
to district foundation allowances along with additional payments rang-
ing from $23 to $46, these are but one-time payouts of federal stimulus 
funds.
All evidence points to further school revenue losses in the coming 
year, as Governor Rick Snyder and the new legislature face a projected 
$1.6 billion general fund budget deficit and federal stimulus funding 
runs out. In the face of these looming cutbacks in school funding and 
rising pension costs, many districts will continue to reduce their spend-
ing, possibly managing to cut costs through sharing or privatizing some 
services, but also eliminating programs and allowing class sizes to 
continue their upward drift. As districts continue to draw down fund 
balances in order to limit teacher layoffs and service cutbacks, they will 
jeopardize their credit ratings and their ability to absorb state funding 
cuts in future years, and more districts will fall into deficit. 
This scenario of unrelenting contraction will continue to unfold 
until the state provides the public schools with additional tax revenues. 
This will require more than economic recovery for the state. A struc-
tural overhaul of our state and local tax system is needed to adequately 
fund our public schools. While Michigan’s economy has contracted 
in recent years, tax revenues have shrunk much more rapidly; broad-
based tax rate reductions and selective tax abatements, combined with 
an antiquated sales tax that leaves our growing service sector largely 
untouched, have eroded funding for education at all levels (Ballard 
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2010). Whether our state leaders can summon the political will to repair 
these structural flaws in our tax system remains an open question.
Money and Schools: A Final Word
Although experience has shown that money and school perfor-
mance are not perfectly or even closely correlated, the steady erosion 
of the financial position of Michigan’s public schools since 2001–02 
has undoubtedly impaired the quality of educational programs across 
the state. Money is not the solution to all problems that plague our 
poorly performing schools, including many of our urban schools that 
suffer from unstable leadership, conflicting political agendas of those 
in authority, and ineffective staff. In these situations, money is often 
wasted, and any influx of new funding would accomplish little in the 
absence of effective leadership, shared vision, collaboration, and other 
organizational attributes that money can’t buy. Further, we understand 
that an organization can often take advantage of a funding reduction 
to eliminate inefficient programs and practices, even those previously 
considered “sacred cows,” and adopt needed reforms.
At the same time, however, the unrelenting cutbacks in real fund-
ing levels of the sort experienced by many Michigan school districts 
over the last six years, particularly the massive revenue losses sustained 
by some of Michigan’s poorest inner-city districts, can only endanger 
their educational mission. Moreover, Michigan’s precipitous economic 
decline has seriously impaired the well-being of families and children, 
along with the ability of state and local government to support them 
through programs in areas such as housing, health, income support, 
and social services. We must understand that families and children are 
themselves vital school resources and that “nonschool” policies and cir-
cumstances impacting their welfare will inevitably impact educational 
outcomes as well. 
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notes
1. Much of the controversy stems from the report’s flawed analysis of the economic 
impact of school quality. Specifically, the report attributed the stagnant productiv-
ity of the U.S. economy in the early 1980s in large part to poor school quality as 
evidenced by low student scores on standardized achievement tests. As we now 
know, however, neither the economic recovery of the mid-1980s nor the unprec-
edented economic growth of the 1994–2001 period can be explained by changes 
in our public schools or rising test scores. Changes in the macro economy occur 
much too suddenly to be explained by the quality of such a slow-to-change institu-
tion as our public schools. Poor planning and investment decisions in the private 
and public sectors, rising international trade and political factors were responsible 
for the deep recession examined in the report (Murnane 1988). 
2. For an analysis of the role of the courts in school finance litigation, see, for 
example, Eastman (2007). For a stinging critique of the scientific validity of the 
costing-out studies, see Hanushek (2007).
3. For a brief description of public school governance and finance in these early 
years, see Thomas (1968). 
4. A mill in Michigan is equivalent to a maximum of a dollar in tax paid per $2,000 
of market value.
5. This section draws upon Addonizio, Kearney, and Prince (1995, pp. 237–240).
6. Concurrently, and for the prior three years dating back to the end of Governor 
Blanchard’s administration, two grassroots efforts also had been under way. One, 
called KIDS, was an unsuccessful petition drive aimed at strengthening the edu-
cation clause of the Michigan Constitution. The second, known as the Olmstead/
Kearney (or “O/K”) Plan, was an initiative petition drive aimed at providing 
school finance reform through statutory change.
7. If it had been adopted by the voters, Proposal A of 1993 would have rolled back 
school property tax rates to 18 mills and established that rate by charter, provided 
for the district levying the full 18 mills a $4,800 per pupil foundation grant indexed 
to revenue growth, included in the $4,800 grant all existing state retirement and 
categorical payments to districts, provided a local option of an additional 9 mills 
equalized at $100 per pupil per mill, and raised the state sales tax from 4 percent 
to 6 percent.
8. Article IX, Section 26 reads, in part, “The revenue limit shall be equal to the 
product of the ratio of Total State Revenues in fiscal year 1978–79 divided by the 
Personal Income of Michigan in calendar year 1977 multiplied by the Personal 
Income of Michigan in either the prior calendar year or the average of Personal 
Income of Michigan in the previous three calendar years, whichever is greater.” 
The applicable ratio is 0.0949, or 9.49 percent.
9. For more detail on the alternative revenue plans, see Addonizio, Kearney, and 
Prince (1995).
10. The idea of a state property tax for public school operations was not new. It had 
been proposed in 1969 by a Governor’s Commission on Educational Reform. 
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11. The members of the task force, known as “Team 14” and consisting of 7 Democrats 
and 7 Republicans, were James Agee, Maxine Berman, Robert Brackenridge, 
William Bryant, Willis Bullard, Barbara Dobb, Robert Emerson, Don Gilmer, 
Lynn Jondahl, William Keith, Susan Grimes Munsell, James O’Neill, Glenn 
Oxender, and Ted Wallace.
12. Of course, the basic allowance may decline or remain unchanged from year to 
year, depending on the state’s revenue collections and appropriations decisions. 
For example, the basic allowance remained at $6,700 for fiscal years 2002–03, 
2003–04, and 2004–05.
13. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that special education programs are a 
state mandate and that the state had failed to fund such programs at the levels 
required by the state constitution. The court ordered the state to pay approximately 
$212 million in damages to the 84 plaintiff districts. Recognizing that nonplain-
tiff districts may have had equivalent claims for state compensation of mandated 
school costs, the legislature approved payments for both plaintiff districts and the 
approximately 500 eligible nonplaintiff local and intermediate districts. Plaintiffs 
were paid in full on April 15, 1998, while payments to nonplaintiffs were made 
over an extended time period. Total restitution exceeded $840 million. 
14. Some of these studies were ordered by the courts as part of school funding lawsuits 
(e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, New York, Ohio, and Wyoming), while others have been 
initiated by state legislatures or sponsored by school organizations in anticipation 
of litigation (Rebell 2006).
15. FY 1978–79 is chosen as the base year because it was the first year for which the 
so-called Headlee Amendment was in effect. Adopted by Michigan voters in 1978, 
this substantial tax limitation amendment to Article IX of the Michigan Constitu-
tion imposed new constraints on K–12 funding. Specifically, Section 31 of the 
amendment requires millage rate reductions in districts where property assess-
ments rise faster than the rate of inflation. Such “rollbacks” were commonplace 
following passage of the amendment.
16. Revenue growth slowed over this period despite the remarkable 12.4 percent 
increase in aggregate nominal school funding appropriated by the legislature for 
1994–95, the first year of the Proposal A reforms. This generous increase was 
clearly intended as a sweetener to bolster public support for the reforms.
17. The biggest school revenue loss, nearly $700 million, came from the phased 
reduction of Michigan’s income tax rate from 4.4 percent to 3.9 percent. When 
enacting these cuts, the legislature protected the School Aid Fund (SAF) from rev-
enue loss by increasing the percentage of income tax revenue earmarked for SAF. 
This meant, however, that the General Fund, General Purpose (GFGP) fund would 
absorb the loss, resulting in less GFGP support for public schools.  
18. In that decision, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the state had failed to fund 
special education at the level required by the state constitution and ordered the 
state to pay approximately $212 million in damages to 84 plaintiff districts. Rec-
ognizing that nonplaintiff districts undoubtedly had equivalent claims against the 
state, the legislature approved payments for plaintiffs and nonplaintiffs alike, with 
total payments exceeding $840 million.
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19. http://www.msbo.org/pdf/2004/FundBalInfo.pdf (accessed October 3, 2009).
20. The Michigan Constitution requires that pension benefits be prefunded and that 
any unfunded liability be amortized. No such requirement exists for health ben-
efits and prefunding of health benefits is not standard practice (Citizens Research 
Council 2004).
21. While this estimate of unmet school facility need is substantial, the authors point 
out that if these capital expenditures were financed through the sale of 30-year 
bonds at 5 percent interest, the state’s annual school spending would rise by less 
than five percent (Arsen et al. 2005).
22. The other states are Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, 






For both Michigan and the entire nation, No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB), the landmark federal legislation adopted with great fanfare 
in January of 2002, is the sine	qua	non of school accountability pro-
grams—at least until it is amended by the Congress in a forthcoming 
reauthorization. To fully appreciate the act’s current import for public 
education in Michigan and the nation, one must first venture back a bit 
into the history of both U.S. and Michigan education, and look briefly at 
the act’s many antecedents, for NCLB did not arrive de	novo in 2002 on 
the public education scene. It is, in many important ways, the product 
of a broad array of progenitors stretching back to at least the late 1950s, 
and as far as Michigan is concerned, even back to the early nineteenth 
century. 
For our present purposes, the signal historical event might well 
have been the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the immediate events that 
followed, beginning with the passage of the National Defense Educa-
tion Act (NDEA) in 1958. The adoption of the NDEA was a response 
to the fear that Russian schools had become superior to America’s pub-
lic schools in mathematics and science, that something had to be done 
immediately to regain that superiority, and that a program of federal aid 
was an absolute necessity if our schools were to regain their advanced 
educational position. At the federal level, the NDEA was soon followed 
in 1965 by the adoption of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA), signaling the creation for the first time of a broadly conceived 
federal program of financial assistance to the nation’s elementary and 
secondary schools, unprecedented in size and scope. The adoption of 
the ESEA also marked the beginning of a bevy of public and private 
educational reform efforts at the national level, at the state level, and 
at local school district and school levels, eventually culminating in the 
adoption of NCLB in 2002. 
It is to NCLB and EducationYES!, the parallel accountability effort 
in Michigan, that we give our major attention in this chapter. But to 
do this well, to fully understand NCLB and EducationYES! (as well 
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as its present successor, MI-SAAS), we must first attend to two tasks 
we identified in our opening paragraph. We need to trace briefly the 
historical roots of EducationYES!—roots that for Michigan educa-
tion stretch back over the 140-year period that predates the launch of 
Sputnik in 1957. Second, we need to set NCLB and EducationYES! 
into the larger framework of what has become a 50-year multicompo-
nent	and nationwide effort to reform and improve American education. 
Only then can we move on to address and fully appreciate the events of 
the immediate past. In order to cover this total span of some 200 years 
in a somewhat coherent manner, we arbitrarily have divided those years 
into three overlapping periods: 1) 1805–1900—the territorial years and 
early years of statehood; 2) 1900–50—the first half of the twentieth 
century; and 3) 1950 to the present—the period that will command our 
major attention.
However, before we begin, it is best to offer an opening statement or 
description of what we mean by the term accountability. Common dic-
tionary entries define accountability as “being responsible, answerable, 
capable of being explained.”1 But perhaps a better and more publicly 
accepted understanding of the term, particularly as it is applied to public 
education, comes from educational historian Raymond Callahan, who 
equates the term accountability with the term efficiency. In his 1964 
seminal work, Education	and	 the	Cult	of	Efficiency,	Callahan	 identi-
fies efficiency as the maxim often claimed to be the basic premise of 
American manufacturing, namely, “the finest product at the lowest cost” 
(p. 234). He further notes that, in his view, it is a premise where the 
emphasis all too often was placed more on lowest cost rather than finest 
product. Callahan’s opinion on the matter, as far as public education 
is concerned, is perhaps best epitomized in a comment one still often 
hears from contemporary educational reformers of a conservative bent, 
namely, “there will be more money for education when there is more 
education for the money” (Doyle and Levine 1985, p. 113). As Callahan 
observes, referring to an October 1958 article in Fortune magazine,
“the schools were [seen as] no different from General Motors for their 
job was to ‘optimize the number of students and to minimize the input 
of man-hours and capital’” (p. 254). 
It was well into the third time period—the late 1950s to the pres-
ent— before the emphasis began to shift appreciably and give increasing 
weight to the second half of the efficiency maxim, the finest product. 
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But we get ahead of ourselves. We turn now to take a brief look at the 
initial period of time: 1805–1900—the territorial years and early years 
of statehood. Then we move on to an even briefer look at the second 
time period: 1900–1950—the first half of the twentieth century. Finally 
we take a more extended look at the third period—the late 1950s to the 
present. As we noted earlier, this last period will command our major 
attention.
1805–1900—THE TERRITORIAL yEARS AnD EARLy yEARS 
OF STATEHOOD
Public education in Michigan first arrived on the scene in 1817, 
when the territorial legislature authorized a general school system, 
organizing public education in the form of a primary school and an 
academy. But it was another 20 years and the granting of statehood 
in 1837 before any concrete steps were taken, starting with the estab-
lishment of the Office of State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
During the next two years, the state legislature adopted a spate of legis-
lation, including the establishment of school districts in each township, 
a requirement that school districts hold school for at least three months, 
and the provision of minimal funding of these schools afforded both by 
means of a Primary School Fund and the legislature’s granting of local 
authority to levy taxes to support these schools. This period also saw the 
establishment of the University of Michigan, and shortly thereafter the 
establishment of “branches” of the university, the veritable forerunners 
of Michigan’s present day high schools. This led, in 1848, to the actual 
establishment in Detroit of Michigan’s first public high school. 
Thirty-one years later, in 1869, the legislature solidified the state’s 
responsibility for providing some modicum of education by adopting a 
law requiring all public schools to be free and open without charge to 
the pupils of the district, followed in 1871 by the adoption of a compul-
sory education law requiring that all children between the ages of 8 and 
14 attend school at least 12 weeks each year. We might argue that these 
two statutes constituted Michigan’s first calls for accountability in edu-
cation—on the one hand, holding the state accountable for the provision 
of free and open public education, albeit for only three months, and 
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on the other hand, holding parents accountable for ensuring that their 
children attend school, again, albeit for only three months. Recalling 
Callahan’s comments about American manufacturing’s basic maxim, 
the 1871 Michigan legislature, to its credit, appears to have paid some 
minimal attention to both sides of the maxim, the lowest cost and the 
finest product.2 
School Accreditation 
In terms of accountability, the 1870s were somewhat remarkable 
in that the decade witnessed two important events that would hold sig-
nificant consequences for future accountability programs in Michigan 
as well as in some of the neighboring states. The first of these—and the 
more important, at least in terms of accountability—was the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s official establishment of its high school accreditation 
program in 1871, generally considered the first of its kind in the United 
States (Williams 1998, pp. 17–19). Under this program, the university 
began to grant “accreditation” to secondary schools providing prepara-
tion for university study, provided university faculty members judged 
them of high quality on the basis of site visits. Graduates of these 
accredited secondary schools were then eligible for admission to the 
University of Michigan on the basis of their diplomas rather than hav-
ing to undergo an entrance examination. 
The University of Michigan’s program eventually led, in 1895, 
to the founding of the North Central Association Commission on 
Accreditation and School Improvement (NCA CASI). The University 
of Michigan accreditation program, as we shall see in a later section, 
also was the forerunner of both the Michigan Accreditation Program 
(MAP I), established by the Michigan Department of Education (MDE) 
in 1988, and Michigan’s present state accountability program—Edu-
cationYes!, established in 2002. In this instance, there appears to be 
little question but that the ostensible concern of the early—and even 
later—proponents of school accreditation was more on the finest prod-
uct side of the aforementioned maxim. The accreditation of a school by 
the university as well as by the NCA CASI in surrounding states came 
to be seen as an assurance to parents and to the public that the school 
indeed was providing the finest product.
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The Kalamazoo Case
The second significant event of that period was the 1875 ruling 
by the Michigan Supreme Court in the now famous Kalamazoo case, 
namely, that the state had a right to levy taxes to support a complete sys-
tem of public education, including high schools and universities (Johns, 
Morphet, and Alexander 1983, p. 5). In effect, the ruling became a prec-
edent used by the plaintiffs’ attorneys to establish a basis for the public 
funding of the Kalamazoo High School, as well as prompting many 
Michigan townships to follow suit. The state had now assumed respon-
sibility—or accountability—for the provision of “open and free” public 
education through the high school years. Coupling this event with the 
immediately prior establishment of the University of Michigan Accred-
itation Program, it appears that the finest product side of the maxim had 
indeed become a paramount concern. However, as the years passed, and 
judging from Michigan’s—and several other states’—long and conten-
tious history with school finance reform, many enduring arguments 
arose over the meaning of free. One has to ask whether equal if not 
increasing emphasis was being placed on the lowest cost rather than the 
finest product side of the equation. In truth, what Michigan and a good 
many other states have witnessed over the years is something of a back 
and forth movement, a waxing and a waning, with the balance scales 
at one point in time tipping toward finest product and at another point 
toward lowest cost.
Before we leave this period, it is fitting to say a bit more about 
Michigan’s influence on school accreditation generally, an influence 
that, as we noted above, went far beyond the boundaries of Michigan, 
for the university’s school accreditation program was extended not only 
to secondary schools within the state but to others as well. By 1899, stu-
dents in some 187 high schools in 15 different states were eligible, by 
diploma alone, for admission to the University of Michigan (Williams 
1998). The Michigan Plan, as it came to be known, gathered supporters 
in other states and regions and eventually led in 1895 to the aforemen-
tioned meeting in Chicago at Northwestern University and the founding 
of the NCA CASI. Today, NCA CASI accredits schools and districts in 
19 states, the Navajo Nation, and the Department of Defense Depen-
dents Schools worldwide (NCA 2009).3 Thus, the decision some 138 
years ago by the University of Michigan to initiate a program of high 
48   Addonizio and Kearney
school accreditation had far-reaching effects and, we argue, effects that 
were for the most part intended to address the finest product side of the 
equation—even if, as we shall see, serious questions arose at later times 
about the effectiveness of school accreditation.
1900–50: THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWEnTIETH CEnTuRy
In terms of meaningful accountability programs in American public 
education, the 50-year period from 1900 to 1950 might best be summed 
up in two descriptive terms—Scientific	Management (Taylor 1911) and 
the Cult	of	Efficiency (Callahan 1964). Beginning in the early 1900s, 
American business, through the writings of Frederick Taylor, discov-
ered the efficiency expert and rapidly adopted Taylor’s new system 
of industrial management that fast became known as scientific man-
agement, or the “Taylor system.” Callahan vividly recounts the many 
efforts to adapt Taylor’s principles and introduce them into American 
education in the early years of the twentieth century.
This is the period that saw the rise of a group of educators who 
became known as “efficiency experts” or “engineers,” and the intro-
duction into the schools of a myriad of efficiency measures. These 
measures included the development of new achievement tests in lan-
guage arts and mathematics; scales for rating the efficiency of teachers; 
surveys of school systems undertaken by outside experts, usually pro-
fessors of administration from the colleges and schools of education; 
and the platoon schools that were first developed and implemented in 
Gary, Indiana. It was the period of records and reports, of educational 
cost accounting, of the educational balance sheet and child accounting. 
As Callahan (1964) points out, “ . . . no reasonable man can deny 
the advisability of applying certain business practices where they are 
appropriate to the work of the schools” (p. 177). But he also reminds us 
that these practices are at best a means to an end: providing “the best 
possible education for all of our children” (p. 177). During this period, 
the balance indeed had tipped heavily toward the lowest cost side of the 
equation. As Callahan notes, “When efficiency and economy are sought 
as ends in themselves, as they were in education in the age of efficiency 
. . . the education of children is bound to suffer. The same thing is true 
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regarding certain business values. A concern about the wise expenditure 
of funds and the avoidance of waste is as desirable in education as it is 
in business. But a ‘wise’ expenditure of funds depends on the outcomes 
which are expected or, in business terms, the quality of the product 
desired” (pp. 177–178).
Schools in Michigan and throughout the nation were not immune 
to this somewhat inordinate preoccupation with the “cult of efficiency.” 
But, beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, because of rising pub-
lic concerns about the quality of America’s schools, events soon led 
toward righting the balance and the placing of increased weight on the 
finest product side of the equation. It is to this period we now turn. 
THE LATE 1950s TO THE PRESEnT
growing Calls for Information on Performance
In the previous section we recounted the University of Michigan’s 
establishment of the nation’s first high school accreditation program 
in 1871. The Michigan Plan, as it came to be known, soon gathered 
supporters in other states and regions and led to the founding of the 
NCA CASI in 1895. For the most part, both the Michigan Plan and 
NCA CASI appeared to address the finest product side of Callahan’s 
equation, as the many proponents of accreditation staunchly claimed up 
through the 1950s and early 1960s. 
However, in the mid-1960s doubts and concerns began to creep in, 
centered largely on accreditation’s seemingly restricted focus on the 
“inputs” of schooling, with scant attention being paid to the “outputs” 
of schooling. Critics began to cite numerous examples of accredited 
high schools—particularly in Detroit and other urban districts—falling 
far short in their attention to or success with the finest product side of 
the equation. Serious and growing concerns were raised—by parents, 
legislators, and the general public—about the quality of schooling and, 
in many instances, the apparent failure of accredited high schools to 
provide their graduates (or nongraduates for that matter) with the most 
basic of skills in academic areas such as reading, writing, mathematics, 
science, and social studies. 
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But accreditation wasn’t the only culprit, perhaps just one of the 
more visible targets. There arose a growing concern and dissatisfaction 
with American public education, particularly with the American high 
school. This discontent was being voiced in the media, in educational 
and secular journals, in public reports, and in any number of published 
books and monographs, which led to increasing calls for reforms aimed 
primarily at the finest product side of Callahan’s maxim. Still there 
were substantial disagreements among the many voices calling for the 
reform of the American high school (Angus and Mirel 1999). On one 
side, there were those who supported the views of James B. Conant, 
the former president of Harvard University. Conant strongly favored a 
strengthening of the comprehensive high school and its central theme of 
curricular differentiation, providing students of different abilities with 
a wide range of courses and programs attuned to their interests and 
abilities (Conant 1959a,b; 1961). On the other side, there was a siz-
able group of advocates who championed the views of scholars such as 
Arthur Bestor (1985) and saw curricular differentiation as the crux of the 
problem. From this group came the call for state legislatures across the 
nation to adopt rigorous and demanding high school graduation require-
ments, to do away with what Powell, Farrar, and Cohen (1985) called 
“the shopping mall high school.” Central to all of these arguments was 
the apparent lack of meaningful and readily available information on 
the academic performance of students. This shortfall very soon became 
the focal point of the critics’ dissatisfactions—in effect, there arose a 
mounting cry for information about the finest product side. 
It was during this time—the early 1960s—that efforts got under 
way at the federal level to address these demands for information on stu-
dent achievement through the creation and development of the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), soon to become known 
as the Nation’s Report Card. It also was at this same time that Michigan, 
in the persons of the superintendent of public instruction and staff mem-
bers in the education department’s newly formed Bureau of Research, 
began to lose faith in input-oriented school accreditation and turned 
their attention instead toward the outcome side, the finest product side, 
toward creating a system to annually gather and report information on 
the academic performance of students in Michigan’s public schools. 
In a series of policy briefs, bureau staff outlined what they saw as the 
problem and offered their suggested solution, namely, the creation of 
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a statewide educational assessment program, beginning with reading 
and mathematics at grades 4 and 7. In a series of three public memo-
randa, Ira Polley, the then state superintendent of public instruction, 
transmitted the staff proposal to the Michigan State Board of Education 
(SBE). In April of 1969, the SBE responded by directing Polley “to 
prepare and submit appropriate legislation for the periodic assessment 
of educational progress in the public elementary and secondary schools 
of Michigan” (Kearney, Crowson, and Wilbur 1970, p. 16). Thus was 
born the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP), one of, 
if not the, nation’s first statewide assessment programs, soon to be fol-
lowed by similar programs in a growing number of other states. In the 
next chapter, we discuss at some length the creation, implementation, 
and further development of the program over the past 40 years. But 
we leave the MEAP for now, and instead shift our focus to Michigan’s 
broader effort to establish a statewide accountability program, an effort 
that followed rather immediately on the establishment of the MEAP. 
John Porter’s Six-Step Accountability Model
In October of 1969, John Porter replaced Ira Polley as the Michigan 
Superintendent of Public Instruction. Polley had been a strong voice in 
support of the development and implementation of the MEAP, the new 
state educational assessment program that was just getting under way. 
Initial fears were that the assessment program, with the loss of one its 
strongest supporters, might now “wither on the vine.” But if Polley was 
a strong supporter of the MEAP, John Porter became an ardent supporter 
not only of the MEAP but also of the more wide-ranging concept of 
educational accountability. The finest product side of the equation had 
truly come to the fore. In Porter’s view, accountability had two essen-
tial dimensions. He saw the first dimension as access to information 
about performance—which the MEAP would provide—and the second 
dimension as the ability to change those factors thought responsible 
for unsatisfactory performance—an ability yet to be realized. Porter 
summed up his view of educational accountability in these words: 
“ . . . the guarantee that all students without respect to race, income, or 
social class will acquire the minimum school skills necessary to take 
full advantage of the choices that accrue upon successful completion 
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of public schooling, or we in education will describe the reasons why” 
(Kearney 1971, p. 5).
As 1970 dawned, Porter moved quickly to begin development and 
implementation of a six-step process that came to be known as the 
Michigan Accountability Model. The six steps included the assessment 
program as step three, but added five other steps to the process:
1) identification of common goals,
2) development of performance objectives,
3) assessment of needs,
4) analysis of delivery systems,
5) evaluation of programs, and
6) recommendations for improvement.
These six steps were not in themselves novel, and one could rea-
sonably argue that, whether intuitively or consciously, they generally 
made up the problem solving and planning activities in which teach-
ers, administrators, and other educators regularly engaged. At the time, 
what was novel was Porter’s effort to gain commitment of a state’s 
entire educational system to a program of coordinated improvement, 
to what was one of the nation’s first state accountability systems. The 
extent to which the six-step program was successful is of course debat-
able, particularly with respect to the final three steps in the process. It 
is much easier to judge the success of the first three steps, even though 
their initial development and implementation appeared to be back-
ward, or chronologically reversed—logically, one would conclude that 
steps one and two should have preceded step three. But step three—
assessment—came first, well before the state had formally identified 
its common goals, and before it had developed performance objectives 
based on those common goals. For Porter and the Bureau of Research 
staff, this did not seem an insurmountable problem. They felt that steps 
one and two could be undertaken, completed, and then step three could 
be appropriately “tweaked,” that is, the necessary modifications could 
be made in the assessment measures themselves. But we leave to the 
next chapter judgments on the success of the approach of tweaking step 
three of the model, and turn now to visit briefly the development of 
steps one and two. 
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In early 1970, the SBE, at Porter’s behest, appointed an advisory 
task force composed of Michigan educators, parents, students, and 
other lay citizens, and gave the task force the charge of identifying and 
delineating what they felt should be the common goals of a state edu-
cational system capable of meeting the growing and changing needs 
of contemporary society. In June of 1970, the task force presented its 
recommendations to the SBE, which reviewed the recommendations 
and made revisions and additions. As a result, 30,000 copies of a docu-
ment entitled “The Common Goals of Michigan Education: Tentative” 
were printed and distributed to educators and citizens throughout the 
state. Twenty-six public meetings were held across Michigan to elicit 
the opinions and concerns of local educators and lay citizens regarding 
the common goals. Subsequently, the SBE, after reviewing the opinions 
and concerns and revising the goals, formally adopted the document in 
1971 and distributed it broadly throughout the state (MDE 1971). 
In effect, two of the six steps were now in place—step one and step 
three. At this point in our narrative, one might now raise some appropri-
ate questions: What has become of the “Common Goals of Michigan 
Education”	first adopted 40 years ago in 1971? What effects have the 
goals had on Michigan education? What direction did they provide to 
subsequent reform efforts? The simple answer is, “not much.” For the 
most part, the document has faded from view, and any remaining copies 
likely are gathering dust on bookshelves or are lost in filing cabinets.4 
But that may be unfairly dismissive. One could argue that the Com-
mon Goals did indeed serve a useful purpose. They demonstrated that 
the MDE, in its attempt to introduce sweeping reforms into Michigan 
education, intended to move in a logical and systematic fashion to build 
a genuine accountability system. To most it would seem to make good 
sense to establish goals, then translate them into specific performance 
objectives, then develop the instruments to measure the attainment of 
those objectives, and so on. At a minimum, the state of Michigan was 
able to demonstrate that it had identified its common educational goals 
(the nation didn’t do this until 1990), and ex	post, it could demonstrate 
connections between the goals and the actual performance objectives 
that later were developed. 
Over the next several years, the MDE did indeed develop a com-
prehensive set of performance objectives and, in turn, a new and 
improved set of assessment measures directly tied to those objectives. A 
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recounting of those efforts—which underlay the state’s movement from 
norm-referenced to objective-referenced tests in the MEAP, from group 
measures to individually reliable measures, from broad to increasing 
specificity in the performance objectives, from generalities to the estab-
lishment of grade-level expectations and benchmarks—are also best 
left to the next chapter, where we deal at length with the history of the 
MEAP over the past 40 years. 
One could reasonably argue that Porter’s accountability model 
has led to the annual production of a considerable amount of useful 
information on the academic performance of Michigan’s public school 
students. Nonetheless, this still leaves questions about what happened 
with steps four, five, and six of the Michigan Accountability Model. 
What became of them? What guidance and direction did they provide 
to Michigan’s ongoing efforts at reform? How useful were they as tools 
to help improve Michigan education? In this instance, one would have 
to argue that nothing specific came out of those three steps, which, like 
the “Common Goals,”	soon faded from view. Yet, in another sense, one 
also could argue that they were subsumed under larger efforts arising 
out of the state legislative reform mandates of the 1980s and the 1990s, 
and the even larger array of national reform activities and congressional 
mandates set in motion by the advent of the Reagan Administration and 
the National Commission on Excellence in Education’s publication of 
A	Nation	at	Risk in April of 1983. For it was the release of this report 
that served as the catalyst for generating renewed attention and action, 
at both state and national levels, to the problems and perceived short-
comings of America’s public schools. 
There are any number of excellent overviews of the multiple nation-
wide and statewide reform efforts that have transpired since the 1983 
release of A	Nation	at	Risk—accounts that are much more comprehen-
sive and much more detailed than any account we could provide within 
the limits of this current chapter.5 Consequently, rather than attempt to 
offer an extended review of these many and diverse efforts, we provide 
here only a brief and somewhat cursory review of that broad range of 
national and state-level activity. We trust that this brief review will help 
set the stage for the arrival of NCLB on the national scene in 2002, and 
concurrently EducationYES!	on the Michigan scene. 
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A Nation at Risk—Catalyst for nationwide Education Reform 
In the mid-1980s, then secretary of education Terrel Bell created 
an 18-member National Commission on Excellence in Education. The 
commission’s report, entitled A	Nation	at	Risk, did its job extremely 
well, capturing the nation’s attention with its eye-catching if not alarm-
ist opening statement: “. . . the educational foundations of our society 
are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens 
our very future as a Nation and a people . . . If an unfriendly power 
had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational perfor-
mance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war” 
(National Commission on Excellence 1983, p. 7). 
The publication of A	Nation	at	Risk helped jump-start what many 
have called the first wave of national (and state) reform—concentrat-
ing in general on such activities as strengthening requirements for high 
school graduation, developing minimal competency tests at both dis-
trict and state levels, and advocating and initiating merit-pay programs 
for teachers. Several more reform waves were to follow, brought on by 
follow-up gubernatorial actions at the state level as well as by further 
significant executive and congressional actions at the federal level. In 
Michigan, the state board’s response was to adopt its 1984 “Blueprint 
for Action,” calling for high school graduation requirements, school 
improvement plans, and a new state school accreditation system—the 
Michigan Accreditation Program (MAP I), which first became opera-
tional in 1988. 
At the federal level, in 1989, at the behest of the National Gover-
nors Association, newly elected President George H.W. Bush and the 
nation’s governors came together in a two-day educational summit in 
Charlottesville, Virginia. The outcome of the Charlottesville Educa-
tion Summit was an agreement to develop a set of National Education 
Goals—to wit, “an ambitious, realistic set of performance goals.” 
By performance goals we mean goals that will, if achieved, guar-
antee that we are internationally competitive, such as goals related 
to: the readiness of children to start school; the performance of stu-
dents on international achievement tests, especially in mathematics 
and science; the reduction of the dropout rate and the improvement 
of academic performance, especially among at risk students; the 
56   Addonizio and Kearney
functional literacy of adult Americans; the level of training neces-
sary to guarantee a competitive workforce; the supply of qualified 
teachers and up-to-date technology; and the establishment of safe, 
disciplined and drug free schools. (New	York	Times 1989)
Referring back to Callahan’s maxim, it appeared that President 
Bush and the nation’s governors were now placing increasing empha-
sis on the finest product. Subsequently, in his 1990 State of the Union 
address, President Bush announced the establishment of six National 
Educational Goals—six goals that, for the most part, directly reflected 
the language set forth above (Executive Office of the President 1990). 
Some months later, in the fall of 1990, agreement was reached with the 
Congress on the establishment of a 14-member bipartisan National Edu-
cational goals panel. In 1991, at the urging of Secretary of Education 
Lamar Alexander, the Congress took the next step and established the 
National Council on Education Standards and Testing (Ravitch 1995a). 
The goals panel and the six national goals themselves (now increased 
to eight) subsequently were formally established in law in 1994 during 
the Clinton Administration under the Goals 2000: Educate America Act 
(Public Law 1994). This act was intended to lay the groundwork for 
the development of state and national standards in education (Ravitch 
1995b). However, this effort failed to get off the ground, due in large 
part to concerns about federal intrusion into the long-held traditions of 
state and local control of education (an effort that was given new life 
in 2009 by action of the nation’s governors and education chiefs; see 
Chapter 4 in this volume). 
From these somewhat jumbled beginnings there followed any 
number of ensuing federal actions and activities aimed at the reform of 
American education, actions also aimed at complementing if not push-
ing further the reforms already under way in a number of states and 
local school districts, including Michigan. Of particular note was the 
movement or approach that became known as systemic school reform. 
The chief authors and advocates of this approach were Marshall Smith 
and Jennifer O’Day. They proposed a design for a systemic state struc-
ture that would be based on clear and challenging standards for student 
learning—standards for the finest product, if you will. State policies 
would be tied to the standards and reinforce one another in providing 
guidance to schools and teachers about student instruction. These poli-
cies in turn would provide a structure of coherent state leadership, while 
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at the same time giving schools the flexibility to develop learning strate-
gies best suited to their students. In effect, systemic education reform 
was intended to combine the “waves” of school reform into a long-
term improvement effort that would provide coherence and direction 
in state reform efforts and put substance and content into the restruc-
turing movement (Smith and O’Day 1990). It is not a huge leap from 
these beginnings to the reasoning behind the subsequent call by the 
U.S. Department of Education for each state to develop its own State 
Accountability Plan—a call that became the prime requirement under-
girding each state’s implementation of NCLB.	
The Demise of the Traditional Approach to Accreditation
Before we turn toward 2001 and the development of NCLB,	and the 
parallel development in Michigan of EducationYES!,	let us return for 
a moment to the mid-1980s and the University of Michigan accredita-
tion program, and its counterpart NCA program, which operated until 
1992 under the auspices of the university. For while the state superin-
tendent and the SBE, by their actions in initiating the MEAP in 1968, 
had turned their backs on the university’s and the NCA’s accreditation 
programs, those programs did not immediately go away. The University 
of Michigan program, as well as the NCA program, began in modest 
ways to incorporate into their ongoing plans attention to student perfor-
mance and student outcomes. Beginning in 1985 the university and its 
school of education assigned both programs to its newly formed Bureau 
of Accreditation and School Improvement Studies. In the bureau, the 
programs took on a somewhat rejuvenated life, focusing more atten-
tion on the outcomes side of the coin, and employing new information 
technologies in the collection, analysis, and reporting of accreditation-
related data to the schools and the public (Bureau of Accreditation and 
School Improvement Studies 1988). But the life of the University of 
Michigan program was fast coming to an end, and it finally gave up the 
ghost in 1993 upon recognizing that its program would soon become 
duplicative of the efforts of the SBE. 
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Public Act 25—A new Accountability Framework for Michigan
Complementing the spate of educational reform efforts at the 
national level briefly described above, state policymakers in Michigan 
set out on a somewhat parallel path. By the late 1980s, the state legis-
lature was expressing growing interest in educational accountability, so 
much so that in 1990 they passed Public Act 25, requiring the creation 
of a new accountability framework under which Michigan’s schools 
would operate. We say new in deference to the original accountabil-
ity framework established in 1970 under John Porter’s six-step process 
described earlier. But by the mid-1980s, as we noted earlier, and with 
the exception of steps two and three—i.e., the performance objectives 
and the assessment—the six-step process pretty much had fallen into 
disuse. 
The new legislation adopted in 1990 called for an accountabil-
ity framework consisting of four principal components: 1) school 
improvement, 2) a core curriculum, 3) accreditation, and 4) an annual 
education report. Under the school	 improvement component, schools 
were required to develop school improvement plans, establish school 
improvement teams, and measure progress toward the achievement 
of the plans’ objectives. Under component two, the state established 
a model core curriculum and proposed, but did not mandate, specific 
learning outcomes for all students. While the schools were encour-
aged to align their curricula with the model core curriculum, they were 
not required to do so. Rather, the legislation only required a district 
to notify its residents if the curriculum was not aligned. The SBE and 
the MDE developed the third component, accreditation, which became 
known as MAP II. Modeled on the beginning work done under MAP I, 
the new MAP II generally followed traditional approaches to accredi-
tation—schools were to be evaluated on the basis of their curricula, 
their staffing, their facilities, and whether they met the requirements 
of the school improvement process. The final component of Public Act 
25 required all schools to publish an annual education report informing 
their residents on how the schools were doing on student achievement, 
parent participation, accreditation status, and other factors relating to 
school improvement efforts. The law also required each school to hold 
a public meeting to review its annual report. 
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Even given these somewhat demanding mandates, policy analysts 
at one of the major state universities argued that the Public Act 25 leg-
islation suffered from a critical fault, namely, “ . . . the absence of any 
mechanism for assessing whether the school improvement process 
defined by the law was effective. Did schools that participated in man-
dated school improvement activities improve or not? Answering this 
question required a mechanism for assessing performance of students, 
schools and school districts” (Education Policy Center 2000).
The Michigan legislature moved to rectify this shortcoming in 
1995 by requiring that the accreditation component of the Public Act 
25 framework include information on student performance on the 
MEAP. This amendment placed the MEAP at the heart of standards-
based accountability in Michigan (Education Policy Center 2000). 
But even this amendment did not rejuvenate the state’s accreditation 
program (MAP II). The assessment data, of course, were there, but a 
number of troubling questions arose on how to restructure the MAP II 
program, and build a MAP III program in a way that would accommo-
date the MEAP data. How would cut scores be set?6 How would they be 
used to determine a school’s accreditation status? Would any informa-
tion other than the MEAP data enter into accreditation decisions? How 
would accreditation decisions be reported both to the schools and to the 
public? Questions such as these led to a series of ongoing discussions 
among senior staff in the MDE about how the department and the state 
board should respond. One such response, reportedly advocated by a 
senior staff member, proposed adopting a simple approach to accredita-
tion, namely, establishing a single MEAP cut score. Any school at or 
above the cut score would be accredited; any school below the score 
would not. 
The state board never voted on that proposal, or at the time seri-
ously considered any other alternatives. The board was having its own 
problems with Governor John Engler, who was challenging the author-
ity of the board on several fronts by issuing a number of executive 
orders transferring major functions of the board and the MDE to other 
departments of state government. Included in these executive orders 
was the transfer of the MEAP to the Treasury Department. Aside from 
the governor’s growing dissatisfaction with the state board, the osten-
sible rationale behind the transfer was that the Treasury Department 
administered the Michigan Merit Scholarship Program.7 Thus you had 
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the MDE responsible for MAP III, and while required to use the MEAP 
data to make accreditation decisions, the MEAP program itself now 
was lodged in a different department of state government. To further 
compound the problem, by executive order, the governor also created 
the Center for Educational Performance and Information and made 
it responsible for handling the MEAP data and related performance 
information on the schools. The state board and the MDE still had the 
accreditation responsibility, but were left without the MEAP and with-
out control over the data lode that it produced.
At the same time the pressures for information on academic per-
formance continued to rise, principally from the business community 
if not from the general public. The education community also became 
increasingly concerned about how the MEAP data would be used in 
making accreditation decisions and how those decisions would be 
shared with the public. 
EducationyES!—The beginnings 
So MAP III, one might say, was limping along, looking for the 
answers to such questions, when in early 2001 the SBE appointed Tom 
Watkins as Michigan’s new Superintendent of Public Instruction. Wat-
kins was not the traditional schoolman; rather, he brought to the role a 
diverse background with substantial leadership experiences in the for-
profit, nonprofit, and public sectors—including senior-level staff and 
executive positions in Michigan state government. He also had spent 
time in the early 1990s as “special assistant for school initiatives” to 
David Adamany, the president of Wayne State University. It was during 
that period that Watkins played a key role in creating Michigan’s first 
charter school—he was not completely bereft of experience in public 
education. 
One of Watkins’s first senior staff appointments was of Bill Bushaw 
as deputy superintendent and chief academic officer. Bushaw, at the 
time of his appointment, was the executive director of Michigan’s NCA 
program of accreditation and school improvement. He had shepherded 
that program’s spin-off from the University of Michigan in 1993 and its 
establishment as an independent and self-funded entity, installing it as 
an increasingly important player in Michigan public education. 
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Bushaw, in early conversations with Watkins, suggested that there 
was a more thoughtful way to go about responding to Public Act 25, to 
build a quality accreditation program using more than just the MEAP 
tests. Watkins gave Bushaw the green light, and Bushaw set out to 
fashion a design for a new state accreditation and accountability pro-
gram. Watkins and Bushaw also wanted to do it in a way that would not 
require opening up Public Act 25 to further amendment. 
Bushaw visited contemporaries in North Carolina, California, 
and Florida and talked with persons in those state education agencies 
who were building or had built state accountability programs, seeking 
advice and counsel based on their experiences. He also was interested 
in learning more about efforts under way in the assessment field to 
develop “growth models,” and he was particularly interested in the 
work of William Sanders (Sanders, Saxton, and Horn 1997) and his 
value-added assessment system. Bushaw believed that growth or value-
added accountability models could be an important element in the new 
Michigan system. Such models presumably would permit measuring 
the annual academic growth of individual students or groups of stu-
dents, in effect measuring what portion of a year’s academic growth 
they were achieving for each year of instruction. 
By late fall, working with fellow staff member Paul Bielawski and 
measurement consultant John Wick, Bushaw had produced an early 
draft of EducationYES! He shared this initial draft with the state board, 
seeking its review and comment. The board received the draft favor-
ably, and offered comments and suggestions for revision. In December 
of 2001, Bushaw presented a revised and more comprehensive pro-
posal to the state board. The board responded by giving the go-ahead 
for further development of EducationYES! and for public hearings on 
the proposal to be held in January 2002. Following the public hearings, 
Bushaw presented a further revision of the EducationYES! proposal to 
the SBE for its review. In March of 2002, the SBE formally approved 
the revised proposal. 
As originally conceived, the design behind the achievement por-
tion of EducationYES! was simple but elegant. At its heart, the design 
called for developing and reporting three separate measures of aca-
demic performance: 1) achievement status, 2) achievement change, and 
3) achievement growth. Achievement status, drawing on the MEAP, 
would measure and report how well a school was doing in educating its 
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students in designated subjects at designated grade levels in any given 
year. Specifically, it would report how many students had achieved pro-
ficiency in designated subjects.8 To ensure stability and reliability of the 
achievement status score, it would be based on a mean of three years of 
comparable MEAP data. 
Achievement change would measure and report this same informa-
tion over time, for example, how a school was doing from one year to 
the next in reading achievement for all of its fourth graders. To ensure 
stability and reliability of the achievement change score, it would be 
based on a mean of five years of comparable MEAP data. This also was 
the score that would be linked into the federal requirement for adequate 
yearly progress (AYP) under NCLB. But more about that later. 
Achievement growth, again drawing on the MEAP data and using 
an aforementioned growth or value-added model, would measure and 
report a score depicting how an individual student, or group of students, 
was progressing over time from grade level to grade level in, for exam-
ple, mathematics. In effect, achievement growth would report on the 
extent to which the school was adding value each year for each student 
going through the system. 
These three hard measures would then be complemented but not 
outweighed by a cluster of softer measures called performance indi-
cators. The design behind this portion of EducationYES! was not so 
simple or elegant, and later led to serious problems in measurement 
and reporting. The performance indicators themselves were intended to 
measure and report on a school’s performance in 11 areas, which con-
stituted a potpourri of indicators grouped into three clusters. 
The first cluster, indicators of engagement, covered three areas: 
1) performance management systems, 2) continuous improvement, 
and 3) curriculum alignment. The second cluster, indicators of instruc-
tional quality, covered four areas: 1) teacher quality and professional 
development, 2) extended learning opportunities, 3) arts education and 
humanities for all students, and 4) advanced course work. The third 
cluster, indicators of learning opportunities, covered four areas: 1) fam-
ily involvement, 2) student attendance and dropout rate, 3) four-year 
education and employment plan, and 4) school facilities. This hodge-
podge of three clusters and 11 areas carried some serious measurement 
problems. How, one might ask, could you develop a single valid and 
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reliable score out of this veritable mess? In effect, this design put the 
department into the catch-22 situation we describe below.9
All four scores—the three achievement scores and the performance 
indicators score—were to be weighted. The three achievement scores—
each of which was weighted at 22.33 percent—would thus constitute 
67 percent of a school’s total or composite score; the performance indi-
cators score would count for the remaining 33 percent of the school’s 
composite total score. All four scores—plus the composite total score—
would use a score scale of 0 to 100. The scores on each of the four 
components would be calculated and reported using the scaled score 
plus a label, that is, a grade of A, B, C, D, or F. These four scores would 
then be combined into a composite total score for the school, again 
expressed on a 0 to 100 scale along with a grade of A, B, C, D, or F. 
Thus, a given school, say, in 4th grade reading, would receive three 
scores and letter grades for achievement—status, change, and growth—
plus a score and letter grade for performance indicators. This same 
school might receive additional scores and letter grades, for example, 
in 7th grade mathematics—and perhaps in other academic areas at other 
grade levels. The designers assumed that all of these independent scores 
and letter grades could in turn be combined into a single composite total 
score and letter grade for the entire school. A school’s composite score 
and letter grades then were to be used in determining the school’s status 
in terms of AYP under NCLB, as well as the school’s Michigan accredi-
tation status—summary accredited, accredited, interim accredited, or 
nonaccredited. For each school, all of this information, summarized 
and appropriately formatted, would then constitute its Michigan school 
report card—released not only to the school and district but also to par-
ents, the legislature, the news media, and the general public. The annual 
release of the school report cards would ensure that each school and 
local district would become publicly accountable for its performance. 
The reader might conclude that the annual report card would provide 
a lot of information, but a lot of information not all that easy to absorb 
and understand.
As we noted above, the design appeared at first glance to be sim-
ple but elegant—at least as far as the achievement measures were 
concerned. Unfortunately, while a general design was there, the mea-
surement methodologies, as well as the processes and procedures 
needed to accomplish all of this, were neither spelled out nor avail-
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able. A substantial number of problems and questions remained to be 
addressed, including how to set the cut scores; how to determine A, B, 
C, D, or F grades for the achievement measures and the performance 
indicators; how to calculate the composite total score for a school; how 
to determine a school’s accreditation status; and how to measure and 
report growth or added value.
The performance indicators in particular presented serious prob-
lems. They were not to be objectively scored but rather self-reported. 
The design called for gathering data in each of the 11 areas but only 
calculating and reporting scores for the three clusters, plus a single 
total score and grade for the entire gamut of performance indicators. 
As originally conceived, it appears that the total performance indicators 
score and grade would serve in part to compensate for low achievement 
scores—one might say a sort of get out of jail free card.
But the most pressing problem facing the state board was how 
to align EducationYES!, the state’s accountability program, with the 
demanding requirements of NCLB, the federal government’s newly 
adopted accountability program, and particularly its requirement of 
AYP. And the timing, depending on one’s view, was either favorable or 
unfavorable, for the two programs had appeared almost concurrently on 
the educational scene. The Congress adopted the new federal legislation 
in January of 2002, the same month that the SBE was holding public 
hearings on the draft proposal of EducationYES! 
EducationyES!—The Accreditation Advisory Committee
In March of 2002, following the public hearings, the SBE approved 
the basic design of EducationYES! While the basic design set forth the 
general framework of EducationYES!, as we indicate above there was 
much work to do before the design could be fully fleshed out. With 
Watkins providing the organizational support, Bushaw, along with 
Bielawski and Wick, immediately undertook the task of refining and 
completing the design. To assist them in the task, at Watkins’s urging, 
the SBE in April of 2002 established a broad-based, five-member advi-
sory committee.10 The board charged the committee with developing 
recommendations in three areas:
1) initial distribution of schools in grade categories, i.e., assigning 
the cut scores for the achievement measures;
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2) measuring school performance indicators, i.e., assigning the 
cluster scores and the total score for the indicators; and
3) alignment of EducationYES! with federal legislation, i.e., 
developing a score to meet the NCLB AYP requirement.
The committee began its work in May 2002 and submitted its final 
report and recommendations to the state board a year later in April 
2003—having met as a working group a total of 22 days over that time 
period, plus providing interim reports to the state board on five differ-
ent occasions (SBE 2003a). The written report of the committee is a bit 
complex and somewhat involved, and deals with a number of areas with 
which the reader may either be unfamiliar or have little interest—for 
example, the linear transformation of MEAP scores to a 0 to 100 scale. 
Accordingly, in what follows we try to avoid complex language and 
explanations and stick to a plain-English telling of the story.11 
Assigning cut scores
The committee turned its immediate attention to its first charge, 
namely, setting cut scores for assigning “proficiency” levels and letter 
grades of A, B, C, D, and F based on the achievement status scores.12 
In effect, the committee had been asked by the state board to make 
judgments about “proficiency” designations and the letter grades to be 
assigned to different levels of performance on the individual assess-
ments, and for aggregate or composite performance overall. If done 
correctly, that alone would be a sizable task. There were 11 separate 
sets of scores in the achievement status category. At the elementary 
school level, there were reading and mathematics. At the middle school 
level, there were reading, mathematics, science, and social studies. At 
the 11th grade level, there were reading, writing, mathematics, science, 
and social studies. 
Apparently in the early staff thinking behind EducationYES!, there 
was some talk of arbitrarily setting the cut scores, for example, by 
“grading on the curve,” where x percent would get A’s, y percent would 
get B’s, and so on, irrespective of the actual scores. There also was 
talk of either a single person or a small group making these judgments, 
keeping it simple, so to speak. The accreditation advisory committee, 
however, in pursuing its charge, insisted that these judgments be made 
through a formal standard-setting process to ensure the integrity of the 
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cut scores and letter grades. For that reason the committee asked depart-
ment staff to convene a standard-setting panel broadly representative of 
classroom teachers, administrators, parents, and members of the busi-
ness community. That panel met on two separate occasions to examine 
actual score profiles, and based on that examination offer its recommen-
dations on cut scores and letter grades to the committee for its review. 
The committee reviewed and subsequently accepted the panel’s recom-
mendations, and in turn recommended their approval to the SBE. The 
cut scores and letter grades, once approved by the SBE, were then used 
in the first public reporting of EducationYES! results.13 
In dealing with the achievement status scores, a related concern 
of the committee was how to address the “masking” of the variance in 
the scores that resulted from using a simple mean or average score for 
a grade or school. For example, a school might have a relatively high 
mean or average score on 4th grade reading, apparently signifying it 
was doing quite well, yet have a number of very low scores hidden, or 
masked, under that mean or average score. To address this, the commit-
tee recommended putting more weight on the scores of low achievers 
in calculating achievement status, thereby encouraging schools to place 
priority on improving the achievement of students who attained the 
lowest scores on the MEAP assessments. It was felt that a local school’s 
attention to these low achievers would have a salutary effect leading to 
improvement in their performance, while at the same time ultimately 
raising the total achievement status score for a subject, grade level, and 
school. 
For the achievement change category there were, of course, the 
same 11 scores as used in the achievement status category—and a 
change score had to be calculated for each. The achievement change 
score, as noted above, would measure and report change over time, for 
example, how a school was doing from one year to the next in reading 
achievement for its fourth graders. This was the score to be linked with 
AYP required under NCLB. As we discuss further in the next section, 
the NCLB goal is to have all students in all subject matter areas attain 
100 percent proficiency by the 2013–14 school year. The achievement 
change score in EducationYES! determines if student achievement 
in a school is improving at a rate fast enough to attain this goal. To 
accomplish this end, the committee developed and recommended an 
achievement change score that involved a calculation based on two 
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trend lines or slopes, an actual score slope for the school against a target 
score slope linked to the goal of 100 percent proficiency by 2013–14. 
Calculating a school’s improvement rate in achievement from one year 
to the next, averaging three years of those improvement rates, and plot-
ting those as a trend line would produce the school’s actual score slope, 
i.e., from any given year to the next. Then plotting the school’s actual 
score slope against its target score slope would indicate whether the 
school was on, above, or below target. The percentage by which the 
school was above or below target dictated the school’s achievement 
change score. 
The committee took upon itself the task of determining what these 
achievement change cut scores and grades ought to be. A grade of A was 
awarded to a school whose actual score slope was 125 percent above 
its target score slope; a B was awarded to a school whose actual score 
slope was between 75 and 125 percent of the target score slope; a C 
went to a school whose actual score slope was between 25 and 75 per-
cent of the target score slope; a D was given to a school whose actual 
slope lay between 25 percent of the target score slope and 25 percent 
of the target below zero; and finally, an F was given to a school whose 
actual score slope was more than 25 percent of target below zero. As 
we indicated above, the achievement change score was closely linked to 
the AYP requirement under NCLB; we shall have more to say about that 
in a later section. The SBE accepted the committee’s recommendations 
and used the achievement change cut scores as the basis for determining 
letter grades and, more importantly, whether a school had made AYP. 
These letter grades and AYP status also were included in the first public 
release of EducationYES! results.
It was in the achievement growth category that the advisory com-
mittee ran into a major problem—the committee was not able to 
calculate achievement growth scores for any number of reasons, not 
the least of which was the lack of measures and scores at adjacent grade 
levels. Without scores at adjacent grade levels, one could not build a 
cross-grade scale and thus follow the progress of a student’s scores, 
say, in mathematics, as he or she proceeded through the grades. Put 
simply, the calculation of achievement growth would have to await the 
implementation of MEAP testing at all grade levels from three to eight, 
which would not be accomplished until at least 2004–05. Furthermore, 
because under EducationYES! as designed, one needed an average of 
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three years to ensure reliability and add stability to the scores, it would 
be sometime after the 2005–06 MEAP administration before achieve-
ment growth scores could be reported in a valid and reliable manner. 
Another problem arose from the many different grade-level configura-
tions found in Michigan’s schools, making it virtually impossible in 
many cases to attribute growth to a single school. For example, in those 
instances where a group of children might be tested in a middle school 
at grade seven with some having matriculated to grade seven from grade 
six in two or more different elementary schools, which schools would 
get the growth score? At the time, there also was the difficulty of linking 
students’ scores from grade four to grades seven and eight. There were a 
number of other problems, chiefly psychometric, that had to be resolved 
before Michigan could confidently and safely utilize an achievement 
growth score—and some of these problems continued to plague the 
program up through the school year 2010–11. As of the 2008–09 school 
year, EducationYES! had yet to employ an achievement growth score, 
although there was an attempt to add such a score in 2009–10. While 
the inclusion in EducationYES! of an achievement growth score would 
seem to be highly desirable, the promise—at least at the time of this 
writing—still outpaces the reality. The notion of a growth, or value-
added, score is an attractive one, and a good many promises have been 
made and are being made by their proponents. Still, at the present time 
the measurement community is of mixed views on the validity and reli-
ability of these scores, and there is much debate about the desirability 
of their use.14 
The Performance Indicators
As mentioned earlier, the three clusters and 11 areas included in 
the performance indicators were a veritable potpourri—a hodgepodge 
that posed both serious construct and measurement problems. As the 
accreditation advisory committee began its work, a separate group was 
still in the process of developing the performance indicators. Unfortu-
nately, as the committee noted in its final report, the development of 
the performance indicators “ . . . proceeded on a separate track rela-
tively immune from feedback offered by the Accreditation Advisory 
Committee. The performance indicators were developed by teams of 
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intermediate and local educators largely in isolation from the work of 
the committee” (SBE 2003a, p. 16).
On reviewing and examining the work of these teams, the advisory 
committee identified four serious problems with the performance indi-
cators. First, since the data were to be self-reported, there likely would 
be little variation in the scores. Second, as a result of little variation in 
the scores, the great majority of schools likely would score very high 
on the measures, leading to a distribution highly skewed to the right. 
Third, based on a pilot study, there indeed was strong reason to believe 
that a full-scale implementation would not produce valid and reliable 
measures on which to assign cut scores and grades; most schools would 
end up with high scores on the three cluster areas—in effect three A’s 
on the clusters and an A on the total score. Fourth, the committee argued 
that rather than measures of performance, the performance indicators 
more properly fell into the category of measures of program policies. 
While the committee lauded the SBE and the MDE on their desire 
to include performance indicator data in addition to the MEAP data in 
EducationYES!, it also pointed out the substantial difficulties of devel-
oping and incorporating into the program a valid and reliable set of 
performance indicator measures, and particularly measures from which 
cut scores and letter grades could be drawn. It judged that the proposed 
performance indicators fell far short of the mark. Contrary to what 
the MDE claimed, the indicators did not provide a snapshot of school 
performance, nor were they research based (SBE 2003a, p. 17). Nev-
ertheless, the SBE and the MDE went forward with the performance 
indicators as an integral part of EducationYES!, and their use continued 
through school year 2007–08. 
In short, the performance indicators truly were, and at least through 
the 2007–08 school year continued to be, a hodgepodge apparently 
designed to provide a get out of jail free card for schools experienc-
ing low scores on the MEAP achievement measures. The Accreditation 
Advisory Committee concluded that if performance indicator measures 
were to continue to be included in EducationYES!, then the state board 
and the MDE would be well advised to go back to the drawing board 
and undertake a serious development effort that would produce a set of 
valid and reliable measures from which cut scores and grades could be 
drawn (SBE 2003a, p. 17).15 
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The third charge that the SBE gave to the Michigan Accredita-
tion Advisory Committee was the alignment of EducationYES! with 
NCLB. The central mandate of NCLB is that each state develop and 
implement an annual state accountability plan for all of its schools, 
complete with state-adopted content standards in the subject areas that 
are offered. In addition, the state is required annually to assess each stu-
dent’s progress toward meeting those subject matter content standards 
and, concurrently, meeting NCLB’s ultimate goal of having all students 
in all designated subject matter areas attain 100 percent proficiency by 
the 2013–14 school year.16 Alignment of a state’s accountability plan 
with the program requirements of NCLB was a major challenge that 
faced all 50 states. For Michigan, which had the beginnings of a state 
accountability plan in Public Act 25 and MAP III, and a plan much fur-
ther developed as a result of its initial design work on EducationYES!, 
it became the challenge of how to move forward on the development of 
EducationYES! while simultaneously aligning it with the requirements 
of NCLB. How best to accomplish this, as we noted above, was the 
third charge given to the accreditation advisory committee, and it is to 
this third charge—or, as one might say, how to effect a “shotgun mar-
riage” of EducationYES! and NCLB—that we now turn.
EducationyES! and nCLb
As noted earlier, EducationYES! had its many progenitors—MAP 
III, MAP II, MAP I, the six-step accountability process of the early 
1970s, the MEAP, and before that the University of Michigan and NCA 
school accreditation programs. EducationYES! also was a direct result 
of rising concerns among parents, the legislature, the business com-
munity, and the general public about the quality of the schooling being 
provided to Michigan’s children and young people. 
As recounted in the prior section, the Michigan legislature in 1990 
had moved to adopt Public Act 25 as an engine of reform, later amend-
ing it in 1995 to bring it closer to becoming an engine of accountability 
by requiring that accreditation, one of the four main elements of Public 
Act 25, begin using the MEAP scores to provide a measure of the effec-
tiveness of the Public Act 25 reforms. Concurrently, in response to the 
act’s call for a model curriculum, Michigan also was developing and 
adopting new content standards and corresponding grade level expecta-
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tions in the subject matter areas offered in the model curriculum. These 
new standards and grade level expectations were then used to guide 
both the revision of existing MEAP tests and the development of new 
MEAP tests to cover additional subject areas and grade levels. Based on 
this work, Michigan, as it undertook the initial development of Educa-
tionYES!, was well on its way to building a full-fledged MEAP-based 
state accountability plan, and in doing that it also was moving ever 
farther toward the finest product side of Callahan’s maxim.
Running on a parallel reform track was a multiplicity of federal 
reform efforts, including efforts under Title I to implement systemic 
reform, complete with the establishment of new content standards and 
performance standards, and measures of school effectiveness in attain-
ing those standards. In 1994, as a part of the reauthorization of ESEA, 
the Congress added to Title I the requirement that the states gather 
and report information on the yearly progress of Title I recipients in 
designated academic areas. Thus was born the notion of AYP, which 
became the hallmark of NCLB, and in many cases the bane of those 
who worked in the schools. 
With the adoption of NCLB in early 2002, not only was AYP appli-
cable to Title I schools, it also became applicable to non–Title I schools. 
Specifically, AYP required that a school must be on track to have all its 
students academically proficient in reading and mathematics by school 
year 2013–14. As part and parcel of the AYP requirement, NCLB man-
dated that during the first year, 2002–03, annual statewide assessments 
had to be administered in reading and mathematics in grade spans 3–5, 
6–9, and 10–12. Comparable tests in science were to begin in school year 
2007–08. By school year 2005–06 the states had to begin administering 
annual, statewide assessments in reading and mathematics in grades 
3–8, assessments aligned with the state’s own academic standards. At 
the high school level, the requirement was at least one other test in these 
subjects at grades 10–12. These assessments had to be able to deliver 
individual student scores, as well as group scores at grade, school, and 
district levels. The scores also had to be broken down and reported by 
four student subgroupings: major racial/ethnic groups, students with 
disabilities, limited English proficient students, and economically dis-
advantaged students. Some have argued that this requirement has been 
NCLB’s greatest contribution, “turning the spotlight . . . on the achieve-
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ment of demographic subgroups whose underperformance used to lie 
hidden within school district and state averages” (ETS 2009, p. 1).17
For Michigan, meeting these measurement requirements was not 
a problem of great moment; the MEAP already was structured to meet 
such requirements, even if new assessments in the three required sub-
ject areas would have to be developed at certain grade levels. Assuming 
resources would be made available, all of this could be accomplished 
by school year 2005–06. As we noted earlier, EducationYES!, incorpo-
rating the recommendations of the accreditation advisory committee, 
already had settled on an achievement change score to measure whether 
a school was meeting the AYP requirement. 
The major problem that remained was how to marry the two sys-
tems. Could a school be accredited under EducationYES! if it had not 
made AYP? How would a school or district administrator meaningfully 
and reasonably explain such an outcome to the school’s constituency, 
or to the general public? What status would the state give to a school 
that made AYP but failed accreditation? How could an administrator 
explain that sort of outcome? In short, could the state marry the two 
systems in a valid, meaningful, and understandable way? Fortunately, 
there seemed to be an available and acceptable, if not totally satisfac-
tory, resolution for this problem. 
The accreditation advisory committee, the MDE, and the SBE set-
tled on a solution suggested by Sandy Kress, an Austin, Texas, attorney 
who had been an education adviser to George W. Bush during his tenure 
as the Governor of Texas. Upon Governor Bush’s election to the presi-
dency in 2000, and in his championship of NCLB, the president called 
on Sandy Kress once again and asked him to visit with and advise the 
several states on a way to handle the problem of marrying the results of 
a state’s accreditation system with a state’s results under AYP. Kress’s 
solution, adopted for use in EducationYES!, is summarized in Table 3.1.
In interpreting Table 3.1, the reader is reminded that the achieve-
ment change score used in EducationYES! is expressed both as a scaled 
score and as a letter grade of A, B, C, D, or F (see p. 67). The first col-
umn lists the composite scaled scores and their positions as cut points 
between letter grades, the second column lists the letter grades given 
to schools that did not make AYP, and the third column lists the grades 
given to schools that did make AYP. Thus, as one can see, a school not 
making AYP could not receive a letter grade higher than B, even if it 
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received a grade of A on the EducationYES! composite score. A school 
receiving an A on the composite score and also making AYP would 
receive an A. The minor roman numerals in parentheses simply indicate 
the priorities that the MDE would use in making decisions about what 
assistance and intervention actions it would take to help Title I schools 
receiving the corresponding letter grades or accreditation status. As 
with the NCLB sanctions, the assistance and intervention actions were 
limited to Title I schools. 
Thus, with its recommendation of using Kress’s solution for how 
to marry the two systems, the accreditation advisory committee had 
fulfilled its three charges. There were a number of other concerns that 
the advisory committee expressed about the initial design of Educa-
tionYES!, as well as committee suggestions for further development 
of the program. For the reader who is interested, these can be found in 
the committee’s final written report to the state board (SBE 2003a). For 
a description of EducationYES! as it has operated over the succeed-
ing five years—2003–2004 through 2009–2010—the interested reader 
may want to look at one or more of the summary bulletins issued by 
the MDE and made available periodically to local schools and districts 
(SBE 2003b; MDE 2006a, 2008a). 
Before we leave this discussion, we should note two other NCLB 
requirements included in and reported under EducationYES! First, 
there was the requirement that each of the aforementioned subgroups 
make AYP. Based on composite district scores, the failure of any one of 
the subgroups to make AYP acted as a “trip wire,” resulting in placing 
the district in the “Does not make AYP” category. Second, there was 
Table 3.1  unified Accountability for Michigan Schools
EducationYES!  
composite score Does not make AYP Makes AYP
90–100 B (iv) A
80–89 B (iv) B (iv)
70–79 C (iii) C (iii)
60–69 D/Alert (ii) C (iii)
50–59 Unaccredited (i) D/Alert (ii)
NOTE: (i) – (iv) indicate the priorities that the MDE would use in making decisions 
about intervention and assistance.
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the NCLB requirement that the state choose an additional indicator of 
making or not making AYP. Michigan chose to use school attendance 
as its additional indicator for its elementary and middle school grades. 
Michigan set its initial attendance target at 85 percent. Schools at or 
above 85 percent were assumed to be meeting the AYP requirement. At 
the high school level, this requirement called for Michigan to use the 
graduation rate as the additional indicator. In this case, the expectation 
was not 100 percent by school year 2013–14, but rather that growth 
toward higher targets would be encouraged. Michigan used 80 percent 
as its beginning target in 2002–03, resetting it to 85 percent in 2005–08, 
and to 90 percent in 2008–09. 
Michigan released its first results on AYP for the 2001–02 school 
year in early 2003. Some 2,489 schools—89 percent—had made AYP. 
As can be seen from Table 3.2, unfortunately, these numbers did not 
hold up for long. In the following year, the percentage of schools mak-
ing AYP dropped to 76 percent, bounced up a bit in the following years, 
and came in at 86 percent in 2009–10. Still, 509 schools—some 14 
percent of all public schools—failed to make AYP.18
Without a doubt, there is considerably more that could and per-
haps should be said about NCLB itself—including the host of other 
implementation problems Michigan and its sister states still face: the 
flexibility (or lack thereof) provided by the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation in implementation of NCLB, and the effectiveness of the law 




Yes Yes (%) No No (%)
Total
schools
2001–02 2,489 89.3 297 10.7 2,786
2002–03 2,415 75.6 781 24.4 3,196
2003–04 2,746 77.9 791 22.4 3,527
2004–05 3,134 88.5 408 11.5 3,542
2005–06 3,058 85.4 524 14.6 3,582
2006–07 3,153 82.9 648 17.1 3,801
2007–08 3,003 79.8 758 20.2 3,761
2008–09 3,143 85.6 528 14.4 3,671
2009–10 3,188 86.2 509 13.8 3,697
SOURCE: MDE.
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in improving American education. More importantly, NCLB itself may 
be subject to major revisions depending on what the Congress may or 
may not do in the pending reauthorization of ESEA and its compo-
nent Title I and NCLB programs. The substance of the reauthorization 
also likely will be strongly influenced by Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan’s Race to the Top program (see p. 250 in Chapter 8 of this vol-
ume). There is a plethora of references—journal articles, reports, and 
books—available for the person interested in pursuing the reauthoriza-
tion issue further.19 For our present purposes, we limit ourselves to a 
short recounting of recent developments in Michigan that very likely 
may lead to substantial revisions in EducationYES!	 
From EducationyES! to MI-SAS and on to MI-SAAS 
As of this writing, it appears that Michigan may soon be saying 
good-bye to the somewhat beguiling title of EducationYES! for its state 
accountability program and replacing it with the more plainspoken titles 
of Michigan’s State Accreditation System—MI-SAS (MDE 2009), or 
more likely, Michigan’s School Accreditation and Accountability Sys-
tem—MI-SAAS (Flanagan 2010). And the new titles apparently may 
not be the only changes. 
The 2009 MDE paper proposes major revisions to EducationYES!, 
the first of which is to reduce the categories of accreditation to three: 1) 
accredited, 2) interim status, and 3) unaccredited. The second change, 
and some would argue not an improvement, is to eliminate the letter 
grade designations—no more A, B, C, D, or F. The third is to remove 
the performance indicators from the scoring scheme and include them 
as one of eight compliance items to be answered with a simple yes/no to 
the question of whether the school submitted them as a part of its annual 
reporting to the MDE—so it’s goodbye to the performance indicators as 
a “get out of jail free card” for those schools and districts scoring low 
on the academic achievement measures. We applaud the MDE on this 
proposed change. The other seven compliance items will address ques-
tions of whether
1) all teachers are certified,
2) the school published its annual improvement plan,
3) the school offered the required curricula,
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4) the school published a fully compliant annual report,
5) the school annually tested literacy and mathematics in grades 
1–5,
6) the high school six-year graduation rate is 80 percent or above, 
and whether
7) the school participated in NAEP, if it was selected to do so.
If the answer is no to any one question in two consecutive years, the 
accreditation status would be lowered one level. 
The fourth change, and an arguable improvement if such a measure 
can be proved valid and reliable, is to add an achievement growth mea-
sure to the program. Achievement growth was the third achievement 
measure built into the original design of EducationYES! but never real-
ized for reasons pointed out earlier (see pp. 67–68).20 The achievement 
growth measure proposed under the revisions, called performance level 
change, would enable schools to show that while some of their students 
may not yet be proficient, their achievement scores are improving from 
year to year. Such scores would fall into a range from “improvement” to 
“significant improvement.” In effect, implementing the proposed per-
formance level change scores would represent an attempt to implement 
the value-added or growth model contemplated in the initial design of 
EducationYES! The performance level change score also would substi-
tute for the achievement change measure in determining AYP. 
Under the proposed revisions, the results of the MEAP would still 
form the bedrock upon which state accreditation decisions are made. A 
school would be designated as accredited if the school had no more than 
one subject below 60 percent proficient and no subjects below 35 per-
cent. A school would be designated interim status, but still considered 
state accredited, if two or more subjects were lower than 60 percent but 
not lower than 35 percent. Any school that had one or more subjects 
lower than 35 percent would be unaccredited.21 
As far as the interface between MI-SAS and NCLB is concerned, the 
same three accreditation categories are to be used, namely, accredited, 
interim status, and unaccredited. A school would be state accredited if it 
met Michigan accreditation standards and AYP. A school would receive 
interim status if it met all Michigan accreditation standards but did not 
make AYP, or if it met Michigan accreditation standards for interim 
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status whether or not it made AYP. If a school did not meet Michigan 
accreditation standards and irrespective of whether or not it made AYP, 
it would be unaccredited. Thus, even though a school did not make 
AYP, it still could be state accredited by Michigan standards in the cat-
egory interim status. The critical difference under the proposed changes 
is that AYP no longer would be the controlling factor vis-à-vis state 
accreditation. It, of course, would be a controlling factor vis-à-vis fed-
eral requirements and sanctions. 
In the summer of 2010, the state superintendent proposed to the 
SBE four further changes to MI-SAS, plus the change of name to Mich-
igan’s State Accreditation and Accountability System—MI-SAAS. The 
proposed changes arise from new guidelines issued by the Department 
of Education as well as the legislature’s recent adoption of reform leg-
islation in response to the Secretary of Education’s Race to the Top 
program. The four proposed changes to MI-SAS are 
1) schools in the lowest 5 percent in the state proficiency ranking 
are automatically unaccredited, 
2) schools in the lowest 6–20 percent are automatically interim 
accredited, 
3) schools in the lowest 5 percent for the School Improvement 
Grant or the School Reform Office are automatically unaccred-
ited, and 
4) to be fully accredited, schools must assess at least 95 percent of 
students in every subject tested.
As of this writing, all of these changes—those proposed originally 
in MI-SAS and those now proposed in MI-SAAS, including the new 
title—are only proposed changes. All must go through a public review 
process, seeking input from the schools, the districts, and the public, 
as well as an approval process by the SBE and the House and Senate 
Education Committees. If all goes well, the proposed target for imple-
mentation would be school year 2011–12. The changes, if enacted, 
would strengthen and streamline the Michigan accountability system. 
They would also enhance the state’s ability to deliver valid and reliable 
information on how Michigan’s public schools and school districts are 
progressing in the academic performance of students, on the schools’ 
and districts’ progress—or lack thereof—in attaining 100 percent pro-
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ficiency for all students, and on the districts’ compliance with related 
federal and state legislative mandates. 
WHAT WILL THE FuTuRE bRIng?
The building of state accountability programs in Michigan has been 
a long and sometimes arduous journey, beginning with local control 
reigning supreme and largely unchallenged from the late nineteenth 
century through the mid-twentieth century, to the dawn of the 1970s and 
state imposition of a mandatory annual assessment of achievement in 
reading and mathematics for all students in grades 4 and 7, to coupling 
state assessment with efforts to build a six-step accountability process, 
to the expansion of state assessment to additional grades and subject 
areas shortly thereafter, to the transfer from the University of Michi-
gan to the MDE of what had become a largely nonaccountable school 
accreditation process, to the relatively ineffectual mandates of Public 
Act 25 as initially adopted, to the building of a new state accountability 
program in EducationYES! and its almost immediate but difficult mar-
riage to NCLB and AYP, to the smoothing out of that marriage, to the 
prospects of implementing an enhanced state accountability program 
in MI-SAAS, and now to providing individual data on the performance 
of teachers and administrators.22 During this process Michigan has 
accommodated a host of new and sometimes old or rehashed ideas and 
proposals for reform. 
In reflecting on the past 40–50 years of efforts to build a state 
accountability program for Michigan’s public schools, on where Michi-
gan now is with respect to accountability, and on where it might be 
headed in the near future, a number of questions come to mind. What 
good has come, or will come, of all of this? How effective have these 
policy reforms been? Is Michigan education today better as a result? Are 
students better off—learning more and succeeding in greater numbers? 
Has the shift of decision-making responsibility from the local school dis-
trict to state government to the federal government had positive results 
for students? Have the increased intrusion of the federal government 
into public education, the growing involvement of state government in 
public education, the state’s tightening of academic requirements, and 
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the public reporting of results all been for the better? Has the casting 
aside of the long-cherished principle of subsidiarity—leaving decision- 
making responsibility to those closest to the action—helped or hin-
dered the goal of providing “the finest product” for Michigan children 
and young people? Undoubtedly honest and straightforward answers 
to these questions would lead to the conclusion that in many if not all 
cases the jury is still out. Certainly many good things have happened 
and improvements have come about, but there also have been stum-
bles and grumbles. It is safe to say that while still generally supportive 
of its public schools, the Michigan public—as well as the American 
public—is not fully satisfied with overall school performance. The poli-
cies adopted have had their limits, both in their crafting and in their 
implementation. 
Beyond these general questions, we argue that there are four spe-
cific questions that demand immediate attention. First, what happens if 
Michigan—or any other state—fails to meet the NCLB and AYP goal 
of 100 percent proficiency by school year 2013–14 based on its own 
standards, i.e., those measured by the MEAP or, for any other state, its 
state assessment programs? EducationYES! and NCLB are now in their 
eighth year. It is just three short years until 2013–14, the school year 
the final bill comes due, so to speak. As of this writing, at the end of 
the 2010–11 school year, 528 of Michigan’s public schools—some 14 
percent—have yet to make AYP. And even with marked increase in the 
number of schools making AYP over the last two school years (now at 
3,188), and the consequent decrease in the number and percentage of 
schools not making AYP, the trajectory is not all that promising. With 
the exception of the two most recent years for which data are available, 
the success rate has been on a downward trend, dropping from a high 
of 89 percent in 2004–05 to a low of 80 percent in 2007–08 (see Table 
3.2). While the 2008–09 and 2009–10 bounce upward to 86 percent is 
welcome, will it hold? Apparently it will not, given the SBE’s recent 
decision to raise cut scores on the MEAP and the very real drop in 
scores that is sure to follow (see Chapter 4). Should Michigan just sol-
dier on and bend every effort to raise student academic performance to 
meet these new and more demanding proficiency levels?
Second, what happens if Michigan—or any other state—meets 
the goal based on its own standards, but does not meet the goal based 
on national standards, i.e., those measured by the NAEP, the Nation’s 
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Report Card? Unfortunately, in the case of Michigan, the latter outcome 
also is highly likely, irrespective of whether the goal of 100 percent 
proficiency is or is not reached based on MEAP standards. Indeed, at 
the present time, using the MEAP standards for 4th grade reading and 
math, 74 and 75 percent of Michigan students, respectively, attained 
proficiency in 2009–10. However, using the NAEP standards, those fig-
ures fall to 30 and 31 percent, respectively. At grade 8, the comparable 
figures for reading and math are 83 percent and 70 percent using the 
Michigan MEAP standards. But again, using the NAEP standards those 
scores drop to 31 and 34 percent, respectively. These are pretty drastic 
differences and should be cause for considerable concern. 
With the recent release of first-time results on the NAEP Trial 
Urban District Assessment, the situation in the Detroit Public Schools 
is even worse and the concerns even greater. The Trial NAEP scores 
for Detroit for grade 4 and grade 8 math and reading are abominable. 
Only a paltry 5 percent of 4th graders achieved proficiency in reading 
and only 7 percent in math. At grade 8 the corresponding figures were 
3 percent and 4 percent. Instead of these students achieving the goal of 
100 percent proficiency by 2013–14, it appears more likely that Detroit 
will have upward of 95 percent of its students not proficient, at least as 
measured by the NAEP. 
Addressing these differences—particularly MEAP versus NAEP—
quickly gets us into a dispute over state versus national standards. Is the 
question of what should be taught in the public schools one that should 
be reserved to the separate states? After all, under the 10th Amendment, 
education is a matter left to the states. Or is it more properly also a 
national and federal concern? Under Section 8 of Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Congress has the authority, if not the responsibility, to 
provide for the general welfare and common defense of the nation. In 
addressing the state versus national standards question, we very quickly 
become involved in questions of federalism. To what extent should 
a state tolerate federal intrusion into basic questions on the goals or 
purposes of public education? To what extent does the federal govern-
ment—or a national entity—have a proper role in this? Who should set 
the standards for Michigan’s or any other state’s students? Should we 
look to and be satisfied with a set of nationwide standards, such as those 
currently being developed under the auspices of the National Governors 
Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers?23
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Third, how will the recent resurgence of past arguments for curricu-
lar differentiation play out against current arguments for rigorous and 
demanding high school graduation requirements? Should our public 
schools, particularly our high schools, attend to and reflect the theme of 
curricular differentiation, providing students of different abilities with a 
wide range of courses and programs attuned to their interests and abili-
ties, as Conant (1959a,b; 1961) argues? Or should our public schools 
eschew curricular differentiation and continue to heed the call for rig-
orous and demanding high school graduation requirements as Bestor 
(1985) and his colleagues argue and as Michigan recently has opted 
to do?24 There already is some evidence that nationwide the pendulum 
may be moving back toward Conant’s view, based on the recent advo-
cacy of campaigns such as A Broader, Bolder Approach to Education 
(2009), championed by the likes of education notables such as Diane 
Ravitch, Helen Ladd, Tom Payzant, Richard Rothstein, Christopher 
Cross, and others. Should Michigan and other states, as that group sug-
gests, begin to move beyond attention “not only to basic academic skills 
and cognitive growth narrowly defined, but to the development of the 
whole person . . . [to] physical health, character, social development 
and non-academic skills . . .” (A Bolder, Better Approach to Education 
2009, p. 2)? Should the states add a substantial array of qualitative 
measures to the quantitative measures already firmly ensconced in their 
state accountability programs? 
Fourth, what will be the outcome for Michigan and the other 49 
states of the pending reauthorization of ESEA and likely changes in 
the requirements of NCLB and AYP? President Obama, according to 
his recent announcements, supports the overall goal of NCLB but with 
reservations (Obama ’08 2008). As noted earlier, President Obama’s 
education secretary, Arne Duncan, in his Race to the Top program, 
is calling for increased rigor and accountability in federal education 
programs. But what the Congress will do in the reauthorization of 
NCLB, and when it will do it, remains anyone’s guess given the pres-
ent economic crises facing the nation, and more importantly, given the 
Republican party’s return to power in the House of Representatives as a 
result of 2010 Congressional elections. It likely will not be business as 
usual. Will any revision be quite modest? Or will we witness substan-
tial changes in the law and its requirements? Will the Congress heed 
the advice offered in a respected scholar’s recent examination of the 
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law? “Rather than abandoning some of the more useful components of 
NCLB, we should maintain and improve them, but we need to drop the 
fiction that all children will be proficient and that all teachers will be 
highly qualified by the 2013–14 school year” (Vinovskis 2009, p. 234).
Can our state and federal accountability programs deliver on the 
promise of academic success for all students? Will they? At the present 
time, we ourselves find no clear-cut answers to these questions. But 
we do hold modest hopes that programs such as NCLB and Educa-
tionYES!; MI-SAAS, if it comes about; and the new state-mandated 
educator evaluations, despite all their shortcomings, eventually may 
begin to deliver on what they promise, namely, to increase academic 
success for all students. Echoing the words of John Porter, they just may 
help provide “. . . the guarantee that all students without respect to race, 
income, or social class will acquire the minimum school skills neces-
sary to take full advantage of the choices that accrue upon successful 
completion of public schooling, or we in education will describe the 
reasons why” (Kearney 1971, p. 5). 
notes
1. See, for example, The	American	Heritage	Dictionary,	 Second	College	Edition. 
Houghton-Mifflin, 1985.
2. For a brief account of this early period, see Chapter 2 in Thomas (1968).
3. Since 2006, NCA CASI is an accreditation division of AdvancED, which is also 
the parent organization of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Coun-
cil on Accreditation and School Improvement and the National Study of School 
Evaluation.
4. It is worth noting that a second edition of the Common Goals was published in the 
early 1980s, and that much later the Michigan Curriculum Framework, published 
in 1997, contained an overarching set of goals. 
5. For a detailed recounting of federal activity during this period, see Vinovskis 
(2009). For a sample of reform activity at national, state, and local levels during 
the same period, see Finn and Walberg (1994). See also Gross and Gross (1985) 
and Toch (1991). 
6. A cut score is a score that separates test takers into various categories, such as a 
passing score and a failing score, a proficient score and a nonproficient score, or 
gradations of proficiency, e.g., basic, proficient, advanced.
7. Under this program, a student’s scores on the 11th grade MEAP, if high enough, 
made the student eligible to receive a $2,500 tuition grant from the state to help 
defray the cost of the first two years of a college education.
Holding Schools Accountable   83
8. In 2003–04 proficiency was defined in relation to MEAP performance levels. The 
levels were 1, 2, 3, and 4, with 1 the highest; proficient was defined as “met/
exceeded expectations” (levels 1 and 2); students scoring at levels 3 and 4 were 
defined as “did not meet expectations.” At the time of this writing, these four levels 
had been renamed advanced, proficient, partially proficient, and not proficient, 
respectively.
9. We would remind the reader that the term catch-22 connotes a situation in which 
a desired outcome or solution is impossible to attain because of a set of inherently 
illogical rules.
10. Members included C. Philip Kearney, professor emeritus, University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, MI; Sharon Johnson Lewis, director of research, Council of Great City 
Schools, Washington, DC; Lawrence Lezotte, president, Effective Schools, Ltd., 
Okemos, MI; Mark Reckase, professor of measurement and quantitative methods, 
College of Education, Michigan State University; and Edward Roeber, vice presi-
dent, Measured Progress, Dover, NH.
11. For the reader interested in more detail, we suggest requesting a copy of the com-
mittee’s report from the office of the SBE.
12. See Note 6.
13. At the time, high school scores were not yet available. However, following the 
same procedure, shortly thereafter a second panel was created to examine and rec-
ommend cut scores and grades for the high school achievement status measures.
14. See, for example, Harris (2009). 
15. At the current time, the MDE has proposed removing the performance indicators	
from the scoring scheme and including them simply as one of eight compliance 
items to be answered with a simple yes/no to the question of whether the school 
submitted its performance indicators as a part of its annual reporting to the MDE.
16. See Note 8.
17. This requirement has a purpose analogous to the accreditation advisory commit-
tee’s recommendation of placing more weight on the scores of low achievers in 
calculating the achievement status score. See p. 66. 
18. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan recently announced that he would entertain 
a state’s request for waivers of the AYP requirement if a state had in place an 
acceptable long-term plan to improve student achievement and proficiency. The 
waiver provision responds to the problem that, despite a district meeting the AYP 
requirement for its total student group, it could still fail because it did not meet 
the requirement by one or more of its four student subgroupings singled out in the 
legislation—1) major racial/ethnic groups, 2) students with disabilities, 3) limited 
English proficient students, and 4) economically disadvantaged students—the so-
called trip wire (see Higgins [2011c]).
19. For a succinct recounting of some of the many problems faced by the states, see 
Ritter and Lucas (2006). For a detailed recounting of the creation of NCLB, see 
Vinovskis (2009).
20. See Note 14.
21. The titles of the categories may be a bit confusing. A school would be considered 
state accredited if it fell into either of the first two categories: accredited or interim 
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status. If it did not meet state accreditation standards, it would fall into the third 
category: unaccredited.
22. Recent legislation now requires a local school district to determine and report 
whether its teachers and administrators are highly effective, effective, or ineffec-
tive. The evaluations are to be tied to local decisions regarding promotion and 
retention of teachers and administrators, including tenure and certification deci-
sions (see Revised School Code, Act 451 of 1976).
23. See, for example, Lewin (2010).
24. As of the present writing, it seems that Michigan legislators are having second 
thoughts about high school graduation requirements. One house of the Michi-
gan legislature has introduced and passed a bill to rescind the recently adopted 




Assessing the Academic 
Outcomes of Schooling
FROM OPPOSITIOn TO ACCEPTAnCE
Today in Michigan there is an abundance of comparative informa-
tion available on the academic outcomes of schooling, on how public 
school students are performing in critical academic subjects such as 
reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies. This infor-
mation is broken out by individual schools and school districts, and is 
collected and publicly reported annually by the MDE. The information 
is not only available by school, but also by grades within a school. A 
parent in East Lansing can easily review the results and see how the 4th 
grade pupils as a group in the Donley elementary school are doing in 
reading, writing, and mathematics. A parent in Ann Arbor can look at 
reading scores for 7th graders in the Tappan middle school, or the math-
ematics scores for the same 7th graders. A parent in Muskegon can find 
out how 11th graders in the Muskegon high school scored on the Michi-
gan Merit Exam, including how those 11th graders scored as a group 
on the ACT. This information on student academic performance also 
is aggregated at the state level and publicly released, so the interested 
Michigan citizen is able to get a clear sense of the degree to which the 
state’s public school pupils are achieving proficiency in critical school 
subjects, whether it be reading, writing, mathematics, science, or social 
studies. And interested parents or citizens can go one step further by 
looking to see how Michigan pupils, and schools, are doing in compari-
son to pupils and schools in other states and in the nation as a whole. 
They can ask, “How are Michigan schools doing compared to Ohio 
schools? How is Michigan doing compared to the nation as a whole?” 
And they can easily find the answers, because now there is comparative 
information from the NAEP readily available on the Internet and in the 
print media that allows one to view the levels of reading proficiency 
and math proficiency in each of the 50 states as measured by the NAEP.
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But it was not always so. Prior to 1969, it was not possible to find 
out how the state’s public schools were doing in reading and math. It 
was not possible for a parent to find out how his or her child’s school 
or school district was doing in these two critical academic areas. There 
was no statewide academic performance information available what-
soever. While most schools and school districts did administer one or 
more of the many available standardized testing programs, there was 
no common testing program across the entire state. Nor for that matter 
were the results of the district and school testing programs made public. 
Comparing schools and school districts on the basis of pupils’ academic 
achievement was considered anathema. In many cases, results were not 
even to be shared with a parent. Test results most often were “embar-
goed,” to be shared only with teachers, counselors, and administrators, 
and perhaps, from time to time, with members of the local school board. 
There existed a deep and ingrained opposition to sharing test results 
with anyone other than a professional educator. And there was even 
stronger opposition to building a state system that would produce stu-
dent achievement information and allow comparisons among schools 
and school districts within a given region or state. To build a national 
system that would allow comparisons between and among states was 
considered an equal if not greater offense. 
But in spite of opposition from the professional education com-
munity, these systems were built and today they produce a rich array 
of information on the academic achievement of pupils in our public 
schools. The breakthrough in Michigan came in 1969 with the launch 
of the MEAP. The breakthrough at the national level came in 1970 with 
the initial public report of the NAEP. But before they became a reality, 
each of these programs had to undergo a gauntlet of strong opposition 
from the entrenched forces of the profession—the teacher unions, the 
professional curriculum and subject matter associations, the adminis-
trator associations, and in many cases even recalcitrant legislators. 
Some sense of the nature of this ingrained opposition in Michi-
gan to the MEAP can be gleaned from the comments back in 1970 of 
the curriculum director of an affluent, suburban school district: “The 
[program] is really politics masquerading as research. Promise after 
promise has been broken. Plans have been dictated and changed by the 
legislature . . . It is not an operational purpose of the assessment project 
to improve instruction by identifying promising practices . . . The con-
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clusions were written before the project was undertaken . . . Educators 
at the district level have not been included in designing the tests and 
are not included in plans for the development of future tests” (Grosse 
Pointe Public Schools 1970).
Nor was the press silent. Apparently expressing the views held by 
their local school district superintendent, a city newspaper had this to 
say: “The damage already has been done this time, but we hope that 
someone does a little more checking the next time before the State 
Department of Education is allowed to pull another stunt like the one 
foisted on thousands of public school pupils this week” (Ypsilanti	Press	
1970, p. 4).
In the same issue, a local legislator gave his view of the effort: 
“ . . . rotten, just out and out Communist propaganda—rotten all the 
way through” (Ypsilanti	Press 1970, p. 4). Still others saw the effort as 
an invasion of privacy (Mt.	Clemens-Macomb	Daily 1970, p. 1). On the 
first public release of the 1969–70 MEAP results, the furor increased. 
A local superintendent wrote to the state superintendent expressing his 
utter dismay, seeing the public release as “ . . . a complete breaking 
of trust . . . [and as] extremely unethical” (Kearney and Huyser 1973, 
p. 56). Similar brickbats were hurled by representatives of the teacher 
unions, the professional administrator associations, and several of the 
professional subject matter associations—all reflecting again and again 
an ingrained opposition to the public release of test results if not to test-
ing itself. And it was a good number of months, if not years, before the 
opposition to the MEAP began to wane.
In like fashion, the early developers of the NAEP faced a simi-
lar gauntlet of opposition from the professional education associations. 
John Gardner, the then president of the Carnegie Corporation and one 
of the initial funders of the NAEP effort, speaking in a more recent 
interview commented on the nature of the opposition the early devel-
opers faced back in 1963. He noted that the American Association of 
School Administrators (AASA) didn’t want anyone to measure them, 
that the National Education Association (NEA) backed the AASA, 
and that the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) did as 
well (Jones and Olkin 2004, pp. 116–117). The AASA was and is the 
national professional association of school superintendents; the NEA 
was and is the more powerful of the two national teacher unions; and 
the CCSSO was and is the professional association of chief state school 
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officers—state commissioners, state superintendents, and secretaries of 
education. Lloyd Morrisett, a vice president of the Carnegie Corpo-
ration at the time, also speaking in a recent interview, remarked that 
they [the early developers] had to overcome very substantial political 
resistance in the educational community, adding that the assessments 
and the sampling had to be designed in a form that “would not seem to 
be dangerous to the people that resisted the idea of comparative test-
ing” (Jones and Olkin 2004, p. 124). A third recent interviewee, David 
Goslin, had served as a recorder for the two initial conferences orga-
nized by the Carnegie Corporation in 1963–64 to explore the feasibility 
and desirability of establishing a national assessment program. Goslin 
corroborated the views of Gardner and Morrisett: “I think that as a polit-
ical position, nobody could acknowledge then that you might one day 
have comparisons of states, localities, and schools on the NAEP test. 
The idea that this would be the basis for a national curriculum would 
have been an anathema; it would not have gone anywhere” (Jones and 
Olkin 2004, p. 137).
To get a sense of the roots of this ingrained and strong opposition 
to the gathering and reporting of comparative information on schools 
and school districts that prevailed in the 1960s and prior years, one 
need only review any number of publications of that era addressing 
the proper roles of state government and the federal government when 
it came to public education. For most who wrote on the subject, the 
concept of local control reigned supreme. As an example, in a small 
booklet published in 1963, one of the authors addressing the question 
of local control begins by noting that “many Americans would hold that 
the local management of public schools is best. The intrusion of other 
levels of government on local operation is often looked upon with dis-
favor. Action by the Federal government is most suspect, but even the 
states, which legally have plenary power with respect to education, are 
not always welcome in their endeavors to control education” (Campbell 
and Bunnell 1963, p. 1).
None other than President John F. Kennedy expressed in the prior 
year a similar sentiment, at least as far as the federal government was 
concerned: “The control and operation of education in America must 
remain the responsibility of state and local governments and private 
institutions. This tradition ensures our educational system of the free-
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dom, the diversity and the vitality in support of public elementary and 
secondary education” (U.S. 1962, p. 1544).
Yet it is somewhat ironic, or perhaps simply a portent of what was 
to come, that President Kennedy’s first U.S. Commissioner of Educa-
tion was Frank Keppel. It was Keppel who first suggested and advanced 
the idea of a national assessment of public education. And it is Keppel 
who is most often touted as the father of national assessment (Jones and 
Olkin 2004, p. 11).
Despite the long-standing hostility of the professional educational 
community, the efforts to mount state assessment programs as well as 
a national assessment program proceeded apace. In large part, these 
efforts were aided and abetted by a public that had become disenchanted 
with its schools. As we noted in Chapter 3, beginning in the 1960s there 
arose across the nation and in the individual states a growing dissat-
isfaction with American public education. This dissatisfaction was 
being voiced in the media, in educational and secular journals, in public 
reports, and in any number of published books and monographs. As a 
consequence, the long-standing wall of opposition by the professional 
education community to state and federal intrusion into the governance 
and management of schools was beginning to crumble. Arguments for 
educational reform abounded, and central to many of the arguments 
was the lack of meaningful and readily available information on the 
academic performance of students. So the nation was soon to see a sig-
nificant change of attitude about testing and about the public release of 
test results begin to take place among the professional educational com-
munity. It didn’t happen rapidly, but it did happen. To look back now, in 
2011, to the 1960s and prior years, is to see an almost complete reversal 
of the mindset of education professionals and their associations in the 
several states when it comes to their own state assessment programs, 
and increasingly the same reversal across the country when it comes to 
the NAEP. 
Against this backdrop, we turn now to a brief telling of the story of 
the development and implementation of these two assessment programs, 
the MEAP and the NAEP, and also take a look at what the two pro-
grams tell us today about the academic achievement of pupils—across 
the entire nation, and particularly in the public schools of Michigan. We 
begin by recounting briefly the history and development of the NAEP. 
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THE nATIOnAL ASSESSMEnT OF EDuCATIOnAL 
PROgRESS: THE nATIOn’S REPORT CARD
The genesis and Development of the nAEP
As noted above, it was Frank Keppel who in early 1963 first 
advanced the idea of a national assessment of public education.1 Keppel 
at the time was the U.S. Commissioner of Education, having been 
appointed to the post by President John F. Kennedy. Keppel broached 
the idea to Ralph Tyler and asked him to prepare a memorandum sug-
gesting a way to evaluate education in the United States. Tyler at the 
time was the director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-
ioral Sciences at Stanford University, and a noted scholar and researcher 
in education and the social sciences. On the receipt of Tyler’s memo-
randum, Keppel turned to John Gardner, the president of the Carnegie 
Corporation, for financial support to hold two conferences to discuss 
Tyler’s memorandum. The conferences were held in December 1963 
and January 1964. 
Out of these two conferences was born the unprecedented effort 
to design and develop a national assessment of educational progress. 
It was an effort that extended over the next 40-plus years, marked by 
a number of ups and downs, first funded by the Carnegie Corporation 
and later the Ford Foundation, and subsequently entirely by the fed-
eral government; experienced a number of changes over the years in 
responsibilities for governance and administration; worked assiduously 
to break down the intense opposition emanating from the professional 
education community; saw expansion of the initial assessment to seven 
subject areas and additional age groups and grades; and—most radi-
cal of all—witnessed its responsibilities being extended to producing 
results not just for the nation as a whole but also for individual states, 
and soon thereafter for large urban school districts. 
Following the two Carnegie-sponsored conferences in late 1963 
and early 1964, a decision was made to create the Exploratory Com-
mittee for the Assessment of Progress in Education (ECAPE), with 
Ralph Tyler as chair. Carnegie again came to the fore and provided a 
grant of $100,000 to support the work of ECAPE. In late 1965, the Ford 
Foundation awarded a grant to ECAPE to supplement the continuing 
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financial support already being provided by Carnegie, and in early 1966 
the U.S. Office of Education for the first time lent its financial support 
to the effort. The U.S. Office of Education, and later the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, eventually assumed full financial responsibility for 
the NAEP. 
While financial support for the NAEP moved from Carnegie and 
Ford and eventually became fully lodged in the federal government, 
the administration, management, and governance of the program over 
the years followed a more checkered path. How checkered can be 
seen by briefly tracing this path. In July of 1968, the “E” was dropped 
from ECAPE and it became CAPE, the Committee for the Assess-
ment of Progress in Education. Shortly thereafter, responsibilities for 
the administration and management of the NAEP, as well as the gov-
ernance, were transferred to the Education Commission of the States 
(ECS) in Denver. Further changes in the administration and manage-
ment of the NAEP took place in 1983, when the ECS was dropped from 
the picture and a new NAEP contract was awarded to the Educational 
Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. By contracting for the NAEP, 
the federal government chose to take a more active role in determin-
ing NAEP policy, which was not a popular position among educators, 
who feared the role of the government dictating what would be tested, 
and hence what would be taught. In 1988, further changes in the gov-
ernance of the NAEP came about when the Congress enacted Public 
Law 100-297, establishing the National Assessment Governing Board 
(NAGB) as an independent body responsible for setting policy for the 
NAEP tests. Over this same general time period, federal administra-
tive oversight of the NAEP was transferred to the National Center for 
Educational Statistics, then to the National Institute of Education, and 
eventually back again to the National Center for Educational Statistics, 
where it is lodged today. The National Center for Educational Statistics 
currently remains responsible for the administration and management 
of the program, enlisting from time to time outside contractors to assist 
in carrying out the myriad tasks of implementation, evaluation, and 
further development of the program. The NAGB continues to provide 
policy oversight for the program.2
Breaking down the deep and ingrained opposition to building a 
national system that would allow comparisons of student academic 
achievement between and among states was a major challenge that 
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faced the initial designers and developers of the NAEP. As we remarked 
earlier, several of the major professional organizations voiced rather 
strident opposition to the notion, with the executive committee of the 
American Association of School Administrators (AASA) adopting a 
formal resolution recommending “that its members refuse to participate 
in NAEP tryouts or in any subsequent operational NAEP” (Jones and 
Olkin 2004, p. 12). The NEA, the largest teacher union in the nation, 
soon followed suit by endorsing the AASA resolution, as did the profes-
sional association of those men and women who led the nation’s 50 state 
departments of education, the Council of Chief State School Officers 
(CCSSO). And as Vinovskis (1998) has observed, the subject matter 
associations were not far behind, with the president of the National 
Council of Teachers of English admonishing teachers “to fight tooth 
and nail to prevent a proposed plan to measure the quality of American 
education” (p. 6). 
As we stated earlier, a major reason for opposing the NAEP arose 
primarily from professional educators’ ingrained opposition to compar-
ing test scores between and among local school districts and, more to 
the point, between and among states. Comparison of states led to rank-
ing of states, and ranking led to losers and winners—there would be 
those states at the top of the heap, those at the bottom, and those in the 
middle. And the same could be said for districts and for schools within 
a district. A second reason was opposition to a national curriculum. The 
opponents claimed that national tests would lead to national standards, 
which in turn would lead to a national curriculum and the loss of local 
control, a much-cherished principle of American public education. It 
would be bad enough to have state standards and a state curriculum, but 
as David Goslin remarked in the interview cited earlier (Jones and Olkin 
2004, p. 137), the idea that the NAEP would serve as the foundation 
for a national curriculum would not have gone anywhere. There also 
was the concern that a national assessment would become, in essence, 
a nationwide individual testing program, again seriously violating the 
principle of local control as well as being an unprecedented invasion of 
students’ (and families’) individual privacy by the federal government. 
This last concern was quickly addressed and put to rest with the 
emergence of the NAEP’s sampling design. No single student would 
take an entire test, thus no individual results would be available. In 
addition, district and state comparisons would not be possible. The stu-
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dent population would be sampled; results would be valid and reliable 
only for groups of students. The design of the sampling frame would 
limit those groups to representing the nation as a whole, and four large 
regions, namely, the four quadrants of the United States—the northeast, 
southeast, southwest, and northwest. The sampling frame would make 
it impossible to deliver state results, much less district results.3 While 
this safeguard initially assuaged the opposition, it was only a few short 
years until the pressure for state-level results would force a change in 
the sampling frames and the NAEP would begin producing results state 
by state, thereby allowing for much-feared comparisons between and 
among states.
The full story of how Ralph Tyler and his colleagues in the early 
days of the NAEP were able to work around if not overcome the opposi-
tion to the program is well told by others, as is the account of external 
pressures that arose in subsequent years and led to a significant change 
in if not reversal of the mindset of those who opposed NAEP (and 
MEAP) in the 1970s and 1980s.4 Today this resistance is a thing of the 
past. Indeed, not only is there a growing acceptance of the NAEP in 
the professional education community, but also growing support for the 
NAEP’s public release of its results on a state-by-state basis. A recent 
statement from Gerald N. Tirozzi, the executive director of the National 
Association of Secondary School Principals, stands in stark contrast to 
the 1970s resolution of opposition adopted by the AASA: 
The significant disparities among states leap from the page when 
state proficiency test scores are compared with National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores—currently the only 
national barometer available . . . Sadly some states have set their 
bars exceedingly low and have given their “proficient” students a 
false sense of achievement . . . If Congress truly wants to drive an 
education agenda for higher standards . . . [it] should shift the law 
at its foundation to institute national standards and a national test 
in reading and math. (Tirozzi 2009)
David Goslin, whom we quoted earlier, must now chuckle a bit to 
himself as he surveys the current education scene and the increasing 
calls for national standards. He might be one of the first to agree that 
the times indeed have changed. The NAEP now enjoys growing sup-
port from not only the professional education community, but also the 
Congress and the nation’s governors, and it appears that that support is 
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here to stay. And on that note, we turn now to the NAEP as it exists and 
operates today, and take a look at some of its more recent test results for 
Michigan students. 
The nAEP Today and Michigan’s Public Schools
Over the past 40 years, from its first offerings in April of 1969 of 
three assessments in citizenship, science, and writing for in-school 
17-year-olds, to its current schedule of offerings in nine different sub-
ject areas at three different grade levels, the NAEP indeed has come a 
long way. Reading and math assessments now are offered every other 
year at grades 4, 8, and 12. Science and writing assessments are offered 
every four years at grades 4 and 8. And the remaining subjects—the arts, 
civics, economics, geography, and U.S. history—are cycled in periodi-
cally at one or more grade levels. All of these subjects are reported at 
the national level, and beginning in 1990, four of these subjects—read-
ing, math, science, and writing—began to be reported at the state level, 
for public schools only. The full range of NAEP offerings scheduled up 
through the year 2017 is depicted in Table 4.1.5
Table 4.1  The Schedule of upcoming nAEP Assessments
Subjects Grade levels Year
Reported at 
state level
Reading 4, 8, 12 2009, 2011, 2013, 
2015, 2017
4, 8, 12a
Writing 4, 8 2011, 2015 4, 8
Mathematics 4, 8, 12 2009, 2011, 2013, 
2015, 2017
4, 8, 12a
Science 4, 8 2009, 2013, 2017 4, 8
The Arts 8 2008, 2016 No
Civics 4, 8, 12 2010 No
Economics 12 2012 No
Geography 4, 8, 12 2010 No
U.S. History 4, 8, 12 2010 No
aFor 2009, there is a pilot study of state-level results, for which 11 states volunteered.
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, the Nation’s Report Card: http://
www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/assessmentsched.asp.
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A Quick Look at Recent Results
In Table 4.2, we present Michigan’s NAEP scores over the past 
several years in the four academic subject areas that NAEP reports on a 
state-by-state basis—reading, mathematics, science, and writing. Only 
about one-third of Michigan students, irrespective of grade level, scored 
at or above the “proficient level,” which by NAEP standards represents 
“ . . . solid academic performance at each grade level—4, 8 . . . It will 
reflect a consensus that students reaching this level have demonstrated 
competency over challenging subject matter and are well prepared for 
the next level of schooling” (Vinovskis 1998, p. 45). 
As depicted in Table 4.2, the NAEP results over the immediate past 
years paint a fairly dismal picture of academic achievement in Michi-
gan’s public schools. Two things are most striking in the results. First, 
among the 37 separate scores presented, in only eight cases—grade 4 
math in 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009; grade 4 science in 2009; and grade 
8 science in 2000, 2005, and 2009—does the percentage of students 
attaining proficiency exceed 33 percent. And the eight exceptions fall 
in the 34–38 percent range. To put it more bluntly, most often more than 
two-thirds of Michigan’s grade 4 and grade 8 students fail to achieve 
academic proficiency in reading, science, math, and writing as mea-
sured by NAEP standards. 
Second, over the period of years included (1990–2007) the scores 
were essentially flat with the exception of grade 4 math and, to a lesser 
extent, grade 8 math. In grade 4 math, the percentage of students attain-
ing proficiency doubled from 1992 to 2007; the percentage figure in 
1992 was 18 percent and by 2007 it had more than doubled to 37 per-
cent. In the most recent administration, 2009, we see a small drop-off 
to 35 percent. In grade 8 math the increase was comparable, from 16 
percent in 1990 to 31 percent in 2009. However, while the increase was 
quite sharp in the first three administrations—12 percent from 1990 to 
1996—the scores then leveled off for the next five administrations, with 
the small increase to 31 percent noted above in the most recent year, 
2009. The grade 4 and grade 8 reading scores were essentially flat over 
a similar period. In grade 4 and grade 8 science, while fewer years were 
involved, the scores also remained essentially flat, albeit there were 
only three years involved at grade 4—2000, 2005, and 2009—and four 
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Table 4.2  nAEP Results for Michigan, Percent Proficient, Available years 
1990–2009, grades 4 and 8






















Grade 4 writing Grade 8 writing
2002 19 24
2007 — 27
NOTE: For the NAEP, percent proficient includes the number of students who score at 
or above the “proficient” level. The NAEP uses three levels: 1) basic, 2) proficient, and 
3) advanced. Basic denotes partial mastery of knowledge and skills that are fundamen-
tal for proficient work at each grade level; proficient represents solid academic per-
formance at each grade level; advanced signifies superior performance beyond grade 
level mastery. There are, of course, students who score “below basic” on the NAEP 
tests, i.e., a fourth level; however, for some reason, it is not a standard or level set or 
used by the NAGB.
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, the Nation’s Report Card: http://
nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/profile.asp.
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years at grade 5—1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009. The overall flatness of 
these scores tells us that academic achievement of Michigan students 
is not improving, at least based on NAEP results. In short, Michigan 
students are not on an increasing trajectory to reach 100 percent profi-
ciency by school year 2013–14 as called for by NCLB and as measured 
by the NAEP. 
And perhaps more telling and of greater cause for concern is 
Michigan students’ decline over time in performance on NAEP when 
compared with other states. For example, Michigan’s rank among par-
ticipating states in 4th grade reading fell from 22nd among 42 states in 
1992 to 30th of 51 states in 2007, while Michigan’s rank in 8th grade 
mathematics fell from 21st among 42 states to 36th of 51 states over the 
same period. The measured performance of African American students 
is particularly alarming, with Michigan’s 8th grade math scores ranking 
next to last in 2007 among 41 reporting states. 
An even greater cause for concern is the dreadfully low NAEP 
reading and math scores for 4th and 8th grade students in the Detroit 
Public Schools that were announced in early December 2009, as well as 
the science scores for Detroit 4th and 8th graders announced in Febru-
ary 2011, following the release of the NAEP’s first Trial Assessment 
of Urban Districts. By NAEP standards, only 5 percent of Detroit 4th 
graders and 7 percent of Detroit 8th graders were proficient in reading. 
In math the scores were even worse—3 percent at grade 4 and 4 percent 
at grade 8.6 Table 4.3 depicts Detroit’s scores as compared to all other 
U.S. cities involved in the Trial Assessment of Urban Districts.
We turn next to the overall 2009 MEAP results and ask how these 
results compare with the quite dismal picture painted by the NAEP 
results. Do they paint the same picture or a different picture, and if so, 
why? However, before we turn to an exploration of recent MEAP scores 
and attention to these two questions, let us first look briefly at the his-
tory and development of the MEAP.
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THE MICHIgAn EDuCATIOnAL ASSESSMEnT 
PROgRAM (MEAP)
The genesis and Development of the MEAP
We noted in the previous chapter that back in the fall of 1968, Ira 
Polley, Michigan’s State Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and 
staff members in the MDE’s newly formed Bureau of Research began to 
lose faith in input-oriented school accreditation.7 They focused instead 
on creating a system that annually would gather and report information 
on the academic performance of students in Michigan’s public schools. 
These efforts eventually led to the drafting of a proposal for creation 
of a statewide educational assessment program, starting with reading 
and math at grades 4 and 7. In the spring of 1969, the SBE responded 
favorably to the proposal and directed Polley “to prepare and sub-
mit appropriate legislation for the periodic assessment of educational 
progress in the public elementary and secondary schools of Michigan” 
(Kearney, Crowson, and Wilbur 1970, p. 16). 
While the SBE did indeed have the power to mandate such a pro-
gram, the program also would require a relatively high level of funding, 
Table 4.3  Academic Achievement in Selected Subjects, nAEP Trial urban 
District Assessment, Percent Proficient, 2009
 Detroit U.S. large cities
Reading
Grade 4 5 23
Grade 8 7 21
Math
Grade 4 3 31
Grade 8 4 24
Science
Grade 4 40 19
Grade 8 30 16
NOTE: Proficient is defined as a score of proficient or above.
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, the Nation’s Report Card: http://
nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/profile.asp.
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and the only realistic source for such funding was the legislature. Two 
possibilities existed: either seek the introduction of a new piece of leg-
islation, which would not only mandate the program statutorily but also 
provide the necessary funds, or establish the program and acquire the 
funds through the simple expedient of adding a line item to the MDE’s 
annual budget request. Both alternatives, of course, would require leg-
islative approval, but the latter had the advantage of not treating the 
assessment program as an entirely new and separate issue. Polley made 
the decision to go the route of asking for a line-item addition to the 
annual budget request, along with the necessary language. The first 
overture, to the Senate Appropriations Committee, met with no success. 
A second approach made to the House Appropriations Committee, after 
lengthy discussion and persistent lobbying by Polley, did meet with the 
approval of the committee. Following passage by the full House and 
subsequent passage by the Senate, with the assessment funding and lan-
guage included, the bill went to the governor’s desk for signature in late 
July of 1969.
At the time, there was some thought that the governor, while basi-
cally favoring the idea, might choose to veto the assessment item and 
seek additional political mileage by introducing state assessment as a 
fresh, new program arising from the work of his ongoing Commission 
on Educational Reform. These fears were unfounded, and on August 12, 
1969, the governor did sign the MDE’s budget bill with the assessment 
provision intact. Thus was born the Michigan Educational Assessment 
Program.
The MEAP’s first year—1969–70
Time quickly became the major problem facing MDE staff charged 
with mounting the initial offering of the MEAP. The language accom-
panying the appropriation called for putting in place a statewide 
assessment of all 4th and 7th graders no later than January 1970—a 
mere six months after the governor’s signing. With little time to spare, 
and no time to build new measures, the MDE turned to the Educational 
Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey, contracting with it to develop 
and administer the new tests. 
The major portion of the assessment battery developed by the Edu-
cational Testing Service consisted of shortened achievement tests in four 
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basic skills areas: 1) reading comprehension, 2) vocabulary, 3) English 
expression, and 4) mathematics. The tests purposely were put together 
as shortened versions of regular size achievement tests, thus making the 
scores valid and reliable only for groups of students, but not for individ-
ual students. As planned, no individual pupil reporting could or would 
take place in the first year. The assessment battery also included a Sec-
tion 1, entitled “General Information,” which contained 26 questions 
designed to provide indirect group measures of socioeconomic status 
and pupil attitudes and aspirations. All of the measures, the achieve-
ment tests as well as the items in Section 1, were norm-referenced. 
In launching the 1969–70 MEAP, the MDE faced the same obsta-
cles faced by the early developers of the NAEP, namely, the school 
community’s deep and ingrained opposition to sharing test results with 
anyone other than professional educators. The decision not to produce 
individual pupil results allayed some of the opposition, but certainly did 
not address the major concern of the school community, namely, public 
release of comparative results. To speak to that concern, the MDE made 
the promise that test results would be made available only to school 
superintendents, principals, and classroom teachers. There would be no 
public release of school or school district results. But even this did little 
to further assuage the opposition. As Roeber (1986, p. 2) put it, “. . . if 
the [1969–70] state assessment program was strong on anything, it was 
strong on generating controversy! Teachers disliked the achievement 
measures. Low scoring districts disliked the percentile ranks. Parents 
and students were offended by the questions in the SES measure and 
turned off by the attitude scales. Administrators were defensive about 
potentially unfair comparisons, while teachers were worried about eval-
uation based on these test results.” 
Despite the initial opposition and the accompanying controversies, 
the first-year program did go forward, the assessments were adminis-
tered, answer sheets were collected and scored, and reports of the results 
were prepared.8 The reports were of two types. The first type was a pub-
lic report, which contained only general information on the levels and 
distribution of student performance for the state as a whole (Michigan 
Department of Education 1970). No individual school or school district 
information was included. The second type was the confidential local 
district reports sent individually to each local district in August of 1970. 
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These reports included the actual assessment scores for each local dis-
trict—each district receiving data only on its schools. 
When it was made known that local districts had received their indi-
vidual results, there immediately arose pressure from several sources 
calling on the MDE to provide, in one document, comparative data on 
all the schools in the state. The requests came from the news media, the 
governor, legislators, and state government officials: “The Chair of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee wanted the data, the House Appropri-
ations Committee, the House Education Committee, the House Special 
Committee on the Quality of Elementary and Secondary Schools, the 
Legislative Fiscal Agency, and several individual legislators all wanted 
the data” (Kearney and Huyser, 1973, p. 52).
The MDE was caught squarely between the interests of two com-
peting groups—1) the governor, legislators, and other state officials 
who demanded the data; and 2) local school personnel who felt that 
they had been assured that no such disclosures would be made.9 Need-
less to say, disclosure won out. The MDE somewhat reluctantly made 
the decision that not only would it publicly release local district results 
for future MEAP administrations beginning with the 1970–71 MEAP, it 
also would go back and prepare for public release a district-by-district 
summary of the 1969–70 results. 
We also should note that a second turn of events reinforced the 
MDE’s decision to publicly release the results of the 1969–70 MEAP. 
During the 1968 session of the Michigan legislature, a categorical aid 
program was added to the State School Aid Act, called Section 3, aimed 
at assisting those schools marked by “a high degree of concentration 
of economic and cultural deprivation.” In the three school years from 
1968–69 through 1970–71, under this provision certain schools became 
eligible for categorical aid based on criteria developed by the MDE. In 
the 1970–71 School Aid Act, the legislature raised the level of fund-
ing, but also changed the criteria. The new criteria required use of the 
1969–70 MEAP results to determine a school’s relative standing on two 
measures: 1) the percentage of students with socioeconomic depriva-
tion, and 2) the percentage of students with low achievement levels. 
The legislation, in effect, required the MDE to prepare a ranking of all 
schools in the state and, on the basis of that ranking, publicly release the 
point scores of all the schools falling in the bottom quartile. The MDE 
was then required to allocate the categorical aid on the basis of that 
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ranking. Thus, for practical purposes, the Section 3 legislation removed 
from the jurisdiction of the MDE the question of whether or not MEAP 
results would be publicly released.10
new challenges, new directions, new accomplishments 
The MEAP endured the trials and tribulations of its first year of 
operation, receiving not only continuing funding for 1970–71 but also 
its own statutory authority in the legislature’s adoption of Act 38 of the 
Public Acts of 1970. Still, the protests of local educators continued, 
including a threatened boycott of the program by several local school 
district administrators. And the protests in the early years of MEAP 
were not limited to school administrators. The Michigan Education 
Association, the state’s largest teacher union, mounted its own protests, 
including enlisting its parent organization, the NEA, in a campaign to 
discredit the MEAP and the MDE (see House, Rivers, and Stufflebeam 
[1974]). Nor were strong critiques of the program limited to mem-
bers of the school community; university professors, both within the 
state and on the national level, also got in their licks (see, for exam-
ple, House, Rivers, and Stufflebeam [1974] and Murphy and Cohen 
[1974]). It would be some years before Michigan witnessed any lasting 
change in the school community’s opposition to assessment testing, and 
particularly the sharing of assessment results with anyone other than 
professional educators. But that change did eventually come. 
Despite the initial obstacles and difficulties, the MEAP held on, 
and significant changes in the architecture of the program began to 
take place in the immediate years following 1969–70. The first was 
the introduction of every-pupil testing in 1970–71. As noted above, the 
1969–70 MEAP had been designed so that the basic—or smallest—
unit of analysis was a school building. There was to be no reporting of 
individual pupil results, nor was any such reporting possible. Many par-
ents, along with educators at the local school level, even while having 
serious reservations about the new testing program, were nevertheless 
displeased that the MEAP did not deliver individually reliable pupil 
scores. In response, the MDE directed a redesign of the 1970–71 MEAP 
so that the assessments would begin to provide individually reliable 
pupil results. In addition, the MDE began to turn away from exclu-
sive reliance on the Educational Testing Service, and started to recruit 
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and train Michigan classroom teachers as item writers. The teacher- 
developed items soon became perceived as better measures of achieve-
ment for Michigan students and, not surprisingly, became better 
accepted by Michigan teachers. At about the same time, a decision was 
made to jettison the MEAP’s norm-referenced approach and move to 
objective-referenced testing. The MDE, working with a new contractor, 
the California Test Bureau, and again enlisting Michigan educators in 
the effort, undertook the development of the performance objectives 
that would form the basis for building the new objective-referenced 
tests. The 1973–74 school year witnessed the MEAP’s first use of these 
new objective-referenced tests. Additional changes were to follow. In 
1979, grade 10 assessments in math and reading were added to the 
MEAP offerings. In 1985, science was added. 
Over the next several years, the MEAP underwent additional 
improvements, as well as a host of continuing trials and tribulations. 
And the MEAP endured, even though at times its continued existence 
seemed in doubt. A failed attempt to establish a grade 1 assessment 
led in 1975 to legislative threats of a moratorium on further expan-
sion, if not also discontinuation of the MEAP, a threat that was headed 
off by the SBE itself adopting a moratorium on immediate expansion. 
MDE and MEAP staff had to deal continually with the competing pres-
sures of meeting immediate program demands versus finding time for 
thoughtful and considered deliberation as ever newer demands were 
being placed upon the MEAP. Less than positive reviews by external 
scholars, as well as continuing brickbats from local educators and their 
state and national associations, added to the tension and strain (House, 
Rivers, and Stufflebeam 1974).11 But the program persisted and, one 
might say, took on a life of its own. Work was undertaken to develop 
additional performance objectives in other academic areas, including 
social studies, art, music, health, and physical education. MEAP tests 
in these areas were constructed, piloted, and initiated on a sampling 
basis in order to provide state and regional level information on how 
Michigan students were doing in these areas. Annual every-pupil test-
ing in reading and math at grades 4, 7, and 10, as well as every-pupil 
testing in science at grades 5, 8, and 11, continued to be a mainstay of 
the program through the 1990s. 
During this same time period, the MEAP introduced a new report-
ing scheme that was to become a harbinger of the “percent proficient” 
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reporting scheme later adopted under the pressures of EducationYes! 
and NCLB (see Chapter 3 in this volume). Called the Proportions	
Report, the new reporting scheme presented test scores, averaged over 
a three-year period, in a format that indicated the percentage of students 
(in the school and in the district) who had scored within each of four 
bands or levels. Band 4 included those students who achieved 75–100 
percent of the objectives tested; band 3 contained those students who 
achieved 50–74 percent of the objectives tested; band 2 held those stu-
dents who achieved 25–49 percent of the objectives; and band 1 held 
those who achieved 0–24 percent of the objectives.
For example, a school might find in grade 4 reading that only 10 
percent of its pupils scored within the top band, 15 percent of its stu-
dents scored within the next band, 20 percent of its students within band 
2, and 55 percent of its students within band 1, the bottom band. The 
MDE would designate this as a “high-needs” school, for it did not have 
at least 50 percent of its students scoring in the top band. A moderate-
needs school did not have at least 65 percent of its students scoring 
in the top band, and a school with at least 75 percent of its students 
scoring in the top band was a low-needs school. Based on the up or 
down movement of the school’s scores in subsequent years, it would be 
designated as improving or declining. The Propositions	Report indeed 
was a harbinger, a forerunner, of what was to come under NCLB and 
EducationYes!
In Chapter 3, we refer to the fact that in the 1990s the SBE was 
having its own problems with Governor John Engler, who at the time 
was challenging the authority of the SBE on several fronts by issuing a 
number of executive orders transferring major functions of the SBE and 
the MDE to other departments of state government.12 Included in these 
executive orders was the transfer of the MEAP to the Treasury Depart-
ment. As we noted, aside from the governor’s growing dissatisfaction 
with the SBE, the ostensible rationale behind the transfer was that the 
Treasury Department administered the Michigan Merit Scholarship 
Program, which awarded financial scholarships to secondary school 
students who passed the MEAP before completing high school.13
Thus the MEAP, first established in 1969 by the SBE and operated 
for over 20 years as an integral unit of the MDE, now became lodged 
in a different department of state government—one that, in truth, had 
little to do with public education. To further compound the problem, by 
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executive order, the governor also created the Center for Educational 
Performance and Information, and made it responsible for handling 
the MEAP data and related performance information on the schools. 
The SBE and the MDE, one might say, were left out in the cold. It 
was not until late 2004, two years into the administration of Governor 
Jennifer Granholm, that the MEAP was transferred back into the MDE 
and recovered its appropriate place in the state administrative frame-
work. During the years of its exile, the kindest thing one can say is 
that the MEAP endured, although some might argue that it simply lan-
guished, if it did not come close to “melting down.” Today, the MEAP 
and its sister programs are the centerpiece of the Bureau of Assessment 
and Accountability, a new MDE unit initially established in 2004 as the 
Office of Educational Assessment and Accountability.14 
Before we leave our brief and somewhat selective account of the 
history and development of the MEAP, there is one other significant 
structural change in the program that needs to be mentioned, namely, 
the introduction in 2007 of the ACT as the central piece of a new grade 
11 Michigan Merit Exam to take the place of the existing grade 11 
MEAP exam. The decision to add the ACT, one of the nation’s two most 
widely required and used college admissions tests—the other being 
the SAT—has an interesting lineage. As we noted earlier, throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s the nation witnessed a growing concern and dis-
satisfaction with American public education and particularly with the 
American high school. As one response to this, sometime in the late 
1980s the legislature placed an “unasked for” $783,000 in the MDE’s 
annual appropriation, along with language that called for the MDE to 
develop and administer to high school seniors an Employability Skills 
Test. 
Enquiring of the legislature what it meant by employability	skills, 
the consensus seemed to be that the legislature expected the MDE to 
develop a high school graduation test, assuming that the term employ-
ability skills was just educational jargon. In the years immediately 
following the appropriation, the MDE did develop an innovative 
employability skills project that would require each exiting high school 
student to leave with a portfolio that would document her or his readi-
ness for subsequent education and work. Unfortunately, this portfolio 
requirement never took off. With the advent of the Engler administra-
tion in early 1991, the program was more or less scrapped. 
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Subsequently, during the summer of 1991, the Michigan legislature 
adopted a requirement that the high school MEAP become a graduation 
test. After substantial lobbying on the part of the MDE and local educa-
tors, the legislature repealed the graduation requirement, but put in its 
place a requirement that all high school transcripts carry scores on the 
grade 11 MEAP, along with an entry indicating that the particular stu-
dent’s score represented performance at one of three levels: proficient, 
novice, or below novice. These performance-level designations were 
quite different from any of those used previously in the MEAP or, for 
that matter, in other testing programs such as the ACT.
While students still faced the requirement of the grade 11 MEAP 
and the entry of their scores and performance on transcripts, there 
remained a waning interest in sitting for the test, much less exerting 
the effort to score well. A growing movement among some parents and 
others in opposition to outcomes-based education, to state assessment, 
and particularly the grade 11 MEAP, buttressed this attitude. To counter 
the negativity, state government enacted an “incentive” by way of insti-
tuting the Michigan Merit Scholarship Program. Under this program, 
a student’s scores on the grade 11 MEAP, if high enough, made the 
student eligible to receive a $2,500 tuition grant from the state to help 
defray the cost of the first two years of a college education. 
However, a serious problem eventually arose from the use of the 
proficient, novice, or below novice designations on a student’s tran-
script, since in a good many cases the designations apparently were 
way out of line with a student’s ACT scores. Some students who were 
admitted to top-tier universities and colleges were labeled novice—or 
worse, below novice—on the grade 11 MEAP. Cases were reported, 
for example, of students with ACT scores in the mid- and high 20s 
being marked on their transcripts as novice on the basis of the grade 
11 MEAP scores. (The ACT has a range of 1 to 36, with a presumed 
mean of 18; a score in the mid- or high 20s is quite good, and certainly 
not the score of a novice learner.) This fomented a rebellion among the 
parents of many of these students and particularly suburban parents, as 
well as serious unrest among the state’s high school principals. It also 
later opened the door for the executive director of the Michigan Asso-
ciation of Secondary School Principals to mount a successful legislative 
lobbying effort to add the ACT to a modified grade 11 MEAP, all pack-
aged as the Michigan Merit Exam (MME), a comprehensive battery 
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that includes the ACT plus writing college entrance exam, portions of 
ACT’s WorkKeys work skills assessment, measures in reading, writing, 
total English language arts, math, science, and social studies (see Bal-
lard 2005). Today, each Michigan student in grade 11 is required to take 
the MME in the spring of the school year. The student then has avail-
able an ACT score, free of charge, to send to a college or university of 
his or her choice; he or she also becomes eligible for a $4,000 Michigan 
Promise Scholarship (which replaced the Michigan Merit Scholarship 
program), provided he or she take the entire MME and receive valid 
scores in math, reading, writing, and science.15
At best, we only have skimmed the surface of the history of the 
MEAP over the past 40-plus years, attempting to hit some of the high 
points to give the reader a sense of the factors that affected and shaped 
the program over that period of time. A full account of the history and 
development of the MEAP demands and deserves much more than we 
have presented here. We only hope that some future scholar might see 
fit to embark upon a definitive study of a program that, warts and all, has 
had a significant impact on Michigan education—an impact that prom-
ises to become even greater in the immediate years ahead. It is worth 
noting the comment of a MEAP staffer responsible for the program in 
its early days who left the MDE in 1991 only to return in 2003 to again 
head up the program. When asked how the MEAP program in 2003 
differed from the MEAP program he left in 1991, his response was that 
there was no longer any argument from locals as to why the state was 
assessing student performance.16 MEAP had become an accepted part 
of the educational landscape in Michigan.
The MEAP Today and Michigan’s Public Schools 
Over the past four decades, from its first offerings in January of 
1970 of assessments at grade 4 and grade 7 in reading comprehension, 
vocabulary, English expression, and math, plus a general section of 
26 questions designed to produce indirect group measures of socio- 
economic status and pupil attitudes and aspirations, to its current sched-
ule of offerings in six different subject areas at eight different grade 
levels, the MEAP has come a long way. Reading, writing, and math 
assessments now are offered every year at grades 3–8, science at grades 
5 and 8, social studies at grades 6 and 9, and the comprehensive MME 
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at grade 11. Student performances in all these subject areas are reported 
at the student and classroom levels confidentially, and at school, dis-
trict, and state levels publicly. Table 4.4 shows the current range of 
MEAP and MME offerings.17
A Look at Recent MEAP and MME Results
In Table 4.5, we present a statewide summary of MEAP scores at 
grades 3–9 for fall 2010, and MME scores at grade 11 for spring 2010, 
the most recent years for which results are available.
In reading, from grades 3–8 we find that 79–87 percent of Michigan 
students have attained proficiency, with the scores being slightly higher 
at the lower grades (3–6). In MEAP writing, the scores are of some con-
cern. However, we should note that the 2010 offering was a redesigned 
writing assessment administered for the first time in fall 2010. Addi-
tionally, the MEAP no longer calculates a total ELA score. Students in 
grades 3 and 4 appear to do particularly well in math, with between 91 





Total English language arts 3–8
Mathematics 3–8
Science 5 and 8









aGrades 4 and 7 only beginning in 2010–11.
NOTE: As of the 2008–2009 school year.
SOURCE: MDE.
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and 95 percent scoring at or above the proficient level. In the next four 
grades, 5–8, the percentages increase from grade 5 to grade 6, level 
off at grade 7, and experience a drop at grade 8. In science and social 
studies, students at only two grade levels were tested: grades 5 and 8 in 
science, and grades 6 and 9 in social studies. 
While the MEAP scores for grades 3–8 at face value appear pretty 
good, we still find upward of 15–30 percent of these students who have 
yet to attain proficiency in these basic subject areas. Still, pretty good 
is not good enough, particularly judged by NCLB’s goal of having 100 
percent of Michigan students reaching proficiency by school year 2013–
14. Additionally, the writing scores continue to be quite troublesome.
Table 4.5  Statewide MEAP and MME Results: Fall 2010—grades 3–9, 






3 87 — — 95 — —
4 84 48 — 91 — —
5 85 — — 80 81 —
6 84 — — 84 — 73
7 79 48 — 85 — —
8 82 — — 78 76 —
9 — — — — — 71
11 69 47 — 54 62 82
aIn fall 2010, the revised MEAP writing test was offered only at grades 4 and 7.
bIn fall 2010, no MEAP total ELA score was calculated. In addition, no MME total ELA 
score is calculated at grade 11.
cScience is offered only at grades 5, 8, and 11.
dSocial studies is offered only at grades 6, 9, and 11.
NOTE: For the MEAP, percent proficient includes the number of students who score at 
or above the proficient level. The MEAP uses four score levels: 1) not proficient, 2) 
partially proficient, 3) proficient, and 4) advanced. Not proficient means the student 
needs intensive intervention and support to improve achievement. Partially proficient 
means the student needs assistance to improve achievement. Proficient means the 
student’s performance indicates an understanding and application of key grade level 
expectations defined for Michigan students. Advanced means the student’s perfor-
mance exceeds grade level expectations and indicates substantial understanding and 
application of key concepts defined for Michigan students.
SOURCE: MDE. 
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The MME scores for grade 11 students are cause for even more 
concern: 31–53 percent of 11th graders have yet to reach proficiency in 
reading, writing, math, and science; in social studies, only 18 percent 
fail to meet the mark.
The summary results presented in Table 4.5 provide only a snapshot 
of student performance, a single cross-sectional look at one moment in 
time, school year 2010–11. What do the scores look like in prior years? 
Are the scores improving, declining, or staying the same? In Table 4.6 
we have arrayed the same scores for the same grades over the most 
recent five-year period in which the MEAP and MME were admin-
istered and scores were available, that is, from school year 2006–07 
through school year 2009–10. We use the scores in Table 4.6 to explore 
a bit further and see what trends may exist in each of the six subject 
areas, from grade to grade and over time. 
COMMEnTS On THE MEAP SCORES
In reading, with the exception of grades 6 and 7, the scores across 
the rows have been essentially flat from year to year, varying no more 
than 3–4 percentage points and hovering in the 80 percent range. At 
grade 6, this pattern is broken by an uptick of 8 percentage points in 
2009–10, but drops back 4 percentage points in the most recent year, 
2010–11. At grade 7, the percent proficient first dips down from 80 
percent to 72 percent over 2006 and 2007, but then jumps back up to 79 
percent in 2008 and tops out at 82 percent in 2009–10, followed by a 
drop back to 79 percent in 2010–11. The flatness across years rings the 
same alarm bell we mentioned above: upward of 20 percent of students 
consistently are falling short of reaching the goal of 100 percent profi-
ciency. But even more worrisome is the pattern we see when looking 
down the columns. With two exceptions, in each of the years, there is 
a drop of approximately 10 percentage points from grade 3 to grade 8, 
with the biggest single drop—10 percentage points—coming between 
grades 6 and 7 in 2007–08. At grade 8, with the exception of the two 
most recent years, roughly 25 percent of the students have yet to reach 
proficiency. In 2009–10 and 2010–11, the percentages drop to 17 and 
18 percent, respectively, but are still troublesome.
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Table 4.6  Statewide MEAP and MME Results, grades 3–9 and 11, 
 2006–07, 2007–08, 2008–09, 2009–10, Percent Proficient
Reading
Grade 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
3 87 86 87 90 87
4 85 84 83 84 84
5 84 82 81 85 85
6 83 82 80 88 84
7 80 72 79 82 79
8 76 77 76 83 82
11 63 66 64 69 67
Writing
Grade 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10a 2010–11b
3 52 67 61 —
4 45 44 44 47
5 57 59 63 —
6 74 73 76 —
7 65 77 78 48
8 67 70 74 —
11 43 45 47 47 51
Total ELA
Grade 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10c 2010–11c
3 79 81 83
4 78 76 77
5 78 78 78
6 78 80 89
7 76 74 80
8 71 75 77
11 — — —
Mathematics
Grade 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
3 88 90 91 95 95
4 85 86 88 92 91
5 76 74 77 79 80
6 69 73 80 82 84
7 64 73 83 82 85
8 68 71 75 70 78
11 50 50 53 54 56
(continued)
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Science
Grade 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
5 83 82 83 81 78
8 75 79 77 76 78
11 60 61 60 62 65
Social studies
Grade 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
6 73 74 74 73 75
9 74 71 72 71 73
11 87 84 84 87 81
aIn fall 2010, the MEAP writing test at grades 3–8 was undergoing revision.
bIn fall 2010, the revised MEAP writing test was offered only at grades 4 and 7.
cIn fall 2009, no MEAP total ELA score was calculated. In addition, no MME total ELA 
score is calculated at grade 11.
NOTE: For the MEAP, percent proficient includes the number of students who score at 
or above the proficient level. The MEAP uses four score levels: 1) not proficient, 2) 
partially proficient, 3) proficient, and 4) advanced. Not proficient means the student 
needs intensive intervention and support to improve achievement. Partially proficient 
means the student needs assistance to improve achievement. Proficient means the 
student’s performance indicates an understanding and application of key grade level 
expectations defined for Michigan students. Advanced means the student’s perfor-
mance exceeds grade level expectations and indicates substantial understanding and 
application of key concepts defined for Michigan students.
SOURCE: MDE.
Table 4.6  (continued)
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The available writing scores vary considerably and certainly are 
not what one would call sterling. The grade 4 scores across the first 
three years—2006–07 through 2008–09—are particularly low and flat. 
The good news is that at grade 7 the scores have risen by 13 percentage 
points over the three years, and at grades 5 and 8 they have risen by 6 
and 7 percentage points, respectively. Grade 3 appears somewhat puz-
zling, going from 52 percent to 67 percent between 2006 and 2007, but 
then dropping to 61 percent in 2008. As we noted above, the MDE is 
not satisfied with the writing assessment and currently is developing a 
new and expanded writing assessment that was not offered in 2009–10 
and administered only at grades 4 and 7 in fall 2010. This, of course, 
raises questions about the validity of the new writing assessment at both 
grade levels.
The available total ELA scores present a set of patterns not unlike 
those we see in the reading scores. At three levels—grades 3, 4, and 
5—the scores across the rows are essentially flat. At the other three 
levels—grades 6, 7, and 8—they increase over the three-year span. At 
grades 6, 7, and 8, the percentage point increase is 11, 4, and 6, respec-
tively. Looking down the columns, we see almost the same general 
pattern of declining scores that we saw in reading, although not quite 
as large—6–8 percentage points versus 10 percentage points. However, 
in 2008 there is a bit of an anomaly at grade 6. The score at grade 6 
jumps up 11 percentage points over grade 5, but then drops down again 
by 9 percentage points at grade 7. Again, as we noted above, no total 
ELA score was calculated for 2009–10 since the writing test was being 
redesigned. And the decision was made not to calculate a total ELA 
beginning in 2011.
The mathematics scores are interesting on a couple of accounts. 
First, the scores across the time span at grades 6–8 are increasing appre-
ciably: at grade 6 there is an increase of 15 percentage points; at grade 
7 the increase is 21 percentage points; at grade 8 the increase is much 
smaller, but still an increase. The trajectory is upward and therefore 
hopeful, even though there is still a good ways to go to reach 100 per-
cent proficiency in math. Second, even more interesting is grade 7, 
where the percent proficient has increased from 64 percent in 2006, 
to 73 percent in 2007, to 83 percent in 2008, to 82 percent in 2009, 
and to 85 percent in 2010–11—increases of about 10 percentage points 
from year to year with the exception of the final two years. Something 
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certainly seems to be happening here, and it is happening in the central 
year of middle school, the proverbial bugbear of mathematics teaching. 
In science and social studies, MEAP assessments are given only at 
two grade levels, thus we are limited in examining patterns. Acknowl-
edging this limitation, we do see that in science the patterns across the 
two rows, grades 5 and 8, are essentially flat, except for a slight drop-off 
at grade 5 in the most recent year, 2010–11. Looking down the columns, 
we see percentage point decreases ranging from 3 to 8. But given that 
there are only two entries in each column for the MEAP, we should be 
cautious in drawing any conclusions. The same can be said for grade 
6 and grade 9 social studies. Indeed, both the rows across and the col-
umns down are essentially flat.
COMMEnTS On THE MME SCORES
The final rows in Table 4.6, labeled grade 11, display results from the 
five most recent administrations of the MME. In the spring of 2007, the 
MME replaced the grade 11 MEAP assessment and is now administered 
each year during the month of March. The MME includes several parts: 
the ACT plus writing college entrance exam, portions of the WorkKeys 
work skills assessment, and several Michigan components developed 
to assess Michigan high school content standards. The MME delivers 
scores in reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, as 
well as the ACT scores. The specific score categories delivered by the 
MME are listed in Table 4.4. The MME also is an integral part of the 
Michigan Promise Scholarship. To qualify for the $4,000 scholarship, 
students must take the entire MME and receive valid scores in reading, 
math, science, and writing.18 
In Table 4.7, at the risk of being redundant, we have summarized 
the MME results that first appeared as the grade 11 rows in Table 4.6. 
Once again, the scores are reported in terms of the percentage of stu-
dents who scored at the proficient or higher levels as approved by the 
SBE. 
Percentage-wise these scores overall tend to be lower than the 
grades 3–9 scores, with the single exception of the social studies scores, 
which are more in line with the grades 3–9 scores in the several subject 
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areas. In terms of the NCLB goal of 100 percent proficiency by 2013–
14, the grade 11 scores also are cause for serious concern. 
THE ACT ExAM
The ACT is a college entrance exam, not unlike the SAT. Many 
colleges and universities do require the exam as part of their admission 
processes, and most likely, a student’s scores on the ACT (or the SAT) 
enter into admissions decisions to one extent or another depending on 
the college or university in which a student seeks to enroll. The mini-
mum possible score on the ACT is 1, and the maximum possible score 
is 36. ACT lists its presumed mean or average score as 18. The writing 
score, however, has a different range; the minimum possible score is 2 
and the maximum possible score is 12; the presumed mean is 6. 
In Table 4.8, we present the statewide ACT results for 2007–2011. 
For all five years, 13 of the scores are slightly above the presumed 
mean of 18.0—composite, math, reading, and science. For four of the 
years, the scores in English plus writing are slightly below the pre-
sumed mean. The scores in English over the four-year period increase 






2006–07 63 43 54 50 60 87
2007–08 66 45 56 50 61 84
2008–09 64 47 56 53 60 84
2009–10 69 47 — 54 62 82
2010–11 67 51 — 56 65 81
aNo total ELA for the MME results at grade 11 was calculated in the school years 
2009–10 through 2010–11. 
NOTE: In addition to reporting on subject matter achievement, the NAEP also reports 
on instructional experiences and school environment for populations of students (e.g., 
all 4th graders) and groups within those populations (e.g., female students, Hispanic 
students). For those interested in more information, see the IES Center for Educational 
Statistics Web site: http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/.
SOURCE: MDE.
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from 17.6 to 18.3. Finally, the four writing scores are slightly above the 
presumed mean of 6.0. Overall, these are respectable if not outstanding 
scores, particularly remembering that the ACT in Michigan is not a self-
selected test but rather one that all grade 11 students are required to take 
as one part of the MME. But we leave it to the reader to make her or his 
personal judgments about what the scores in Table 4.8 tell us about the 
academic performance of Michigan’s high school youth. 
Having now completed our presentation of recent MEAP and MME 
assessment scores, let us return to the critical question we raised earlier, 
namely, how do these MEAP results compare with the disheartening 
picture presented earlier in the NAEP scores? 
A COMPARISOn OF MEAP AnD nAEP SCORES
As we see in Table 4.2, the NAEP state-level score results for 
Michigan are dismaying, but Michigan is not alone. Many other states 
do not fare well on the NAEP, and when comparing their NAEP scores 
to the corresponding scores reported in their own state assessment pro-
grams, the differences often are also stark, as can be seen in Table 4.9. 
For example, judging Michigan on the basis of its MEAP scores paints 
a much rosier picture than judging Michigan on the basis of its NAEP 
scores. By Michigan standards, fully 84 percent of its combined 4th 
and 8th graders are proficient in reading in 2009; by NAEP standards 
that figure falls to 31 percent. Almost identical differences are seen in 
Michigan’s combined 4th and 8th grade mathematics scores. A simi-
Table 4.8  Statewide ACT Results, grade 11
Composite English   
English + 
writing Math Reading Science Writing
2007 18.8 17.6 17.3 18.8 18.9 19.3 6.4
2008 18.8 17.6 17.5 19.0 18.8 19.5 6.6
2009 19.0 18.0 17.9 19.2 19.0 19.4 6.7
2010 19.3 18.3 17.9 19.3 19.4 19.7 6.5
2011 19.3 18.7 n/a 19.8 19.2 19.9 n/a
SOURCE: MDE.
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lar picture results when examining Michigan’s state assessment scores 
compared to the U.S. average state assessment scores, and then also 
comparing those scores to NAEP scores. The NAEP scores come in 
48–53 percentage points lower than Michigan scores and 34–35 per-
centage points lower than the U.S. average scores. The difference 
between a state’s assessment scores and its NAEP scores is most stark 
in the case of Nebraska, where the NAEP reading score is almost 56 
percentage points lower than its own state assessment reading score; its 
NAEP math score is 53 percentage points lower.19 
In Table 4.10, we present 2010 NAEP scores for two critical subject 
areas and two critical transition points in a student’s journey through the 
grades. Reading is absolutely essential to success in school, and par-
ticularly for students as they leave the primary or elementary phase and 
enter the middle years of schooling. Unfortunately, the NAEP scores in 
4th grade reading are, to say the least, underwhelming. By NAEP stan-
dards, only 30 percent of Michigan 4th graders are proficient in reading, 
and while that score is just 3 percentage points shy of the U.S. average, 
Table 4.9  Academic Achievement in Reading and Mathematics, Percent 
Proficient, grades 4 and 8 Averaged
State assessments 2009a NAEP 2009
Reading Math Reading Math
Michigan 83.5 81.0 30.5 33.0
United States 67.4 70.5 32.5 36.5
Nebraska 90.5 89.7 35.0 36.5
aThe state assessment scores for Michigan are 2009 scores; the state assessment scores 
for the United States and Nebraska are 2007 scores.
SOURCE: Education	Week (2009).
Table 4.10  Academic Achievement in Reading and Mathematics, Percent 
Proficient, nAEP 2009, grade 4 Elementary and grade 8 
Middle School
NAEP grade 4 reading NAEP grade 8 math
Michigan 30 31
United States 33 34
Massachusetts 47 52 
SOURCE: Education	Week (2009).
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it is still 17 percentage points below Massachusetts, the highest scor-
ing state in the nation. Mathematics also is a critical school subject, 
and mathematics achievement in middle school, or the lack thereof, is 
of serious and growing concern. The student who exits middle school 
without a solid base in mathematics will face serious challenges in 
high school. Yet only 31 percent of Michigan 8th graders are deemed 
proficient in 2010 by NAEP standards—3 percentage points under the 
national average and trailing Massachusetts again, this time by 21 per-
centage points.
Table 4.11 lists comparative figures for the percent proficient on 
selected MEAP scores and NAEP scores for the year 2010 for read-
ing and math. The comparative figures for science are for MEAP 2006 
and NAEP 2005, the most recent somewhat comparable scores. The 
comparisons indeed are startling. As measured by MEAP scores, Mich-
igan 4th and 8th graders are doing quite well in reading, math, and 
science. But these same students are not doing nearly so well, indeed 
quite poorly, as measured by NAEP scores. In reading, the difference at 
grade 4 is 54 percentage points, and at grade 8 it is 52 percentage points. 
Math and science scores also paint an equally dismal picture with dif-
ferences ranging from 36 to 53 percentage points. The fall 2009 MEAP 
scores indicate that from 70 percent to better than 92 percent of the 
Table 4.11  Academic Achievement in Selected Subjects, Percent 
Proficient, MEAP Fall 2009 versus nAEP Spring 2010
MEAP NAEP
Reading
Grade 4 84 30
Grade 8 83 31
Math
Grade 4 92 39
Grade 8 70 34
Science
Grade 5 83a 30b
Grade 8 75a 35b
aFrom year 2006.
bFrom year 2005. 
SOURCE: MDE and National Center for Educational Statistics, the Nation’s Report 
Card: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states. 
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Michigan students in question have attained the state’s proficient level 
in their respective subject matter areas. The spring 2010 NAEP scores, 
on the other hand, paint a far different picture—no more than one-third 
of Michigan 4th and 8th graders attained the NAEP’s proficient level 
in their respective subject matter areas—reading, mathematics, and sci-
ence (the sole exceptions being grades 4 and 8 math scores and grade 8 
science scores, which, at 34 percent, 39 percent, and 35 percent slightly 
exceed the one-third mark). 
MEAP versus nAEP—Further Considerations
From our examination of the data in Tables 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, it 
is patently clear that judging Michigan only on the basis of its MEAP 
scores paints a much rosier picture than judging it on the basis of its 
NAEP scores. As we see in Table 4.9, by Michigan standards nearly 
84 percent of the state’s combined 4th and 8th graders are proficient 
in reading in 2009, but when using NAEP standards that figure falls to 
31 percent—a drop of more than 50 percentage points. Almost identi-
cal differences are seen in combined 4th and 8th grade math scores. 
In Table 4.10, we are witness to the sorry state of Michigan’s grade 4 
NAEP reading scores and grade 8 NAEP math scores. The differences 
become even more obvious in Table 4.11. (And looking back to Table 
4.3, we witnessed the absolutely abysmal NAEP reading and math 
scores for the Detroit Public Schools.)
Why do we see such differences? What are the reasons? Some will 
argue that Michigan has set the bar too low; others will argue that the 
NAEP has set the bar too high. Some will argue that Michigan’s assess-
ment tests are not rigorous enough; others will argue that the NAEP’s 
assessments are too rigorous. And some argue that such comparisons 
are inappropriate if not invalid. Let’s look at some of the possible expla-
nations for these sizable differences. 
The problem of content standards
Assessment tests, whether national or state, are based on content 
standards. Thus, a problem arises from the fact that the content stan-
dards employed by the MEAP and the NAEP are different. Content 
standards should set forth a near complete description of what it is that 
a student should know and master in a particular subject at a particular 
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grade or level. They are the bedrock of any given achievement test. For 
example, an NAEP assessment test will be based on specific descrip-
tions of a body of knowledge and skills that the NAEP governing board 
believes a student should know and master, say, in 4th grade math. Cor-
respondingly, a MEAP assessment—or any state’s assessment—in the 
same subject matter field and at the same grade level will be based on 
specific descriptions of a body of knowledge and skills that the SBE—
or any state’s governing board—believes a student should know and 
master in 4th grade math. Problems quickly arise because the NAEP 
standards and the MEAP standards—or any individual state’s content 
standards—are not the same; indeed it is fair to say that that they differ 
considerably, and furthermore were developed for different purposes. 
The NAGB board members are on record as stating that the NAEP con-
tent standards should be “aspirational,” that they should address what 
“ought” to be taught (Vinovskis 1998, p. 44). In effect, they are intended 
to establish a very high set of expectations, nothing but the best, so to 
speak, or, as is often claimed, they constitute “the gold standard.” The 
MEAP content standards, on the other hand, lie more on the pragmatic 
side, designed to link closely with classroom instruction. In any event, 
there is no question that the MEAP content standards differ appreciably 
from the NAEP content standards and, by and large, so do the separate 
content standards established by each of the other 49 states. 
Earlier, we referred to a published statement by the executive direc-
tor of the National Secondary School Principals Association calling for 
resolving this problem by moving to establish national standards and 
a national test: “Sadly some states have set their bars exceedingly low 
and have given their ‘proficient’ students a false sense of achievement 
. . . If Congress truly wants to drive an education agenda for higher stan-
dards . . . [it] should shift the law at its foundation to institute national 
standards and a national test in reading and math” (Tirozzi 2009). 
Thus, it would seem that the answer to the problem of so many 
different separate sets of content standards among the 50 states—and 
content standards that differ appreciably from the NAEP content stan-
dards—is for the states to forgo their own separate content standards 
and buy into the establishment of a common set of national standards. 
But the question of forgoing separate state standards and establish-
ing national standards, and a national test, quickly presents another set 
of problems. After all, as we note in Chapter 3, under the 10th Amend-
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ment to the U.S. Constitution education is a matter left to the states. 
Still, the national government properly gets into the mix on the basis 
of Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution—Congress’s author-
ity and responsibility to provide for the general welfare and common 
defense of the nation. So immediately we become involved in questions 
of federalism—to what extent will citizens in the separate states accept, 
or even tolerate, further federal inroads into deciding what subjects and 
what content ought to be taught in our public schools?20 Is this properly 
a decision that should be reserved to the separate states, respecting the 
principle of subsidiarity? Or is it more properly a matter of the nation’s 
general welfare and common defense? If not the federal government, 
could the task be assigned to a nonfederal or nongovernmental body 
created for the purpose? If the nation were to move in the direction of 
national standards, what of the costs of jettisoning 50 separate states’ 
sets of content standards and replacing them with a new or revised set 
of national assessment standards? Who should, and who would, assume 
responsibility for the costs? The Congress? The individual states? Or 
would it necessitate establishing some sort of shared responsibility?
In mid-2009, the nation’s governors and state education chiefs set out 
to answer these questions. Under the auspices of their two professional 
organizations, the National Governors Association and the Council of 
Chief State School Officers, the governors and the chiefs launched a 
first attempt to establish common core standards for the nation’s pub-
lic schools. On July 21, 2010, the two organizations jointly announced 
that not only had they completed work on common core standards in 
English language arts and math, but that 27 states had adopted the stan-
dards and about a dozen more were expected to do so in the following 
weeks (see Lewin [2010, p. A:1]). The three states mentioned earlier 
apparently were holdouts—Texas, Alaska, and Virginia. So, it appears 
that 40 or more states were now ready to jettison their separate sets of 
core content standards and begin moving toward the adoption of a set of 
common core standards—common content standards for what it is that 
children should know and be able to do as a consequence of their public 
schooling. Yet much remains to be done, not the least being to success-
fully mount similar efforts in other subject matter areas such as science, 
social studies, and the arts and humanities (see Dillon [2011b]). And 
even if these efforts are wholly successful, there remain a second and 
third problem. The second problem is the question of setting perfor-
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mance standards. The third problem is the question of constructing a 
common test to measure the performance of students against the com-
mon core standards.
The problem of performance standards
The second problem, in fact one that is inextricably linked to the 
problem of content standards, is what score levels should be estab-
lished to determine whether a student has attained proficiency in any 
given subject at any given grade level. In addressing the problem of 
performance standards, the NAEP has set four performance levels: 1) 
basic, 2) proficient, 3) advanced, and 4) below basic.21 For the NAEP, 
proficiency is defined as scoring at or above its proficient level. The 
MEAP has set four performance levels: 1) advanced 2) proficient, 3) 
partially proficient, and 4) not proficient. For the MEAP, proficiency 
is defined as scoring at or above the proficient level. The MEAP’s not 
proficient level is analogous to the NAEP’s below basic designation. It 
goes without saying that the performance standards used by the NAEP 
are different from those used by the MEAP, even though the names or 
descriptive titles for the levels look similar. Each set of performance 
standards—the MEAP’s and the NAEP’s—is separately established, 
based on different tests, and each of the tests, in turn, is based on differ-
ent content standards. In addition, NAEP scores are based on sampling 
frames; not every pupil is tested. MEAP scores are based on every-pupil 
testing.22 So, at the risk of appearing somewhat facetious, comparing 
performance results on the MEAP and the NAEP is, as the saying goes, 
like comparing apples and oranges.
The problem of a common test
Assuming that current efforts to develop and adopt nationwide com-
mon core standards prove successful, and that agreement can be reached 
on what the student performance levels ought to be, the third problem 
to be addressed is the development and adoption of a common national 
test to measure the performance of students against the standards. We 
do, of course, already have the NAEP, but it is unlikely that it could or 
would be used for the purposes we have in mind. It was designed and 
developed to sample the learning and knowledge of groups of students, 
to provide a periodic check on the educational progress of individual 
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states and the nation, not to measure the academic achievement of indi-
vidual students. To modify it to do the latter would be a huge if not 
prohibitive task. The NAEP is not given annually but rather periodi-
cally. It does not cover the entire 3–8 grade span, but rather only select 
grade levels. For example, the NAEP reading and math tests cover only 
grades 4 and 8 and are given only every other year (see Table 4.1). The 
NAEP is a national—not nationwide—test, funded by the federal gov-
ernment and governed by a federally appointed board of directors. As 
such, it again would lead one to become quickly enmeshed in questions 
of federalism. To have each state develop its own assessments (and 
performance standards), even when based on nationwide common core 
standards, would seem to run awry from the goal of common academic 
measurement across the nation. Thus, it seems that the effort, without 
question, would necessitate the development of a new nationwide test, 
built on core standards and common across the 50 states. It would be a 
substantial but doable task, one that would require considerable time, 
effort, and cost.
Indeed, work already is under way on addressing the problem. In 
September 2010, two consortia were awarded federal grants to begin 
the task of constructing common assessments. The first set of common 
assessments, aligned with the common core standards, will be devel-
oped in English language arts and math. As of February 2011, 45 states 
and the District of Columbia had signed on to participate in the work of 
the consortia. The MDE is a member of one of these two consortia and 
has assumed a leadership role in the consortium’s work. The target date 
for the first administration of the common assessments is the 2014–15 
school year. If all goes well, by school year 2015–16, Michigan’s state 
assessment scores, as well as the assessment scores of some 40-plus 
other states, should be well in line with the NAEP scores. However, 
saying that the results of the two tests should be well in line begs the 
question, of course, of whether the score levels—the percent proficient 
on either or both tests—will satisfy the parents, legislators, educators, 
and other citizens of Michigan. 
Shorter-term solutions
But short of moving to common core content and performance stan-
dards and a common test, there are some steps that might be taken in the 
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short run to better align the results of the states’ and the NAEP’s testing 
programs. First, for Michigan, perhaps the easiest if not the most desir-
able or defensible step would be to raise the cut scores that are used 
to set the performance levels on the MEAP. Other states could do the 
same. The current MEAP cut scores are judgments made through a for-
mal standard-setting process. In setting cut scores the MDE convenes 
standard-setting panels broadly representative of teachers, adminis-
trators, parents, and members of the business community. The panels 
meet, are trained, and then examine actual score profiles. Based on that 
examination and its judgments, the panel offers its recommendations on 
cut scores to the MDE, which in turn recommends acceptance, accep-
tance with revisions, or nonacceptance to the SBE. The SBE then takes 
action to adopt, revise and adopt, or reject the recommendations. The 
NAEP follows a similar judgmental process in setting its cut scores and 
performance standards. 
A second way the MDE could set new cut scores would be by statis-
tically recalibrating them against an enhanced set of content standards 
or expectations. In February 2011, the SBE took action to do just that. 
The board directed the MDE to recalibrate the current MEAP cut scores 
“to make them consistent with the skills students need to be prepared 
for college and careers” (Higgins 2011a). Spring of 2011 is the tar-
get for approving the new cut scores which then will be applied to the 
2011–12 MEAP assessments. The good news is that the SBE’s action 
is a first step in bringing the MEAP scores into closer alignment with 
the NAEP scores. The bad news is that, at least initially, this will result 
in a precipitous drop in the MEAP scores, resulting in a far lesser per-
centage of Michigan students attaining proficiency. For example, it is 
estimated that the percent proficient in grade 3 math will drop from 95 
percent in 2009 to 34 percent in 2011, bringing the MEAP scores much 
more in line with the NAEP scores. This action also is bound to have 
a significant impact—probably a substantial drop—on the number of 
Michigan schools that meet the federal requirement for AYP.23 To say 
the least, many schools—and their communities—will be in for a rude 
awakening. But one cannot reasonably argue against raising expecta-
tions and inducing more rigor into the system, provided of course that 
the increased expectations and demands are accompanied by ample 
resources and renewed efforts to improve the quality of teaching and 
instruction.
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A third but more difficult step, at least politically, to move toward 
closer alignment with the MEAP and NAEP scores would be to convince 
the NAGB to include in its definition of proficiency those students who 
score at its basic or higher level, in effect lowering the current NAGB 
cut scores. There are fairly strong arguments for doing this. Martineau 
(2007, p. 15) makes a somewhat compelling case that “the available 
evidence indicates that NAEP cut scores are inaccurate representations 
of proficiency.” His comments follow on a long history of controversy 
and contention over the advisability and validity of the NAEP’s perfor-
mance standards (Vinovskis 1998; Beaton and Johnson 2004; Bourge 
2004; Linn 2004). 
At first, the two descriptions—the NAEP’s basic and the MEAP’s 
proficient—do not seem that far apart. For the NAEP, basic “denotes 
partial mastery of knowledge and skills that are fundamental for profi-
cient work at each grade level.” For the MEAP, proficient “means the 
student’s performance indicates an understanding and application of 
key grade level expectations defined for Michigan students.” 
Without attempting to resolve the dispute it would seem useful, at 
the least, to examine what some of the comparisons might look like if 
the NAGB governing board chose to include in its definition of profi-
ciency those students who score at its basic level or higher. In Table 
4.12, which is a revision of Table 4.11, we have done just that. In the 
NAEP column, we changed the original scores to now reflect the per-
centage of those Michigan students who scored at the basic level or 
higher on the spring 2010 NAEP. 
While one might question the validity of the comparisons, they do 
present quite a different and, at least from Michigan’s point of view, 
more positive picture. There still remain some substantial differences—
for example, in grade 4 reading, grade 4 math, and grade 5 science. But 
the new comparisons do better align the MEAP scores and the NAEP 
scores. At the least, it should make one pause and ask whether the prob-
lem is not so much in the MEAP performance standards as it is in the 
NAEP performance standards—or, for that matter, in the MEAP or 
NAEP content standards. 
One also might ask whether a part of the problem is in the media’s 
reporting of the scores. While Detroit’s MEAP and NAEP scores are not 
a very good example, it is interesting to note again that the two Detroit 
newspapers reported Detroit’s Trial Urban District Assessment (TUDA) 
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scores using basic and above rather than NAEP’s criterion of proficient 
and above. This gave Detroit’s absolutely abysmal NAEP scores a 
slight boost, as depicted in Table 4.13. Indeed, while it improves the 
picture for Detroit, even very large, huge differences still remain, mak-
ing Detroit’s MEAP scores appear even more suspect. 
But we will have to leave a definitive answer to the questions raised 
to the measurement experts and, more appropriately, to the policymak-
ers. For it is the policymakers—whether the SBE or the NAGB—who 
have made and will make the ultimate decisions on what the perfor-
mance standards will be, as attested to by the most recent SBE action in 
Michigan mentioned earlier. 
A cautionary note
It is with some trepidation that we offer the foregoing, for a good 
many experts in the measurement community would argue that it is with 
considerable risk that one undertakes comparisons of state assessment 
Table 4.12  Academic Achievement in Selected Subjects, Percent 
Proficient, MEAP 2009 versus nAEP 2009
MEAP NAEP
Reading
Grade 4 84 64
Grade 8 83 72
Math
Grade 4 92 78
Grade 8 70 68
Science
Grade 5 81a 69b
Grade 8 76a 66b
aFrom year 2006.
bFrom year 2005. 
NOTE: For the NAEP, in this table proficient is defined as a score of basic or above. In 
addition to reporting on subject matter achievement as measured by MEAP, the MDE 
in its school report card also reports on the extent to which local districts are meeting 
a number of other legislative requirements. For information on these requirements, see 
the MDE Web site: http://www.michigan.gov/mde.
SOURCE: MDE and National Center for Educational Statistics, the Nation’s Report 
Card: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states. 
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results with NAEP results, and that such comparisons at best should be 
used with extreme caution (NCES 2007). Ho and Haertel (2007), for 
example, writing on the underlying assumptions of state-NAEP com-
parisons, point out that while there is a large body of literature on linking 
state tests to the NAEP, much of it is indeed cautionary. Still, such com-
parisons, driven largely by NCLB, have become widespread, and public 
school personnel, as well as state and national policymakers, are forced 
to answer to them. In doing so, educators and policymakers would do 
well to heed the advice offered by Ho and Haertel: “As awareness of 
the fundamental differences between state tests and NAEP grows more 
widespread, we hope and anticipate that State-NAEP discrepancies will 
be used, not to confirm suspicions of invalid state results, but to begin 
deeper explorations into the differences between tests and testing prac-
tices” (p. 5). 
A FInAL ObSERvATIOn
Irrespective of whether one favors moving to nationwide standards 
and a nationwide test, or raising cut scores on the state assessment, or 
defining students who score at the basic level on the NAEP as proficient, 
or simply giving up on trying to link state results with NAEP results, we 
Table 4.13  Detroit Public Schools, Academic Achievement in Selected 
Subjects, Percent Proficient, MEAP 2009 versus nAEP 2009
MEAP NAEPa NAEPb
Reading
Grade 4 64 5 27
Grade 8 69 7 40
Math
Grade 4 76 3 31
Grade 8 40 4 23
aProficiency is defined as a score of proficient or above on the NAEP scale.
bProficiency is defined as a score of basic or above on the NAEP scale.
SOURCE: MDE and National Center for Educational Statistics, the Nation’s Report 
Card: http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/districts. 
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can certainly celebrate the transparency that has come about in public 
education as a consequence of the NAEP and of state assessment pro-
grams such as the MEAP. No longer is information on the academic 
attainments of students in our public schools the sole province of the 
professional educator. The doors and the windows have been thrown 
open, and any one of us—parent, advocate, citizen, businessperson, 
legislator, state executive—has access to a wealth of comparative infor-
mation on the performance of our local schools and school districts, 
our state public school systems, and our nation.24 Such information 
alone, of course, will not automatically alleviate the educational prob-
lems facing the state or the nation; it will, however, further empower 
those concerned with improving the quality of our public schools. Used 
creatively and thoughtfully, that information can result in improved 
education for the children and youth of Michigan and the nation. 
notes
1. For this section, we draw on Jones and Olkin (2004), who provide a lengthy and 
detailed account of the history and development of the NAEP.
2. For the reader interested in further detail, we recommend consulting either of the 
following two publications: Jones and Olkin (2004) or Vinovskis (1998). 
3. The NAEP also drew samples by community type (e.g., urban core, suburban, 
town, and rural), socioeconomic status, racial-ethnic group, and sex.
4. See Note 2 above, and Chapter 3 in this volume.
5. In addition to reporting on subject matter achievement, the NAEP also reports on 
instructional experiences and school environment for populations of students (e.g., 
all 4th graders) and groups within those populations (e.g., female students, His-
panic students). For those interested in more information, see the IES Center for 
Educational Statistics Web site: http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/.
6. Both Detroit newspapers reported these results as 69 percent and 77 percent of 
Detroit 4th and 8th graders, respectively, scoring below basic on the NAEP assess-
ments, which is bad enough. However, by NAEP standards the situation is even 
worse. The NAEP does not include the basic category in its definition of profi-
ciency. Only the two top NAEP score categories, proficient and advanced, are 
included in the NAEP definition of proficiency. Thus, discounting scores of stu-
dents who scored at the basic and below basic levels, and including only scores 
of students who scored at the proficient and advanced levels, we arrive at the 3 
percent and 4 percent proficiency scores reported here. That is, by the NAEP’s 
scoring protocol, more than 90 percent of all DPS 4th and 8th graders were not 
proficient in either math or reading. 
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7. For this section I draw extensively on Kearney (1970, 1971), Kearney and Huyser 
(1973), and Brictson and Roeber (n.d.). 
8. A fuller account of the controversies that surrounded the program in its initial year 
is provided in Kearney (1970).
9. For a fuller account of the demands for public release of the assessment results 
and the MDE’s acquiescence to these demands, see Kearney and Huyser (1973).
10. The program still exists today but in substantially amended form. No longer are 
MEAP results used. Rather, allocations are now made to school districts that have 
a high incidence of children coming from poverty circumstances, as measured by 
the number of children eligible for free and reduced price lunches. The allocations 
are effected by adding 0.115 weighting per eligible pupil (counting each of those 
pupils as 1.115) to the foundation allowance of those districts eligible for the aid. 
11. See Kearney and Huyser (1973); House, Rivers, and Stufflebeam (1973); and 
Murphy and Cohen (1974).
12. During his tenure, Governor Engler issued over 100 executive orders transferring 
existing units of state government from one agency to another, as well as orders 
that created new departments including the Center for Educational Performance 
and Information. 
13. Under this program, a student’s scores on the 11th grade MEAP, if high enough, 
made the student eligible to receive a $2,500 tuition grant from the state to help 
defray the cost of the first two years of a college education.
14. In addition to the MEAP, the bureau also offers a continuum of alternate assess-
ments to serve special needs students, including MEAP (with accommodations), 
MEAP-Access, MI-Access Functional Independence, MI-Access Supported Inde-
pendence, and MI-Access Participation. For information on these assessments, see 
the MDE Web site: http://michigan.gov/mde. 
15. Unfortunately, funding for the Michigan Promise scholarship was eliminated by 
legislative action in July 2010 as the state moved to eliminate a pending $2.8 mil-
lion shortfall in the FY 2011 budget.
16. Telephone interview with Edward D. Roeber, April 29, 2009.
17. In addition to reporting on subject matter achievement as measured by MEAP, the 
MDE in its school report card also reports on the extent to which local districts 
are meeting a number of other legislative requirements. For information on these 
requirements, see the MDE Web site: http://michigan.gov/mde. 
18. See Note 15 above.
19. For the reader interested in how other states fared, see Education	Week	(2009).
20. As we shall see later in this chapter, three states—Texas, Alaska, and Virginia—
already are on record in opposition to the development of common standards.
21. While there are, of course, students who score below basic on the NAEP tests, for 
some reason the NAEP claims it is not a standard set or used by the NAGB—that 
is, the NAGB claims only three levels.
22. This is not to say the sampling isn’t capable of producing valid and reliable results. 
For the doubters, there is a time-tested rejoinder: “If you don’t believe in sampling, 
the next time you have a blood test, tell them to take it all.” 
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23. It remains to be seen if the AYP requirement will be significantly altered, if not 
eliminated, under the scheduled Congressional reauthorization of NCLB.
24. A contention further corroborated by the announcement in the Detroit	Free	Press 
on August 13, 2011, that the state is launching a Web site that “will eventually 
provide parents—and everyone else—a way to gauge how well individual high 
schools prepare their graduates for college . . . the site will give parents and every-





Following the 1983 publication of A	Nation	at	Risk, opinion leaders, 
policymakers, and the public became more vocal in their dissatisfaction 
with U.S. public schools. Indeed, this discontent triggered an astonish-
ing wave of reforms covering teacher licensure requirements, improved 
teacher pay, longer school days and years, more stringent high school 
graduation requirements, early childhood education, and more stan-
dardized testing. Further, because these reforms cost money, the 1980s 
saw large increases in funding levels for public schools, with aggregate 
support more than doubling during the decade, from $106 billion in 
1980 to $223 billion in 1990 (U.S. Department of Education 2006). 
The passage of so much school reform legislation in the 1980s was 
a remarkable political achievement and was not without some apparent 
academic successes. In particular, from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s, results of the NAEP showed black-white test score differences 
cut in half, as schools focused on “facts and drill” education. Never-
theless, despite the spate of reforms and some evidence of improved 
academic outcomes, popular support for school reform remained high 
as the 1990s began. Critics pointed to the poor showing of U.S. students 
on international comparisons of reading, mathematics, and science 
achievement. And with most of the traditional reforms already enacted 
across the states (e.g., more time in school, higher standards, and better 
teacher pay), reformist energies turned to the organization and gover-
nance of public schools. 
Specifically, reformers pointed to school bureaucracies as a prin-
cipal reason for underperforming schools and called for more school 
autonomy and greater parental choice in U.S. public education. Indeed, 
the emergence of school choice as an idea in good standing was per-
haps the most important development in K–12 education policy in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. It also marked a change in public attitudes 
or perceptions, given the popular rejection of vouchers and tuition tax 
credit proposals during the preceding decade. This new interest in pub-
lic school choice was fueled, in part, by an influential study published 
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by the highly regarded and politically moderate Brookings Institution 
in 1990. Politics,	Markets,	and	America’s	Schools, by John Chubb and 
Terry Moe, called for nothing less than fundamental reform of the insti-
tutions through which public K–12 education is controlled in the United 
States.
Analyzing data from random samples of roughly 400 schools and 
9,000 students from the Administrator and Teacher Survey of the High 
School and Beyond data set, Chubb and Moe (1990) estimate that a 
student in an effectively organized school gains at least a half year in 
achievement over a student in an ineffectively organized school over the 
last two years of high school. Extrapolating that finding to the normal 
four-year high school experience, the authors argue that an effectively 
organized high school may increase the achievement of its students by 
more than one full year. Now, what are the observable characteristics 
of an effective school? Chubb and Moe see such schools as “coherent, 
strongly led, academically ambitious, professionally grounded, team-
like organizations” (p. 141). Schools with these characteristics are high 
performers. Certainly, the personal qualities of the students in the school 
and the support and nurturing of their families are important determi-
nants of their academic performance. Nevertheless, the organizational 
qualities of the school exert a significant and independent influence 
on student learning. The question then becomes: How are these orga-
nizational qualities fostered in schools? For the authors, the answer 
is the school environment, which is shaped, in turn, by the school’s 
institutional structure. The effective school is unburdened by bureau-
cratization and centralized control. Essentially, the effective school runs 
itself, with minimal, if any, direction from a district or state authority.
For Chubb and Moe, excessive school bureaucracy and centraliza-
tion, the main barriers to school effectiveness, are rooted in America’s 
institutions of democratic control. And their policy prescription to 
promote school autonomy and professionalism was nothing less than 
“fundamental reform of the institutions through which education is con-
trolled” (Chubb and Moe 1990, p. 142). Specifically, Chubb and Moe 
called for a system of public school choice that would encourage the 
creation of new schools, remove authority over the schools from the 
traditional players (e.g., school boards, superintendents, central offices, 
state departments of education), and vest that authority in parents, stu-
dents, and the schools themselves. In the authors’ words, 
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Schools would be legally autonomous: free to govern themselves 
as they want, specify their own goals and programs and methods, 
design their own organizations, select their own student bodies, 
and make their own personnel decisions. Parents and students 
would be legally empowered to choose among alternative schools, 
aided by institutions designed to promote active involvement, 
well-informed decisions, and fair treatment. (p. 229) 
With their influential publication, Chubb and Moe raised public 
awareness of the possibility of school choice through the creation of 
new public schools, referred to as charter	schools,	that were free from 
the policy control of locally elected boards of education, and free from 
most, if not all, state school laws and rules. This notion of innovative 
public schools of choice was not new. The idea had been discussed in 
the 1980s by Ted Kolderie, Al Shankar, and others, but the Brookings 
study emphasized the legal autonomy of the new schools and greatly 
expanded the exposure of the new concept.1 
Minnesota passed the first charter school law in 1991. Since then, 
40 states and the District of Columbia have passed charter school stat-
utes, and by 2009 more than 4,700 charter schools enrolled more than 
1.4 million students nationwide (Center for Research on Education 
Outcomes [CREDO] 2009). Of course, education policy is determined 
in the political arena, and the unique politics of each of the 50 states will 
determine whether some form of charter schools will be established and 
will forge different sets of compromises when drafting charter school 
legislation. However, while state charter school statutes vary consider-
ably across the states, Buckley and Schneider (2007) identify several 
defining characteristics of charter schools:
Broadly defined, charter schools are publicly funded schools that 
are granted significant autonomy in curriculum and governance 
in return for greater accountability. In addition, the charter estab-
lishing a school is, ideally, a performance contract that details the 
school’s mission, its program and goals, the population served, and 
ways to assess success (or failure). Charters are granted for fixed 
lengths of time (usually three to five years), at which time the body 
that authorized the charter reviews the performance of the school 
and decides whether or not to renew it. (p. 2)
States writing charter school statutes then must decide such core 
provisions as the length of the charter, which public bodies may grant 
134   Addonizio and Kearney
them, the extent of charter school autonomy from existing public school 
laws and rules, and the like. 
MICHIgAn nEgOTIATES A CHARTER SCHOOL STATuTE
John Engler was sworn in as Michigan’s 46th governor on Janu-
ary 1, 1991. In his campaign, Engler promised greater parental choice 
in K–12 education. During his first year in office, Michigan was vis-
ited by Chubb and Moe, Shankar, and several times by Kolderie. In 
public speeches and private meetings with government, business, and 
school leaders, these scholars and educators outlined their conceptions 
of a new system of charter schools. Rep. Bill Bryant (R. MI) became 
an early and staunch supporter of this innovation and sponsored leg-
islation, drafted in concert with the governor’s office, to enact such a 
system of autonomous public schools in Michigan.
Michigan’s first charter school statute passed the legislature in 
December 1993 and was signed by Governor Engler in January 1994. 
Public Act 362 of 1993, which termed the new schools public	school	
academies (PSAs), remains one of the most expansive charter school 
statutes in the country. That is, charters may be granted by local boards 
of education, boards of intermediate school districts, and the governing 
boards of community colleges and public universities. In all, more than 
600 boards are empowered to issue charters (although the vast major-
ity has thus far declined to do so). This widely distributed chartering 
authority has produced one of the largest charter school programs in 
the United States, with only Washington, DC, Arizona, Colorado, and 
Delaware enrolling a higher percentage of public school students in 
charter schools in 2006–07 (MDE 2007). However, while Michigan’s 
charter school program is one of the nation’s largest, it is also one of the 
least autonomous, with the statute requiring PSAs to “comply with all 
applicable law . . . ”2 In essence, Michigan’s PSAs are subject to all the 
laws and rules applicable to traditional public schools. The one notable 
exception is that teachers and other employees of PSAs are not union-
ized, save for the few PSAs chartered by local school district boards.  
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Financing Public School Academies
Under the statute, PSAs were considered school districts, but unlike 
traditional districts, they had no geographic boundaries beyond their 
walls, no service area other than the state as a whole, no local property 
tax base, and no taxing authority of any kind. Except for federal aid 
available to all Michigan public schools (about 7 percent of operating 
revenue, on average), public funding for PSA operations would consist 
entirely of state aid. The question for the legislature at the time was the 
level of per pupil funding, or foundation allowance, for the new public 
schools. 
Although the 1994 Proposal A reform package had significantly nar-
rowed differences across local districts in per pupil funding, substantial 
disparities remained. The prevailing sentiment among legislators was 
that the foundation allowance for a PSA should be set at the level of 
the traditional district (“host”) in which the PSA is located. In this way, 
PSAs and traditional districts would be on roughly the same financial 
footing as they compete for students.3 However, in light of the vast dif-
ferences in local district foundation allowances, ranging in 1994–95 
from $4,200 in many rural districts to more than $10,000 in the most 
affluent suburban districts, the legislature concluded that PSA allow-
ances should match those of the host district only up to a specified limit. 
This limit was set at $5,500 for 1994–95, or $500 above the state basic 
foundation allowance. As such, this cap would be adjusted annually 
with this basic allowance and would be high enough to guarantee that 
PSAs established in Michigan’s urban districts, where the need for new 
school choices was perceived to be greatest, would have per pupil fund-
ing equal to their hosts. In this way, prospective PSA organizers might 
be attracted to districts like Detroit, Flint, Saginaw, Pontiac, and Grand 
Rapids, but would not be tempted to locate in an affluent suburb nearby 
and reap a financial windfall while luring children away from the inner 
city.
The Proposal A reforms, and particularly the state’s new foundation 
funding formula, greatly simplified the funding of school operations, 
including PSAs. But the funding of PSA construction and other capital 
projects eluded such easy resolution. Proposal A did nothing to change 
capital funding for Michigan’s public schools. All such funding con-
tinued to be raised entirely from local property taxes. No state aid was 
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available to local districts for capital projects. This means, of course, 
that property-rich districts like Bloomfield Hills, Birmingham, South-
field, Ann Arbor, and Jefferson can build new schools or upgrade old 
ones with relatively low millage rates, while property-poor districts, 
including most of Michigan’s urban districts, have to levy high tax 
rates to finance capital projects or allow their capital infrastructure to 
deteriorate.
The legislature decided not to address capital funding for PSAs. 
The new schools would have to lease or acquire and renovate build-
ings with a portion of their operating revenue.4 This financial restriction 
substantially hindered efforts by independent groups seeking to estab-
lish charter schools to acquire sites and undoubtedly contributed to 
the extraordinary prominence of for-profit educational management 
organizations (EMOs) in Michigan.5 These organizations have access 
to private equity to cover school start-up costs, including school con-
struction or acquisition. Indeed, most of the state universities that have 
authorized PSAs in Michigan have required that the schools have an 
EMO contract, largely because of the financial support they provide to 
the school (Horn and Miron 2000). 
EARLy COnTROvERSIES 
 Ironically, despite the relative lack of autonomy accorded Mich-
igan PSAs by the new law, the statute was challenged in 1994 by a 
coalition of education groups on the grounds that it violated constitu-
tional requirements for oversight by the SBE (Council	of	Organizations	
and	Others	for	Education	about	Parochiaid,	Inc.,	et	al.	v.	Engler 1997). 
Following the plaintiffs’ victory in district court, the Michigan legisla-
ture repealed Public Act 362 and passed Public Act 416 of 1994, which 
explicitly cited the SBE’s oversight powers and marginally strength-
ened state control over PSAs. In passing the new bill, however, the 
Republican-controlled legislature hedged its bet on the final disposi-
tion of the case by inserting a section that would repeal the new law if 
Public Act 362 were to be subsequently upheld on appeal. Indeed, in 
1997 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the district and appellate 
courts, holding that the original statute was constitutional and that the 
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repealer inserted into Public Act 416 was valid and enforceable (Coun-
cil	of	Organizations	and	Others	for	Education	about	Parochiaid,	Inc.	
v.	Governor 1997). In the high court’s opinion, the original statute in no 
way compromised SBE “leadership and supervision” of public school 
academies.
noah Webster Academy
The new charter statute, however, also eliminated the authority of 
non-K–12 school district boards to grant charters, and this provision 
remained in effect throughout the appeals process. This issue arose soon 
after passage of the original statute when the local board of a small K–6 
district in Ionia County, seeing an opportunity to eliminate a district bud-
get deficit with authorizer fees, chartered the Noah Webster Academy, 
a virtual school linking homeschool families to a small headquarters in 
Ionia. Backed by Governor Engler, this network quickly preenrolled 
about 1,300 students on the promise of state revenue for home comput-
ers and college trust funds for participating families. However, in the 
face of strong opposition from the legislature and the State Department 
of Education, the charter was revoked, the law amended, and academy 
representatives were unable to obtain a charter from any remaining 
authorizing body.6
The Cap
Initially, the Michigan legislature did not impose any limit on the 
number of schools that could be chartered by any authorizer. However, 
concerns over the large number of charters granted by the trustees of 
Central Michigan University in the early years of the program led the 
legislature to amend the statute in 1996 to limit the total charters issued 
by the governing boards of Michigan’s 15 public universities to 150. 
This limit, which was reached in 1998, has constrained university char-
tering ever since.
The “bay Mills Loophole”
Bay Mills Community College (BMCC), located in the Upper 
Peninsula’s Baraga County, is Michigan’s only tribally controlled com-
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munity college. Unlike the 28 community colleges organized under 
state law, each with a designated service district, the BMCC district 
is statewide. Michigan’s PSA statute empowers community college 
governing boards to authorize charter schools anywhere within their 
respective districts. In 2001, the BMCC Board of Regents chartered 
PSAs in Bay City and Pontiac. A coalition of traditional public school 
organizations and supporters challenged these charters by requesting a 
formal opinion of the Michigan attorney general regarding the scope of 
BMCC chartering authority. In an opinion issued in September 2001, 
then Attorney General Jennifer Granholm upheld the authority of the 
BMCC regents to issue charters statewide. 
In essence, BMCC enjoys chartering authority commensurate with 
that of a public university but without the restriction of the cap. With 
virtually no room remaining under the university limit, petitioners now 
had a new source of school charters. Following the 2001 ruling, the 
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number of BMCC-chartered PSAs grew dramatically, from two in 
2001–02 to 35 in 2006–07. Only Central Michigan University, with 
57 PSAs, has more. During this six-year period, the BMCC regents 
accounted for 33 of 68 new PSAs authorized in the state. The growth of 
Michigan’s charter school program is depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
As Figure 5.1 shows, growth in the number of Michigan PSAs has 
slowed dramatically in recent years, with net increases of just 7 schools 
over the last three years examined. Of the 10 new schools opened in 
2006 and 2007, 5 were authorized by BMCC. This pattern of slowing 
growth may be temporary, or it may be an indication that Michigan’s 
charter school movement is reaching maturation. If the latter, then per-
haps the pool of potential school organizers is nearing depletion. More 
likely, however, the state’s willing authorizers not subject to the cap (a 
very small group led by BMCC) are now more concerned with moni-
toring and supporting their current schools rather than authorizing new 
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ones. Currently, statewide growth in the number of charter schools is 
difficult to predict, although more charters can be expected in Detroit as 
state-led reform efforts unfold in the city.
More steady growth is seen in PSA enrollments (Figure 5.2), as 
current schools expand enrollments and, in some cases, add grades as 
allowed by existing or amended charters. Often, PSAs begin operations 
with elementary grades only and “grow into” their charters over time as 
their students progress to middle school grades and beyond.
The Michigan Commission on Charter Schools
The cap on university-chartered PSAs was reached by 1999. As a 
result, chartering activity came to a virtual standstill, with Michigan’s 
total number of PSAs rising by a mere two in 2001–02. This lack of 
chartering activity and corresponding accumulation of unmet demand 
upset charter school proponents. At the same time, the attorney gen-
eral’s opinion regarding BMCC chartering authority did not sit well 
with opponents of the movement. This issue and others, including an 
apparent dearth of PSA services for special education students, the 
relative responsibilities of PSA authorizers and PSA boards, and poten-
Reprinted with permission.
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tial conflicts of interest involving PSA managers and board members, 
prompted the Michigan legislature in October 2001 to create a special 
commission on charter schools “to conduct a complete and objective 
review of all aspects of public school academies in Michigan.”
The eight-member commission, chaired by Michigan State Univer-
sity President Peter McPherson, gathered data and commentary through 
hearings, Web site postings, research, and mail and e-mail communica-
tions during late 2001 and early 2002 and issued its report, Charter	
Schools	in	Michigan, in April 2002.7 Key recommendations included a 
stronger role for the superintendent of public instruction in overseeing 
PSA authorizing bodies, greater protections against possible conflicts 
of interest involving PSA board members, administrators, and school 
management companies, and greater emphasis on PSA responsibili-
ties in special education. Most notably, the commission recommended 
that the cap on conventional charters issued by public universities be 
raised from 150 to 205 over six years and that BMCC, as a statewide 
authorizing body, be subject to this restriction. The report also called for 
the creation of up to 175 “special purpose” charters over 15 years for 
children with academic or socioeconomic deficits. A bill incorporating 
most of the commission recommendations, including BMCC, the higher 
cap on university-authorized PSAs, and enhanced state oversight, was 
quickly introduced in the legislature but fell one vote short of passage 
in the House. A second House vote garnered even less support, and the 
highly touted commission report was quietly left for dead. At that point, 
the Michigan legislature turned its attention to the state’s dwindling 
employment level and mounting budget deficits, an issue that has occu-
pied much of their attention ever since.
STuDEnT ACHIEvEMEnT In CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE 
nATIOnAL PERSPECTIvE
Although our national experience with charter school programs 
is now entering its 17th year, the impact of charter schools on student 
achievement remains a most contentious question among researchers 
and educators nationwide. The central question, of course, is whether 
charter schools are more effective than traditional, district-based public 
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schools in improving student achievement. The greatest challenge in 
making this comparison arises from the selectivity of charter schools. 
That is, students are not randomly assigned to charter schools; rather, 
they choose to attend. Consequently, comparisons of the achievement 
levels or growth in charter schools and traditional schools must be 
conditioned on differences between the two student populations. Ide-
ally, this research question requires longitudinal student-level data on 
students who are randomly assigned to charter and traditional public 
schools. Two such experimental research projects have been launched 
by the U.S. Department of Education’s Institute for Education Sciences, 
but definitive findings are probably three to five years away (Buckley 
and Schneider 2007).
While we await the results of this experimental research, we have 
conflicting findings from several statistical studies. A 2004 study by 
the National Center for Education Statistics reports that, for students 
from the same racial and ethnic backgrounds, achievement levels in 
reading and mathematics in charter schools do not differ from those in 
other public schools (U.S. Department of Education 2004). However, 
analyzing the same NAEP data in 2004, researchers with the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT) report that charter school students had 
lower achievement in reading and mathematics than students in tradi-
tional public schools. The differences were significant for all students 
as well as low-income students and students from the inner city. No 
significant difference in achievement was found for minority students 
(Nelson, Rosenberg, and Van Meter 2004).     
This AFT study, reported favorably on the front page of the New	
York	 Times, drew a critical response. Harvard economist Caroline 
Hoxby argued that the study was flawed because it relied on an inad-
equate sample and failed to properly consider differences in educability 
between charter and traditional school children. Hoxby’s own study 
(2004) examined a matched sample of charter and traditional schools. 
Specifically, Hoxby matched each charter school with its nearest tra-
ditional public school, both geographically and in terms of racial 
composition and then computed the difference in the percentage of stu-
dents proficient in reading and mathematics in the 4th grade on the state 
assessment. Hoxby concluded that: “ . . . although it is too early to draw 
sweeping conclusions, the initial indications are that the average stu-
Charter Schools   143
dent attending a charter school has higher achievement than he or she 
otherwise would . . . ” (p. 3).
Hoxby’s study was praised by critics of the AFT study, but sharply 
criticized by researchers at the Economic Policy Institute, a liberal 
Washington, DC, think tank, who argued that her methodology did not 
adequately control for differences in student characteristics. By their 
reanalysis of Hoxby’s data set, supplemented with additional data to 
control for these differences, the achievement advantage for charter 
schools disappears for both reading and mathematics (Roy and Mishel 
2004). 
The question of charter schools’ impact on student achievement 
is inextricably tied to the question of whether charter school students 
are harder to educate than their traditional public school counterparts. 
Buckley and Schneider (2007) analyze data from the 2002–03 school 
year in Washington, DC, to answer this question: Do charter schools 
enroll students who are harder to educate, do they attract more motivated 
or more socioeconomically advantaged students in their communities, 
or do they do both to some extent?
Using a sophisticated Bayesian statistical model and Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo estimation method, Buckley and Schneider (2007) find 
mixed evidence for a difference in educability as proxied by free/reduced 
price lunch, special education, and English language learner student cat-
egories. While they find greater concentrations of low-income children 
in DC charter schools on the average, the charter schools had propor-
tionately fewer English language learners and about the same fraction 
of special education students. The authors also examine student-level 
survey data on additional characteristics related to educability, includ-
ing student mobility, attitudes toward school, home environment, and 
peers. They conclude: “In general, we find scant evidence that char-
ter-school students in DC are harder to educate than students in the 
traditional schools” (p. 94). 
The most comprehensive and sophisticated charter school evalu-
ation reported to date has been undertaken by researchers at Stanford 
University’s CREDO. The researchers assembled longitudinal student-
level achievement data from 14 states and the District of Columbia 
to assess the impact of charter schooling on student learning gains.8 
This landmark study compares the educational achievement levels and 
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academic growth of charter school students to equivalent students in 
traditional public schools that the charter students themselves attended 
before enrolling in charter schools. This national “head-to-head” 
assessment of the performance of charter schools reveals that 17 per-
cent of the charter schools outperformed their traditional district school 
counterparts, nearly half of the charter schools showed results that were 
statistically indistinguishable from local public schools, and 37 percent 
of the charter schools significantly underperformed their traditional 
counterparts. 
This study, which is rich in detail and only briefly summarized here, 
also finds that charter students in elementary and middle school grades 
make greater progress than their traditional public school peers, but 
students in charter high schools and charter multilevel schools have 
significantly worse results. At the same time, however, the study also 
reveals significant variation in charter school performance across the 
states (CREDO 2009). 
CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMAnCE: EvIDEnCE 
FROM MICHIgAn
As we’ve pointed out, any valid assessment of Michigan’s charter 
schools must recognize that their students are not randomly selected 
from the local school-age population; rather, they are self-selected.9 
Even in instances where charter school slots are oversubscribed and 
enrollees are selected by lottery, the self-selection bias remains because 
the families electing to enter the lottery may differ in important ways 
(e.g., level of interest or involvement in the child’s school and educa-
tion) from families who do not. Accordingly, this section will examine 
the characteristics of Michigan’s PSA students as compared with those 
of traditional public schools in both host districts and statewide. Also, in 
view of the rapidly growing research literature affirming the importance 
of teacher quality for student learning (e.g., Rockoff 2004; Murnane 
and Steele 2007), we will consider some important differences between 
PSA teachers and teachers in traditional public schools.
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PSA Students
PSA students in Michigan are disproportionately urban, minority, 
and poor. Over half are eligible for free or reduced price lunch, com-
pared with 34 percent of traditional public school students statewide. 
However, as indicated in Figure 5.3, the ethnicities of PSA students 
closely resemble those of the 17 urban school districts that house three-
fourths of them.10 African American students comprise 56 percent of 
PSA enrollments and 59 percent of host district enrollments, but only 18 
percent of traditional school enrollments statewide. Caucasian students 
comprise 34 percent of PSA enrollments and 29 percent of host district 
enrollments, but fully 74 percent of traditional school enrollments. His-
panic, Asian, and other races comprise the balance of enrollments in the 
schools. 
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PSA Teachers
The quality of a charter school, or any school, is determined by the 
teachers in the school. A growing “teacher effects” literature confirms 
the importance of good teaching for student learning (Rockoff 2004; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Murnane and Steele 2007). These 
findings based on measures of student achievement gains confirm our 
intuition, but researchers have been challenged to identify observ-
able teacher characteristics or credentials that may be associated with 
effectiveness in the classroom. The question is important. Principals, 
department heads, and parents need to identify good teachers without 
benefit of ex	post analyses of student achievement gains. Instead, they 
must rely on a review of standard teacher credentials such as license 
or certification held, undergraduate school, major and minor areas of 
study, and teaching experience. Selecting those who will excel in the 
classroom can be daunting.
Two characteristics that have been indicative of teaching effec-
tiveness and are often used as proxy measures of teacher quality are 
certification or license held and teaching experience. Teachers with the 
highest level of professional certification have been found to demon-
strate effectiveness in the classroom (Darling-Hammond 2000). And 
recent research has confirmed that teachers improve dramatically over 
the first three or four years on the job (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 
2005).
A recent analysis of 2005–06 data on Michigan public school 
teachers has revealed some sharp contrasts in the quality proxies noted 
above between PSA teachers and teachers in traditional public schools 
(Gawlik, Addonizio, and Kearney 2010). These findings, along with 
data on relative salary levels, are summarized in Table 5.1.
As the analysis reveals, Michigan PSAs employ proportionally 
fewer fully certified teachers and more substitute teachers than their tra-
ditional counterparts. Further, PSA teachers are much less experienced 
than teachers in traditional public schools and earn substantially lower 
salaries, as one would expect given the lower experience levels and the 
absence of teacher unions in PSAs.11
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ACADEMIC OuTCOMES
As noted earlier, the best comparison of charter school perfor-
mance with that of traditional public schools would be drawn from a 
randomized experiment. Unfortunately, no such experiment has been 
conducted here in Michigan, so we draw our comparisons from pub-
lished, nonexperimental research studies that attempt in various ways 
to deal with the issue of student comparability between PSAs and tra-
ditional schools. As we will see, these studies also vary in the statistical 
rigor used to control for important differences between these two stu-
dent populations.
Horn and Miron (2000) analyze MEAP data for five years—from 
1995–96 to 1999–2000. They compare charter schools as a group with 
the aggregate performance of their host districts (i.e., the school district 
in which the PSA is geographically located) and then compare change 
scores in the percentage of students demonstrating proficiency for indi-
vidual PSAs over two, three, and four years with change scores for 
traditional schools in host districts. In general, they find that host district 
students outperform charter school students in percentage of students 
achieving proficiency. This finding was consistent in all subjects and 
grade levels tested through grade 7.12 The authors add, however, that 
many individual charter schools showed greater yearly improvement in 
Table 5.1  Teacher Characteristics and Salary Levels in PSAs and 
Traditional Public Schools, 2005–06
Dependent variable PSAs Traditional districts
Percent certified 57.77 74.51
(16.39) (8.89)
Percent substitute 42.23 25.49
(25.04) (10.40)
Average years teaching 4.15 12.00
(1.35) (2.17)
Average salary ($) 37,337 54,739
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Gawlik, Addonizio, and Kearney (2010).
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test scores than the traditional host schools. Finally, the authors com-
pare the performance of students in EMO-run charter schools with their 
counterparts in non-EMO charters and find roughly equal four-year 
proficiency rates across all subject areas for the two school groups.
Eberts and Hollenbeck (2001), using a more rigorous statistical 
methodology to control for differences in PSA and traditional school 
student populations, analyze student MEAP scores for 4th and 5th grad-
ers for three school years, 1996–97 through 1998–99. They use a set of 
models to estimate differences in achievement between charter students 
and traditional public school students in the host districts. Each charter 
school was paired with its host public school district, and statistical 
controls were used for differences across students, schools, and dis-
tricts. The authors find that students attending a charter school scored 
about 2–4 percent lower on 4th grade reading and math assessments 
than their traditional public school counterparts. They also find PSA 
students lagging traditional school students in host districts by about 4 
percent on the 5th grade science test and about 6–9 percent on the 5th 
grade writing test. And the authors note that their results may understate 
the achievement gaps between PSA students and students in traditional 
schools because, despite their sophisticated methodology, they were 
unable to fully control for the bias resulting from the self-selection of 
PSA students. Finally, the authors find evidence that Michigan’s PSAs 
appear to improve their relative performance over time.13 
Michigan Department of Education
The most up-to-date analysis is provided by the MDE. As with the 
earlier studies, the measure of academic achievement is taken from 
the MEAP, the sole assessment available for all PSAs and traditional 
schools in the state.14 The following results are taken from the fall 2006 
elementary and middle school testing and spring 2007 high school test-
ing. As we have emphasized, the effect of charter schools on student 
achievement can be reasonably accurately gauged only by comparing 
the performance of charter school students with the performance of 
traditional, district-based students of equivalent social and economic 
backgrounds. Accordingly, the MDE compares aggregate PSA scores 
on MEAP and the MME with the aggregate scores of traditional schools 
in the host districts as well as with aggregate scores of all traditional 
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schools statewide. While the latter comparison is of interest, the former 
is a more valid indicator of the relative effectiveness of PSAs.
Elementary and Middle Schools
For aggregate performance in grades 3–8, as measured by the 
percentage of students who met or exceeded state standards, PSA stu-
dents outperformed their traditional public school counterparts in the 
17 host districts in both English Language Arts (ELA) and mathemat-
ics, although the advantage is not substantial. These comparisons are 
depicted in Table 5.2.
The MDE analysis shows also that both the PSAs as a group and the 
host districts badly lag the state’s traditional public schools in both ELA 
and mathematics at the elementary and middle school levels.    
Some evidence indicates that charter schools improve modestly 
the longer they are open, at least over the short term. The MDE com-
pared aggregate ELA and mathematics proficiency for grades 3–8 for 
fall 2006 for three PSA groups: 1) schools open one to three years at 
the time of testing, 2) those open four to six years, and 3) those oper-
ating seven years or more. Aggregate proficiency was slightly higher 
in both ELA and mathematics for the schools in the four- to six-year 
category as compared with the new schools, although the advantage 
is so small as to be inconsequential. The difference in aggregate profi-
ciency is more substantial between the PSAs that have operated seven 
years or more and both groups of newer schools. These comparisons are 
depicted in Figure 5.4.
This finding is intuitive. As noted above, the rapidly growing 
research literature on teacher quality reveals that teachers are the most 
important school-based influence on student achievement and that 
their effectiveness improves dramatically over the first three or four 
Table 5.2  Fall 2005 and Fall 2006, grades 3–8, MEAP Percent Proficient
ELA Math
2005 2006 2005 2006
PSAs 62.9 65.7 57.3 61.3
Hosts 59.3 61.2 51.7 56.1
Non-PSAs 75.2 77.4 72.2 75.7
SOURCE: MDE (2007).
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years of teaching (Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; 
Goldhaber 2007). The evidence on improvement in teaching effective-
ness after four years is mixed, with some studies finding improvement 
over many years (Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2006) and others not 
(Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). It is entirely possible that the age 
of the PSA in the MDE analysis is a proxy for staff experience and com-
petence. A study of teachers and administrators working in Michigan’s 
PSAs would shed light on this important question of PSA quality and 
maturation.
Student Subgroups
The MDE analysis also disaggregated 2005 and 2006 MEAP data to 
examine achievement for four major student subgroups: 1) economically 
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ELA Math
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disadvantaged, 2) African Americans, 3) Hispanics, and 4) students with 
disabilities. These comparisons are presented in Table 5.3.
The panels of Table 5.3 reveal that PSAs consistently outperformed 
the host district schools, with an advantage in both subjects and both 
years across all four student groups. The advantage is most pronounced 
with special education students, the group for which the issue of self-
selection, or nonrandom student sorting, may be the most serious. That 
is, students with more serious learning deficits may remain in traditional 
public schools where specially trained staff are more readily available. 
Nevertheless, the apparent advantage of the PSAs over the host district 
schools is notable and calls for closer statistical analysis to disentangle 
school effects from effects of family and peers.
Also noteworthy is the advantage of Michigan PSAs over all tradi-
tional schools with respect to African American students in mathematics 
for 2005 and 2006 and for ELA in 2006. The differences are small and 
Table 5.3  Aggregate Achievement of Student Subgroups, 2005 and 2006, 
grades 3–8, Percent Proficient
2005 2006
Student subgroup Math ELA Math ELA
Economically  
disadvantaged
PSA 51.1 55.3 54.8 59.2
Host 44.7 52.0 49.9 55.2
Traditional 57.1 60.0 62.0 64.0
African American
PSA 46.4 54.6 51.9 59.3
Host 42.0 52.4 47.3 55.2
Traditional 45.2 55.0 50.9 57.9
Hispanic
PSA 60.1 60.7 59.8 61.4
Host 50.5 52.6 55.3 56.2
Traditional 59.2 61.0 63.8 64.4
Students with disabilities
PSA 35.1 31.2 37.6 35.4
Host 23.4 22.4 28.2 24.5
Traditional 41.1 37.0 45.1 39.3
SOURCE: MDE (2007).
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may be statistically insignificant and so too for the traditional schools’ 
relative advantage over PSAs in 2005 ELA results. Nonetheless, these 
results should dispel any impressions that PSA performance system-
atically lags that of traditional schools in all student categories. On the 
contrary, these descriptive analyses suggest that Michigan’s PSAs are 
relatively effective with our hard-to-educate student subgroups.
Of course, aggregate analyses like this one mask substantial dif-
ferences among individual schools. In an analysis of 2005–06 MEAP 
scores for elementary and middle schools in the Detroit metropoli-
tan region (i.e., Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties), Gawlik, 
Addonizio, and Kearney (2010) find substantial variation across PSAs 
in the percentage of students achieving proficiency. These findings are 
summarized in Table 5.4.
High School Achievement
Administered for the first time in spring 2007 to 11th graders, the 
MME consists of three parts: 1) the ACT college entrance examination; 
Table 5.4  MEAP Performance for PSAs in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb 
Counties, 2005–06




Grade 3 85 18.80 97.00 61.0941 17.12612
Grade 4 84 8.30 96.40 53.9226 17.28403
Grade 5 82 15.80 94.70 54.0256 18.03876
Grade 6 80 21.80 94.70 60.4313 16.31519
Grade 7 68 10.20 90.40 55.2559 18.42338
Grade 8 66 0.00 86.50 51.8697 18.96947
Math
Grade 3 85 28.60 100.00 73.7541 15.46249
Grade 4 85 22.20 100.00 59.1329 16.49170
Grade 5 82 7.90 94.70 47.7012 19.96498
Grade 6 80 7.10 96.40 37.8600 21.03768
Grade 7 68 2.60 89.30 32.9176 18.44046
Grade 8 66 0.00 90.90 37.9985 20.54055
SOURCE: Gawlik, Addonizio, and Kearney (2010).
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2) the WorkKeys job skills assessments in reading and mathematics; 
and 3) Michigan assessments in mathematics, science, social studies, 
and persuasive writing. The aggregate percent proficient for PSAs, 
host-district high schools, and traditional high schools are depicted in 
Figure 5.5.
As Figure 5.5 makes clear, Michigan’s high school PSAs substan-
tially underperformed their host district counterparts on the 2007 MME 
in both ELA and mathematics. Further, both of these school groups 
lagged far behind all traditional Michigan high schools in both subjects. 
Aggregate student proficiency was particularly dismal (9.5 percent and 
4.2 percent in ELA and mathematics, respectively) in PSA high schools 
that had been open three years or less. Proficiency was substantially 
higher in older PSA high schools, but still lagged the levels of traditional 
high schools by a wide margin. This pattern of lagging PSA achieve-
ment is also found for economically disadvantaged students and African 
American students.15 These comparisons are presented in Table 5.5.
SOURCE: MDE (2007).
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Attendance Rates
Both the federal NCLB statute and Michigan state law require that 
public school attendance and graduation rates be monitored. Further, 
the Michigan School Code requires a minimum attendance rate of 70 
percent for the payment of state aid for an individual school day. Obvi-
ously, school attendance is viewed as essential for academic progress. 
On this criterion, Michigan’s PSAs appear to lag behind their tradi-
tional counterparts. For the 2005–06 school year, 17.8 percent of PSAs 
recorded attendance rates below 90 percent, compared with 5.9 percent 
for traditional schools in host districts and 6.2 percent for traditional 
schools statewide (MDE 2007).16
graduation Rates
Statistics on high school graduation rates are notoriously unreli-
able. Different methodologies can yield wildly disparate rates for the 
same school or district. However, application of a consistent methodol-
ogy can yield a valid comparison of graduation rates across schools and 
school systems.
As Figure 5.6 reveals, graduation rates for Michigan’s charter high 
schools compare favorably with rates reported for traditional high 
schools in the host districts but lag those of traditional schools statewide 
by a substantial margin. Of course, these comparisons are hampered by 
the small size of the PSA high school population, with just over 17,000 
Table 5.5  Aggregate Achievement of Student Subgroups Spring 2007 
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students, and the lack of PSA data disaggregated by student subgroups.17 
And, again, these mean values mask variation across individual PSAs.
Nevertheless, the data on PSA graduation rates are roughly con-
sistent with the general pattern of outcomes described earlier for 
elementary and middle schools. Public school academies tend to be 
located in districts with low-achieving schools and equal or exceed 
the academic performance of these schools on average. At the same 
time, Michigan’s charter schools fall well below the average academic 
performance of Michigan’s traditional public schools, hardly an unex-
pected outcome given the disproportionately high poverty rate among 
PSA children.18
Figure 5.6  High School graduation Rates, 2005–06 (percent of schools in 
each category)










Over 90% 70–90% Below 70%
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SuMMIng uP
In one sense, Michigan’s charter school program has been aggres-
sive in that a wide array of governmental bodies are empowered to 
authorize schools and the result has been one of the largest programs 
in the United States. In another respect, however, Michigan’s program 
is quite conservative. That is, unlike the theoretical ideal of new pub-
lic schools unencumbered by state school laws and rules and offering 
innovative programs fashioned by teachers, Michigan’s PSAs are sub-
ject to the full panoply of laws and rules that apply to traditional public 
schools, save for those laws (e.g., property taxation and election laws) 
that reflect differences in governance. Indeed, one could persuasively 
argue that Michigan’s PSAs represent innovation only with respect to 
school governance and the absence of employee unions.19
The result of this compromise between program size and school 
autonomy has been the creation of many schools that “play it safe,” as 
opposed to progressive, teacher-led centers of innovation envisioned by 
the intellectual founders of the charter movement. In fact, in many of 
Michigan’s charter schools, teachers appear to occupy positions clearly 
subordinate to school managers. As noted earlier, Michigan’s charter 
school program is unique among the states in the prevalence of EMO-
run schools, with their prepackaged curricula, policies, and procedures. 
Teachers are often untenured, at-will contractors with little autonomy 
and professional discretion. At the same time, however, the resulting 
tendency toward uniformity as opposed to experimentation and innova-
tion has its appeal. Charter school observers have noted that the freedom 
inherent in some state programs is no guarantee of success. As several 
education scholars have observed, “Freed from bureaucratic regulations 
and union rules, many of the best educators can design excellent charter 
schools. But freed from these rules, many of the worst educators can 
design terrible schools” (Carnoy et al. 2005, p. 118). 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Michigan’s PSA program 
has been neither a disaster nor an unqualified success. Some schools 
are excellent, many have waiting lists, some struggle with poor man-
agement and poor outcomes for students, and some have been closed. 
And the system has slowly evolved, despite the Michigan legislature’s 
quick relegation of the charter school commission report to the circular 
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file. The cap on university-authorized charters, the main issue prompt-
ing the commission’s creation, remains in place for now but has been 
attenuated to a degree by the rise of BMCC as a statewide authorizer. 
However, BMCC may be nearing their capacity for acceptable PSA 
oversight as reflected in the slowing growth of their program. In any 
event, they remain Michigan’s sole statewide authorizer not subject to 
the cap and it is difficult to know whether the dearth of new charters in 
recent years reflects limited demand on the part of school organizers or 
limited capacity of authorizers.
Another notable addition to Michigan’s PSA law was a provi-
sion empowering public university governing boards to authorize up 
to 15 “urban high school academies” in Detroit.20 Urban high school 
academies may employ as a classroom teacher any full-time tenured 
or tenure-track faculty member from the authorizing university. Each 
academy must operate grades 9–12 within three years of opening and 
may include any other grades, including kindergarten and early child-
hood education. At the time of this writing, two urban high school 
academies were operating in Detroit and a third was being prepared 
for a fall 2009 opening. All three academies were authorized by Grand 
Valley State University.
LOOKIng AHEAD: SOME OuTSTAnDIng ISSuES
Aside from the cap, the commission addressed two additional pol-
icy issues that continue to engage policymakers. Both are discussed at 
length in the MDE	2007	Report	to	the	Legislature. The first concerns 
the lack of authority of the superintendent of public instruction over 
authorizing bodies to ensure they fulfill their responsibilities for PSA 
oversight, while the second arises from the apparent inability of many 
PSA boards to effectively oversee the activities of the EMOs they hire 
to run their schools. In effect, the EMOs control the boards in many 
instances. Both issues arise from the rather elaborate but loosely struc-
tured regulatory system created by the legislature to govern their large 
charter school system. Let’s consider each in turn.
158   Addonizio and Kearney
The Role of the Superintendent
The Michigan Constitution assigns general leadership and supervi-
sion of public schools to the SBE and empowers it to hire a superintendent 
of public instruction to execute SBE policy. The superintendent and 
the State Department of Education are mandated by statute to enforce 
laws relating to public schools, including PSAs. However, while the 
Michigan School Code empowers the superintendent to enforce school 
laws for PSAs, including rulemaking regarding pupil and financial 
accounting and school safety, the commission found substantial gaps 
in the superintendent’s statutory authority over PSAs, particularly PSA 
authorizers. Specifically, although the commission stated that PSA 
authorizers should exercise primary oversight of charter schools, the 
commission called for amendments in the charter school law to require 
the superintendent to periodically certify the authorizers’ performance 
in four areas: 1) holding PSA boards accountable for meeting academic 
standards, 2) enforcing contracts they sign with PSA boards and EMOs, 
3) ensuring compliance with state law, and 4) the financial management 
of the schools.   
The Role of the Authorizer
The authorizing body lies at the heart of charter school governance. 
It is the charter school’s source of legitimacy as a public school. Initially 
described by Kolderie as “a publicly elected body with an education 
mission,” these entities substitute for the elected local board of educa-
tion as the charter school’s source of legitimacy as a public institution.21 
They are designated and empowered by statute to authorize charter 
schools and hold them accountable to the public by issuing and enforc-
ing contracts that specify the educational and financial responsibilities 
of the school. The authorizer’s regulatory role consists of monitoring 
the actions of charter school boards and ensuring their compliance with 
the charter contract and all applicable law. The authorizer also acts as 
the fiscal agent for its charter schools. All state aid to which the school 
is entitled flows through the authorizer. Michigan’s charter school stat-
ute allows authorizers to charge oversight fees of up to 3 percent of total 
state aid. In return, authorizers are responsible for ensuring that their 
PSAs uphold the public trust.
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The Role of the PSA board
The commission report stated that “the frontline responsibility to 
run the school” rests with the PSA board and expressed concern over 
testimony about the apparent lack of independence of PSA boards from 
the EMOs they hired to run their schools. The commission called upon 
the legislature to amend the charter school statute to require authorizers 
to include in their contracts with PSA boards a set of requirements that 
would strengthen both authorizer and board control over EMOs. These 
requirements were intended as safeguards against conflicts of interests 
whereby PSA boards would hire close relatives to run the schools, pay 
individual PSA employees for more than one full-time position (e.g., 
assistant principal and teacher), and generally place the interests of 
EMO principals and shareholders before those of the students and the 
public. The recommended amendments also required authorizers to 
approve all contracts between PSA boards and EMOs.
These policy issues continue to be debated in Michigan and are 
addressed in the MDE	2007 Report	to	the	Legislature. However, while 
the commission report recommended specific amendments to Michi-
gan’s charter school statute, the MDE report calls on the legislature 
to grant the superintendent of public instruction rulemaking authority 
over authorizers and raises specific concerns about PSA board rela-
tionships with EMOs. First, EMO administrators are often involved 
in recruiting board members and recommending their appointment to 
authorizers. Second, many EMO contracts are turnkey agreements by 
which the EMO controls all revenue available to the PSA board and 
manages all aspects of school operations. Moreover, in many instances 
the EMO owns the school building and much of the school’s furniture 
and equipment (Horn and Miron 2000). Such an arrangement can eas-
ily compromise the board’s ability to effectively represent the school’s 
and students’ interests when negotiating service agreements and fees 
with the EMO. The MDE report also expresses concerns over the lack 
of statutory requirements for authorizers’ oversight of these PSA-EMO 
contracts and concludes with a call for legislation giving the superinten-
dent rule-making authority to set specific standards for such authorizer 
oversight.
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POLICy EQuILIbRIuM OR POLICy STALEMATE?
These concerns, raised in several studies of Michigan’s charter 
school program, including both the 2002 commission and 2007 MDE 
reports, and the legislature’s unwillingness to address them reflect 
Michigan’s ambivalence toward its charter schools. That is, these 
schools should stand apart from the traditional public schools and pro-
vide families with alternative educational options. But they should not 
constitute a separate public school system. They should be autonomous 
from local district boards but not from state laws and rules. They should 
be judged on the basis of student achievement, but their administrative 
practices should be closely scrutinized by the state. The program should 
be large in scale, but should not approach the degree of independence 
envisioned by Chubb, Moe, Kolderie, and other intellectual founders 
of the charter school movement. Indeed, observing the abundance of 
Michigan’s franchise-like, EMO-run PSAs, with 100 schools run by 
eight companies and 34 by NHA alone, one is left to wonder what 
happened to the program creators’ vision of autonomous, teacher-led 
centers of educational innovation, free from the bureaucratic burdens 
of traditional schools.
On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the evolution of Michi-
gan’s charter school program, including the ascendency of EMOs, 
reflects an equilibrium or consensus that has emerged from the state’s 
political and economic environment. Certainly charter school laws 
in Michigan and across the states have been motivated by a desire to 
improve children’s academic achievement. But they serve other ends 
as well. Charter schools provide families in urban areas with an oppor-
tunity to send their children to smaller and, at least in their view, safer 
schools. Charter schools also introduce competition to the public school 
system, and they respond to the public’s demand for educational choice 
while stopping short of, and perhaps guarding against, more radical and 
controversial voucher proposals. Viewed this way, Michigan’s charter 
school program is not an unfinished educational innovation derailed by 
political stalemate and economic distress, but rather a workable com-
promise emerging from the state’s evolving political economy and one 
of Michigan’s most important school reforms of the past 30 years.  
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notes
1. The term charter	school was coined by Ray Budde (1974), a retired education pro-
fessor, in a 1974 conference paper. American Federation of Teachers President Al 
Shankar (1988a,b) further developed the concept in a 1988 address to the National 
Press Club and in a New	York	Times column. Both Budde and Shankar envisioned 
these new public schools as teacher-run laboratories for instructional innovations, 
created with permission from the local school district board (Vergari 2007). 
2. As one might expect, this point was the subject of vigorous debate in the legisla-
ture. An early draft of the bill limited PSAs’ mandates to only a relatively short 
list of statutory citations, but proponents of greater state control (generally Demo-
crats) held sway on this issue and inserted the broader language.
3. Such “equality” would be rough, indeed, as the overall financial condition of a 
school district depends on enrollment trends, operating costs, cash management, 
and other factors. 
4. Some PSA boards have taken innovative approaches to capital funding. For exam-
ple, the boards of Chandler Park Academy and Detroit Community High School 
issued tax-exempt, fixed-rate revenue bonds backed by future school operating 
revenue (Gongwer	News	Service 2005).
5. The MDE reports that for the 2006–07 school year, 61 percent of Michigan’s PSA 
boards (serving two-thirds of the state’s charter school students) elected to hire 
an EMO to run some or all of their school operations. These contracts range from 
facility management to personnel management, accounting and payroll, curricu-
lum development, and professional development for teachers and administrators. 
Michigan’s percentage of EMO-run schools far exceeds the national average of 
10 percent. Indeed, the next highest states are Ohio and New York, at merely 33 
percent and 26 percent, respectively.
6. A much smaller school, with students in attendance at the Ionia County facility, 
was subsequently chartered, but the notion of a virtual school was abandoned.
7. Coauthor Addonizio served on the commission. In addition to Chairman McPher-
son, the commission included Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Watkins, 
Michigan Education Association President Lu Battaglieri, local school board 
member Sheri Thompson, educator Carmen A. N’Namdi, Professor Louann Bier-
lein Palmer, and attorney Richard McLellan. 
8. The states participating in this study are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado 
(Denver only), Florida, Georgia, Illinois (Chicago only), Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas.
9. This section draws primarily on Horn and Miron (2000), Eberts and Hollenbeck 
(2001), and MDE (2006b, 2007).
10. In 2006–07, these host districts were Ann Arbor, Benton Harbor, Dearborn, 
Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, Hamtramck, Highland Park, Inkster, Jackson, Lan-
sing, Muskegon, Pontiac, Port Huron, Saginaw, Southfield, and Wayne-Westland.
11. The sole exception with respect to unions applies to those few PSAs that are autho-
rized by the boards of local school districts.  
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12. The authors did not compare charter high school student scores with host high 
school student scores because the specialized nature of some charters (i.e., serving 
at-risk students) threatened the validity of such comparisons.
13. Interestingly, Eberts and Hollenbeck (2001) find that PSAs managed by EMOs 
had lower test scores relative to traditional schools than self-managed PSAs. This 
finding is particularly notable because of the extraordinary presence of EMO-run 
charter schools in Michigan, as noted earlier.
14. In addition to MEAP, several authorizers use additional standardized assessments 
(e.g., Gates-McGinnite, Iowa Test of Basic Skills, Scantron Performance Series) 
to monitor the academic progress of students in their respective schools as a part 
of their oversight activities.
15. No analysis of Hispanic students or students with learning disabilities was possible 
due to insufficient sample size.
16. Figures are based on unweighted school counts.
17. While Michigan’s PSAs continued to enroll proportionately more K–5 students 
(57.4 percent) than either host districts (42.9 percent) or traditional districts (40.7 
percent) in 2006–07, the number of PSA high school students more than doubled 
over the 2001–02 through 2006–07 period, generally through the addition of high 
school grades by existing PSAs.
18. In 2006–07, over half of Michigan’s PSA students were eligible for free or reduced 
price lunch, as compared with about one-third of traditional school students (MDE 
2007, p. 5).
19. Again, the exception would be those PSAs chartered by local district school 
boards, a very small fraction of the whole PSA program.
20. Public Act 179 of 2003. Chartered under a separate part (6C) of the PSA statute, 
UHSAs are not subject to the 150-school cap imposed on university-chartered 
schools.




Following passage of Public Act 362 of 1993 and subsequent leg-
islation that created Michigan’s charter school program, the Michigan 
legislature expanded the state’s educational choice initiatives by creat-
ing a schools of choice program in 1997.1 This legislation, Section 105 
of the School Aid Act, required all local school boards to decide whether 
or not they would accept nonresident students in their schools. Those 
districts opting into the program were required to publish the schools, 
grades, and programs open to nonresidents and then accept applica-
tions. If the number of applicants exceeded available slots, enrollees 
would be selected by random lottery.2 
Prior to this legislation, students could enroll in other districts as 
nonresidents in one of two ways. First, they could enroll as tuition stu-
dents, with tuition calculated according to a (nearly incomprehensible) 
section of the School Aid Act.3 Alternatively, the student’s district of 
residence could release the revenue associated with the student to the 
enrolling district, enabling the student to receive free tuition. As one 
would expect, such permission was rarely granted. The new “schools of 
choice” law allowed students to leave any district of residence to enter 
a choice school within the same intermediate school district (ISD), 
and the associated revenue (i.e., foundation allowance) followed auto-
matically. Specifically, the enrolling district receives the lesser of the 
foundation allowance of the resident district and the enrolling district. 
Further, the enrolling district is prohibited from charging tuition in any 
form to make up any revenue differences.
Michigan’s schools of choice program was expanded in 2000 to 
include contiguous districts outside the ISD and to include districts 
in any contiguous ISD the following year.4 As with the 1997 legisla-
tion, local school boards electing to enroll nonresidents were required 
to select such students by lottery if their district was oversubscribed 
and, again, the enrolling district receives the lower of its own and the 
resident district’s per pupil foundation allowance. Districts electing to 
enroll nonresidents are not required to provide transportation to choice 
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schools, although anecdotal evidence reveals that some districts do send 
school buses into neighboring districts for this purpose.
While adopting both charter schools and schools of choice, Michi-
gan legislators and voters defeated two efforts to institute school 
voucher programs in the state. In 1999, Senate Bill 31 was introduced to 
give vouchers to students in cities with a population exceeding 750,000. 
The proposal, of course, would have impacted only the Detroit school 
district. Students from families earning less than 150 percent of the fed-
eral poverty level would have been eligible for the vouchers. The bill, 
however, died in committee.
Following the demise of Senate Bill 31, business executive and for-
mer Michigan Board of Education member Richard DeVos led a coali-
tion of education, civic, and business leaders in forming Kids First! 
Yes! which sought to amend the Michigan Constitution to give parents 
whose children attend school in districts that failed to graduate two-
thirds of their students a publicly funded voucher worth one-half of the 
district’s per pupil expenditure to attend a school of their choosing. As a 
sweetener, Proposal 1 would have guaranteed that public school spend-
ing would never fall below the current level and would have required 
teacher testing in academic subjects.5 Opponents of the proposal orga-
nized under the name All Kids First! On November 7, 2000, Michigan 
voters defeated Proposal 1 by a margin of more than 2 to 1.
Among the various forms of K–12 school choice, voucher pro-
grams, which encompass private as well as public schools, are easily 
the most controversial. This controversy stems primarily from the use 
of public revenue to fund religious school education, a practice prohib-
ited by most state constitutions, including Michigan’s.6 In addition to 
constitutional issues regarding the separation of church and state, crit-
ics cite the potential of vouchers to increase social stratification along 
racial, ethnic, academic, and socioeconomic lines (Goldhaber and Eide 
2002). Concern over such stratification has also been raised in connec-
tion with charter schools and interdistrict choice, but the objections 
have been less strident, probably because these reforms involve only 
public schools, which are tuition-free and, with rare exception, equally 
accessible to all applicants.7 Consequently, these public choice initia-
tives have enjoyed much more public support in Michigan and across 
the states. 
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RATIOnALE FOR SCHOOLS OF CHOICE
This form of educational choice, often referred to as open enroll-
ment, appears on the surface to be a more modest policy reform than 
charter schools.8 These programs do not alter school governance, as 
do charter schools, and may not hold the same potential for curricular 
and instructional innovation as the more autonomous charter schools. 
Rather, open enrollment programs enlarge geographic school atten-
dance boundaries, so students are not limited to their neighborhood 
schools. The first state open enrollment law was adopted by Minnesota 
in 1987. Since then, the number of states with open enrollment pro-
grams has grown to 42. Of these, 19 states have mandatory laws and 23 
have voluntary programs. Mandatory laws require local school boards 
to promulgate open enrollment policies, while voluntary laws allow 
such local district policies (Witte, Carlson, and Lavery 2008).
In essence, open enrollment breaks the link between household and 
school location. In so doing, these programs could reduce the socio-
economic and racial stratification of students, allowing students to cross 
boundaries of local districts that segregate families along these lines. 
On the other hand, interdistrict choice could exacerbate such segrega-
tion as families further sort themselves without having to change their 
place of residence.
 Advocates of these and other market-based education reforms, 
including charter schools, vouchers, and tuition tax credits, generally 
assert that the resulting competitive pressures exerted on schools will 
improve the productivity of the educational system as a whole (see, 
e.g., Friedman 1955; Chubb and Moe 1990; Hoxby 2000, 2002). That 
is, competition among schools will benefit not only those students 
who actively choose to participate in these programs, but also those 
who remain in their traditional, neighborhood schools. This argument, 
which often emphasizes the private rather than public (or civic) benefits 
of education, rests on the notion that traditional public schools essen-
tially enjoy a monopoly over students living in their attendance areas, 
and that monopolies, protected as they are from competition, do not use 
resources efficiently. Choice advocates further assert that if the money 
follows the student, a market-based choice program will cause good 
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schools to prosper and grow, while bad schools will either improve or 
disappear (Hoxby 2000).
 By this line of reasoning, school choice advocates see the poten-
tial for particularly substantial educational gains for minority and low-
income children who traditionally attend low-performing schools. 
Indeed, studies show that support for school choice, whether open 
enrollment, charter schools, or vouchers, varies by racial/ethnic group 
and with the quality of available public schools. For example, a 1993 
survey of Michigan residents revealed greater support for a proposed 
public school choice plan among Detroit residents, particularly lower-
income minority residents and those less supportive of their neighbor-
hood schools (Lee, Croninger, and Smith 1994).
At the same time, however, these market-based reforms have been 
criticized on the grounds that they may compromise the public purposes 
of schools, particularly those regarding civic participation and social 
cohesion. That is, the idea that schools should contribute to equality 
of social, economic, and political opportunities for people of differ-
ent racial and socioeconomic backgrounds suggests that all students 
be exposed to a common educational experience that ought not be left 
to the vagaries of individual or family preferences (Levin 1991, 2000; 
Fiske and Ladd 2000; Gill et al. 2001). For example, school competi-
tion could exacerbate the stratification of students across schools by 
race, class, and ability or deemphasize preparation for citizenship. Such 
an instance of market failure could arise if schools and parents are inter-
ested not only in school quality, but also in the characteristics of the 
student body. Specifically, if parents select schools at least partly on the 
basis of the socioeconomic profile of the student body and schools have 
some ability to influence their applicant pool (e.g., by selective adver-
tising or social networking), then competition could increase stratifica-
tion (Epple and Romano 2000; Ladd 2002).
Critics say that the school choice initiatives can impair the effi-
ciency of schools that lose students to their competitors. First, more 
motivated students and parents may be more likely to actively choose 
their schools, leaving their less motivated counterparts concentrated 
in the less attractive schools (Levin 1998; Witte 2000). These schools 
would then become increasingly less capable of competing in the edu-
cational marketplace as their positive peer influences leave. Second, as 
revenues decline in tandem with enrollments but operating costs do not, 
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these schools are forced to cut programs and services, triggering further 
losses (Fiske and Ladd 2000). 
IMPACTS OF OPEn EnROLLMEnT PROgRAMS
Although open enrollment is arguably the least innovative of the 
school choice initiatives, more closely resembling the traditional system 
of local public schools than either charter school or voucher programs, 
as a form of school choice, open enrollment can be expected to exert 
several important effects on students and communities, and these effects 
may be interrelated. In addition to the straightforward fiscal effects of 
school choice, other important but less obvious effects are those on 
school performance and student sorting. In examining these effects, 
we must consider why families value school choice. To the extent that 
parents choose schools on the basis of their educational quality, one 
could expect that school choice would improve school efficiency. That 
is, schools can be expected to strive for improvements in teaching and 
learning to attract new students and the resources that accompany them. 
Conversely, to the extent parents choose schools on the basis of the 
socioeconomic profile of the student body, choice could compromise 
school efficiency as school incentives are directed away from academic 
performance and toward selective advertising and recruitment activities 
(Ladd 2002; Rothstein 2006). 
Despite the widespread adoption of open enrollment programs 
across the states, researchers have focused primarily on the effects 
of the alternative school choice mechanisms of vouchers and charter 
schools. Moreover, although we now have a fairly substantial body of 
research on the effects of school competition on educational outcomes, 
much of this work examines the effects of competition from nearby 
private schools or neighboring public school districts. Reviewing more 
than 40 studies in the United States, Belfield and Levin (2002) find 
that competition has modest positive effects on student achievement. 
The research literature on the effects of open enrollment programs, in 
contrast, is relatively scant. A study of well-established open enrollment 
programs in Minnesota and Colorado finds that students tended to leave 
districts with higher proportions of low-income and low-achieving stu-
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dents and enroll in districts with greater concentrations of middle-class 
and higher-achieving students (Witte, Carlson, and Lavery 2008). Such 
effects are not unexpected, but the full array of short- and longer-term 
impacts of open enrollment programs continue to unfold. 
Fiscal Effects
The most immediate effect of children moving from one district to 
another is the accompanying transfer of revenue and creation of finan-
cial winners and losers. The common practice across the states of pay-
ing for schooling by the student ignores a number of important realities 
about the costs of operating schools. First, almost all instruction takes 
place in classroom groups, so the actual personnel costs of adding a 
single student to a classroom are essentially zero. And this is certainly 
so if the open enrollment program is limited to filling empty classroom 
seats, as is generally true in Michigan. Similarly, overhead costs for 
such things as buildings, administration, and even transportation are 
not increased by the addition of even a substantial number of students if 
seats are available for them. Conversely, the district of residence sees no 
reduction in operating costs as it loses students to neighboring districts.9 
As a result, an open enrollment program such as Michigan’s, in 
which a full per pupil foundation allowance follows the child, provides 
a windfall for the enrolling district and a corresponding loss for the 
sending district. Further, to the extent students seek transfer to schools 
in more affluent or more academically successful districts, such a pro-
gram will likely exacerbate the quality differences between districts and 
encourage further transfers. At the same time, however, the absence of 
such financial rewards and penalties would give public school districts 
little incentive to improve their programs and respond to parents’ edu-
cational demands.10 
Educational Effects
Empirical evidence on the academic effects of school choice is 
mixed. Those studies that do find positive effects also tend to find that 
minority students living in urban areas benefit the most from school 
choice (e.g., Goldhaber and Eide 2002). On the other hand, choice 
reforms could adversely impact such students as enrollments and 
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resources shift from one set of schools to another in these communities 
(Addonizio 1994). The distinction, of course, depends on who elects to 
change schools and who does not.
Some evidence of the educational effects of competition among 
public schools is taken from large-scale intradistrict choice programs 
in New York City and Chicago. Community District 4 on the upper 
east side of New York City has been widely acclaimed as an example 
of a high poverty district serving predominantly minority students that 
has seen dramatic improvements in student achievement following the 
introduction of school choice. Starting in 1973, the district formed more 
than 20 alternative schools from which parents could choose. In creat-
ing these alternative schools or programs, District 4 leaders severed the 
traditional correspondence between buildings and schools. Several pro-
grams, usually employing different educational approaches and serving 
different age groups, were housed in the same building (Elmore 1990).
Most research on District 4 points to the dramatic improvements in 
student achievement, but researchers disagree as to how much of the 
gains are attributable to choice and competition. Other possible con-
tributing factors cited by researchers include higher achieving students 
attracted to the district by the innovations, increased resource levels, 
and school downsizing (Teske et al. 1999). One could argue, how-
ever, that these additional factors are themselves desirable attributes of 
any well-conceived school choice program that provide educators the 
resources and latitude to offer new educational alternatives.
One study of Chicago’s high school open enrollment program that 
used distance from a student’s home to school of attendance to identify 
active choosers reveals little impact on academic outcomes district-
wide, but it does find a small positive impact on graduation rates for 
some students attending career academies, a type of vocational school 
(Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2000). A second study comparing academic 
outcomes between lottery winners and losers in Chicago’s high school 
choice program finds little evidence that attending sought-after pro-
grams improves students’ academic outcomes, whether standardized 
test scores, attendance rates, or credits earned.11 Further, while the 
study finds some evidence that lottery winners attending sought-after 
schools were less likely to report that they were disciplined at school or 
arrested, they were not more likely to expect to graduate college, enjoy 
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school, have positive interactions with peers or teachers, or feel safe at 
school (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2003).
Peer Effects
In addition to the impact of school choice on student achievement, 
a second question dominating the school choice debate is whether 
choice results in greater student sorting or stratification. That is, given a 
choice of school or district, will families sort themselves by race, socio- 
economic class, or some other characteristic in a way that would weaken 
community bonds and social cohesion? And one could easily imagine 
such sorting also impairing the educational achievement of particular 
student groups.
Prior to about 1990, school choice for families in the United States 
consisted almost exclusively of choosing the school district in which 
to live or sending children to private school. Accordingly, much of the 
research on school choice focused on this type of “Tiebout choice,” 
or “voting with one’s feet.”12 Clotfelter (1999) finds evidence of stu-
dent sorting across districts, but Hoxby (2000) and Alesina, Baqir, and 
Hoxby (2000) conclude that more student sorting occurs within dis-
tricts across schools. Urquiola (2005), examining the effects of school 
district concentration and competition in U.S. metropolitan areas, finds 
that competition among school districts does contribute to student strat-
ification, but adds that this observed sorting may also reflect residential 
segregation patterns possibly unrelated to schooling and school district 
boundaries. 
The introduction of open enrollment and charter school programs in 
the 1990s created new avenues for student sorting, as families were no 
longer restricted by school district boundaries when choosing their pub-
lic schools. This new sorting could occur in two general ways. First, as 
noted earlier, households may differ in their interest and ability to exer-
cise this newfound choice. More specifically, choosing households may 
be of higher socioeconomic status than nonchoosing households, rais-
ing the possibility that white students, more academically able students, 
and students from families with more educational resources will leave 
their traditional public schools for schools of choice. This hypothesis 
is supported by a substantial body of research (e.g., Lee, Croninger, 
and Smith 1996; Armor and Peiser 1998; Witte 2000). Second, active 
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choosers may sort themselves as well, possibly along racial or class 
lines. Less research is available on this question, but a rigorous study 
by Weiher and Tedin (2002) of school choice in Texas finds that race is 
a good predictor of the school choices made by choosing households. 
Analyzing the choices of 1,006 charter school households, the authors 
find that whites, African Americans, and Latinos transfer into charter 
schools where their groups comprise between 11 and 14 percentage 
points more of the student body than the traditional public schools they 
are leaving. Further, the vast majority of choosing households transfer 
their children into charter schools with lower performance on the state 
achievement test than the traditional schools they left. Interestingly, this 
observed behavior largely contradicted preferences expressed by these 
households on surveys designed to elicit their criteria for choosing a 
school. 
IMPACTS In MICHIgAn
Following passage of the schools of choice legislation, many 
Michigan school districts saw an opportunity to increase their oper-
ating revenue. By the program’s second year, 45 percent of districts 
were accepting nonresidents and by the fifth year, fully 80 percent of 
Michigan’s districts had signed on. Statewide pupil counts, however, 
were quite modest in the program’s early years, with schools of choice 
enrollments rising from 7,836 in 1997 to 33,506 in 2001, about 2 per-
cent of Michigan’s K–12 enrollment (Cullen and Loeb 2003). Examin-
ing the first two years of the program, Arsen, Plank, and Sykes (2000) 
find participation highest in rural and central-city school districts.13 It 
was much lower in suburban districts and lowest of all in high-income 
districts and districts with growing resident enrollments. This finding is 
not surprising. While the fiscal effects are unambiguously positive for 
a district enrolling nonresident students to fill otherwise empty desks, 
some districts may decline to participate in the program because of con-
cerns over peer effects, real or perceived. Put simply, local boards of 
education may fear that without the authority to screen applicants, the 
district runs some risk of enrolling undesirable students, including low 
achievers, those with behavioral problems, or racial minorities.14 
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 Arsen, Plank, and Sykes (2000) also find that transferring students 
were moving to districts with higher family incomes, higher MEAP 
scores, and lower concentrations of minority students than their home 
districts. For rural districts as a group, student outflows were roughly 
offset by inflows, while central cities sustained an average 0.7 percent 
enrollment loss. For some urban districts, however, the net loss of stu-
dents and revenue was much larger.15 
RECEnT TREnDS
Michigan’s schools of choice program has grown in recent years. 
We obtained data from the MDE on Sec. 105 and Sec. 105C enroll-
ments (full-time equivalent student counts [FTEs]) from the program’s 
inception in 1996–97 through 2008–09. 
With the exception of 2001–02, statewide participation in Michi-
gan’s schools of choice program has risen each year since its incep-
tion. This steady growth in schools of choice enrollments, moreover, 
has occurred during periods of both growth and decline in Michigan’s 
total public school enrollments. These data are presented in Table 6.1. 
As the data show, the rate of participation in Michigan’s schools 
of choice program has grown steadily since its inception and is now 
approaching 5 percent of Michigan’s K–12 enrollment.16 This growth 
is undoubtedly fueled by the growing financial pressure on local school 
districts, a topic discussed in Chapter 3. Because local districts can 
control the scope of their participation in the program, designating the 
schools, grades, and number of slots available to nonresidents, they can 
essentially seek to fill empty desks, thereby gaining revenue while con-
trolling operating costs. 
County and Local Impacts
These totals, while showing steady annual growth statewide, con-
ceal the very uneven impact of schools of choice across localities. 
The majority of local districts in Michigan are largely unaffected by 
the program, neither losing nor gaining enrollments to any substantial 
degree. But many districts in major metropolitan areas are significantly 
Schools of Choice   173
impacted, with some districts enrolling substantial numbers and propor-
tions of nonresident students. Much of this interdistrict student move-
ment has occurred in the tri-county region of southeastern Michigan, 
consisting of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties. Table 6.2 lists 
the 28 local districts whose schools of choice enrollments numbered at 
least 500 and accounted for at least 15 percent of total district enroll-
ment in 2008–09.
While Michigan’s total schools of choice enrollment accounted for 
less than 5 percent of the state’s total K–12 enrollment in 2008–09, 
this 13-year-old state program is the source of a substantial share of 
student enrollments and operating revenue for some local districts. As 
noted earlier, participation in the choice program is a local decision, 
and success in attracting nonresident students depends on local market-
ing efforts as well as reputation. As a result, local impacts vary, even 
for neighboring districts. Indeed, competition for students is often most 
intense among neighboring communities, fostering local rivalries and 
resentments not seen in the charter school movement. An example of 
diverse impacts on neighboring districts is provided by Highland Park, 





Nonresident as % 
total enrollment
1996–97 7,386 1,680,693 0.44
1997–98 10,576 1,694,320 0.62
1998–99 14,413 1,709,892 0.84
1999–00 19,045 1,714,815 1.11
2000–01 33,506 1,720,335 1.95
2001–02 33,248 1,731,092 1.92
2002–03 39,800 1,750,631 2.27
2003–04 50,247 1,734,019 2.90
2004–05 57,671 1,708,585 3.38
2005–06 63,279 1,697,900 3.73
2006–07 66,673 1,678,480 3.97
2007–08 74,091 1,648,540 4.49
2008–09 76,650 1,615,371 4.75
SOURCE: MDE.
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Percent Sec. 105 
enrollment
Highland Park 1,563 2,747 56.9
Inkster 1,526 3,005 50.8
Clintondale 1,758 3,647 48.2
Vandercook 540 1,302 41.5
Carrollton 703 1,792 39.3
Oak Park 1,467 3,771 38.9
Westwood 685 1,923 35.6
Dearborn Heights 1,013 2,847 35.6
Madison (Oakland) 523 1,520 34.4
Riverview 838 2,641 31.7
Corunna 764 2,438 31.4
Lakeview 875 3,132 28.0
Essexville-Hampton 537 1,923 27.9
Pennfield 535 2,029 26.4
Melvindale-N. Allen 654 2,800 23.4
Ypsilanti 898 3,877 23.2
Western 659 2,865 23.0
West Bloomfield 1,567 6,845 22.9
Bangor 553 2,540 21.8
Ferndale 758 4,033 18.8
Southgate 988 5,467 18.1
Lakeview (Calhoun) 685 3,790 18.1
East Lansing 604 3,417 17.7
Berkley 776 4,407 17.6
Allen Park 639 3,730 17.1
Fraser 772 4,802 16.1
Warren Woods 517 3,391 15.3
Saginaw Twp. 805 5,334 15.1
SOURCE: MDE.
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which enrolls fully 57 percent of its students from outside the district 
(with the vast majority of these choice students living in the Detroit 
Public School District), and neighboring Hamtramck, which enrolls a 
mere 8 percent from outside the district. A local school board’s decision 
about enrolling nonresidents is multifaceted, involving educational, 
financial, and political considerations. Moreover, for those local dis-
tricts choosing to participate, success in enrolling nonresidents depends 
on the aggressiveness of the district’s marketing efforts and the dis-
trict’s image, socioeconomic characteristics, and academic reputation. 
And, of course, districts must be concerned with loss of resident enroll-
ment whether they pursue nonresident students or not.
Some insight into the dynamics of Michigan’s schools of choice 
program can be gained by examining participation at the county level. 
Fully 17 of the 28 local districts listed in Table 6.2 are located in the 
three counties of Michigan’s southeastern region, with Wayne, Oak-
land, and Macomb counties claiming 8, 5, and 4 of these 28 high choice 
enrollment districts, respectively. At the same time, however, while 
nonresident enrollments are quite high in these 17 local districts, par-
ticipation rates are considerably higher in several other counties and 
zero or near zero in others. Nonresident enrollment rates for selected 
counties for the past five years are presented in Table 6.3.
The counties (each an ISD) are ordered by their 2008–09 schools of 
choice enrollment rates, from high to low. The three most active coun-
ties in 2008–09, Jackson, Berrien, and Saginaw, were also the most 
active in each of the last five years, in terms of participation rates. 
Moreover, nonresident enrollment rates have increased in each of the 
past four years in each of these counties. Indeed, the numbers and pro-
portions of nonresident enrollments have increased steadily across most 
of these counties, reflecting the state’s steady growth in open enroll-
ment activity. Notable exceptions, however, include Kent and Genesee 
ISDs, which have eschewed the state’s choice program in favor of their 
own cooperative student transfer programs. 
At the same time, nonresident enrollment rates vary considerably 
across local districts within each county, again reflecting the localized 
nature of school choice in Michigan. These local district rates are pre-
sented for Jackson County in Table 6.4.
As a percentage of total public school enrollment, the level of open 
enrollment activity in Jackson County has been the highest in the state 
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Table 6.3  nonresident Enrollments Selected Counties 2004–05 through 2008–09
2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09
County FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE %
Jackson 2,918 10.95 2,997 11.26 3,226 12.19 3,379 13.11 3,516 13.94
Berrien 2,429 8.77 2,631 9.69 2,879 10.73 3,009 11.38 3,130 12.01
Saginaw 3,457 9.78 3,526 10.18 3,627 10.75 3,816 11.55 3,855 11.91
Ingham 3,196 6.59 3,364 7.05 3,563 7.56 3,719 8.01 3,847 8.48
Midland 799 5.49 834 5.83 393 2.79 961 6.88 1,011 7.39
Macomb 4,782 3.48 5,703 4.10 6,545 4.69 7,822 5.64 9,244 6.68
Oakland 7,490 3.68 8,056 3.95 8,679 4.24 9,175 4.54 9,452 4.71
Washtenaw 1,229 2.58 1,508 3.15 1,585 3.31 1,695 3.60 1,971 4.19
Wayne 9,307 2.60 9,721 2.76 9,914 2.90 11,893 3.59 11,791 3.70
Kalamazoo 138 0.40 152 0.45 222 0.65 219 0.65 252 0.75
Muskegon 161 0.58 566 1.74 669 2.09 1,100 3.49 165 0.53
Genesee 56 0.07 70 0.08 79 0.10 109 0.14 119 0.15
Kent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Group 35,962 3.13 39,128 3.41 41,381 3.65 46,897 4.21 48,353 4.43
State 57,671 3.38 63,279 3.73 66,673 3.97 74,091 4.49 76,650 4.75
SOURCE: MDE.
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Table 6.4  Local Districts in Jackson County nonresident Enrollments 2004–05 through 2008–09
2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09
Local district FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE %
Western 551 19.5 554 19.2 619 21.0 644 22.2 659 23.0
Vandercook Lake 473 35.5 471 35.0 498 36.8 506 38.3 540 41.5
Columbia 154 8.6 140 7.8 168 9.4 171 9.8 203 12.0
Grass Lake 91 7.8 98 8.3 115 9.5 155 12.5 181 14.2
Concord 118 11.8 110 11.1 136 14.1 150 15.5 160 17.4
East Jackson 315 19.6 312 20.1 310 20.8 329 22.7 297 22.3
Hanover-Horton 218 15.5 247 18.0 255 18.7 275 20.4 306 22.7
Michigan Center 324 22.0 316 21.4 291 20.1 284 20.3 311 22.1
Napoleon 129 7.9 148 8.9 166 10.1 216 13.3 220 13.8
Northwest 143 4.0 143 4.1 158 4.7 183 5.7 174 5.7
Springport 107 10.1 129 12.1 128 12.2 128 12.4 147 14.2
Jackson 296 4.4 329 4.9 381 5.7 338 5.2 318 5.0
SOURCE: MDE.
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for each of the past five years. Local districts enrolling the highest pro-
portions of nonresidents have been Vandercook Lake, Western, East 
Jackson, Hanover-Horton, and Michigan Center. It is no coincidence 
that each of these districts has recorded high school graduation rates 
among the highest in the county and well in excess of Jackson Public 
School District.17 Jackson City Schools has been the big loser in the 
county’s schools of choice program. The district’s enrollment gains and 
losses in schools of choice are given in Table 6.5. Jackson City was los-
ing enrollment prior to the inception of schools of choice, but the choice 
program has managed to accelerate this trend in recent years, starting 
in 2004–05. 
berrien County—a tale of three districts 
Two of the three local districts in Berrien County where non- 
residents exceed 200 FTEs and 20 percent of enrollment are Coloma 
and Eau Claire. (The third is Bridgman.) And the district with the small-
est nonresident enrollment is Benton Harbor, with a mere 12 nonresi-
dents, or 0.3 percent of enrollment. A five-year history of nonresident 
enrollments for local districts in Berrien County is presented in Table 
6.6. Benton Harbor schools are open to nonresidents but few families 
in neighboring communities have shown interest in enrolling. Clearly, 
Table 6.5  Jackson Public Schools Enrollment Losses Due to Schools of 
Choice, 2000–10, Fall Pupil Counts (FTE)
Year Enrollment gain Enrollment loss Net loss
2000 102.30 831.01 728.71
2001 92.00 888.67 796.67
2002 162.80 1,052.39 889.59
2003 186.34 1,186.75 1,000.41
2004 251.95 1,345.32 1,093.37
2005 295.52 1,500.68 1,205.16
2006 329.30 1,486.50 1,157.20
2007 381.03 1,527.45 1,146.42
2008 338.00 1,587.00 1,249.00
2009 318.25 1,646.40 1,328.15
2010 284.06 1,756.83 1,472.77
SOURCE: MDE.
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Table 6.6  Local Districts in berrien County nonresident Enrollments 2004–05 through 2008–09
2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09
District FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE %
Benton Harbor 4 <0.1 3 <0.1 4 0.1 17 0.4 12 0.3
St. Joseph 5 0.2 75 2.7 140 5.0 215 7.6 234 8.2
Lakeshore 15 0.5 57 2.0 102 3.5 145 4.9 161 5.5
River Valley 96 9.6 91 9.8 91 10.5 87 10.7 81 10.6
Galien Twp. 33 18.9 58 32.6 67 38.3 58 31.0 61 37.0
New Buffalo 182 26.5 192 29.6 195 29.3 185 28.1 164 24.9
Brandywine 194 13.1 202 14.0 228 15.5 212 14.5 235 16.5
Berrien Springs 235 14.5 283 16.6 363 20.5 389 22.2 457 24.3
Eau Claire 205 24.0 221 26.0 248 30.0 252 31.1 207 28.1
Niles 198 4.9 195 4.8 208 5.2 204 5.2 247 6.3
Buchanan 199 11.3 190 11.1 189 11.0 205 12.0 201 12.0
Watervliet 231 16.8 234 17.5 230 17.3 255 19.2 244 19.1
Coloma 512 23.2 510 24.0 482 23.4 425 22.2 424 22.9
Bridgman 233 22.7 231 22.2 238 23.8 267 26.7 292 29.6
Hagar Twp.#6 49 71.0 37 52.2 40 58.0 31 54.4 45 73.8
Sodus Twp.#5 38 61.3 52 80.0 54 84.4 64 85.3 65 91.5
SOURCE: MDE.
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the movement of choice students has been away from Benton Harbor 
and toward Coloma and Eau Claire, among other districts. We can track 
this migration of students from Benton Harbor with administrative data 
compiled by the MDE for their state aid payment system. Table 6.7 
provides a historical profile of the district’s student exodus from 2000 
to 2010 under the state’s schools of choice program.
Such movement of students across public schools in and around 
Benton Harbor has been of enormous social, political, and legal con-
sequence for decades. The Benton Harbor, Coloma, and Eau Claire 
districts were principals in a 35-year federal desegregation case that 
spanned the period of 1967–2002. The case originated with a lawsuit 
filed against the Benton Harbor School District by the parent of a stu-
dent and the NAACP, claiming the district was discriminating against 
and segregating black students. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that black 
teachers were assigned to black schools and white teachers to white 
schools, and that in the junior high and high schools, which were more 
integrated than the elementary schools, students were tracked, with 
most black students placed in the slower sections (Kotlowitz 1998). 
The litigation dragged on for 15 years before the plaintiffs eventu-
ally prevailed. In 1981, Judge Douglas Hillman of the Western Dis-
trict Court of Michigan found that officials of the predominantly white 
Coloma and Eau Claire school districts promoted “white flight” from 
the largely black Benton Harbor School District by taking transfer stu-
dents, mostly white, from the district on a tuition basis and ordered 
the desegregation of Benton Harbor, Eau Claire, and Coloma schools. 
The court order called for voluntary busing between Benton Harbor 
and the two heavily white neighboring districts “whenever such transfer 
would result in decreasing segregation in each school system” (Berry	
v.	 School	 District	 of	 City	 of	 Benton	 Harbor	 1981).18 The court also 
ordered extraordinary state payments to Benton Harbor for magnet edu-
cational programs.
The desegregation order remained in force until April 4, 2002, when 
Judge Hillman granted the state of Michigan’s motion for “unitary sta-
tus,” a declaration that all remaining effects of past segregation in Ben-
ton Harbor had been eliminated.19 The ruling phased out the program 
of court-ordered state payments, which had totaled more than $116 mil-
lion, to the district and effectively ended the 35-year-old case.20 
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Table 6.7  The Exodus of benton Harbor Residents under Schools of Choice, by Enrolling District, 2000–01 through 
2010–11
Year Coloma Eau Claire Berrien Watervliet Bridgman St. Joseph Other Total
2000 78 70 14 10 5 0 14 191
2001 138 76 10 27 10 0 28 289
2002 167 102 48 41 17 0 54 428
2003 191 102 68 44 35 1 80 521
2004 280 153 100 42 36 0 63 674
2005 378 121 105 53 40 3 86 786
2006 363 166 138 54 29 45 124 919
2007 365 192 207 43 22 100 146 1075
2008 299 194 218 56 28 161 172 1127
2009 270 164 274 63 23 173 175 1142
2010 289 230 315 86 13 177 263 1373
SOURCE: MDE.
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Since Judge Hillman’s decision terminating the federal desegre-
gation efforts in Benton Harbor, the racial composition of the district 
has changed little, with the proportion of children who are African 
American remaining about 94 percent. These students, however, have 
become even more poor, with the proportion who are economically dis- 
advantaged (i.e., eligible for free or reduced price lunch under the 
national school lunch act) rising from 79.6 percent in 2002–03 to an 
astronomical 98 percent in 2008–09. Over this same period, the propor-
tion of African American students has fallen in both Coloma and Eau 
Claire, and the proportion of economically disadvantaged students has 
fallen dramatically in Eau Claire. These data on the racial and socio-
economic composition of the students in these districts, along with 
neighboring Bridgman Public Schools and the public school academies 
of Berrien County, are presented in Tables 6.8A and 6.8B. 
Although these descriptive data do not establish a causal relation-
ship between the advent of schools of choice and the growing socio-
economic stratification across the local districts involved in the court 
order, the correlation between Michigan’s schools of choice program 
and the increasing socioeconomic isolation of the children in Benton 
Harbor Public Schools is unmistakable. This phenomenon is depicted 
in Figure 6.1.
The data draw a stark picture of a school district beset by steadily 
declining enrollment and rising poverty. Over this period, Benton Har-
bor Area Schools has lost nearly half its enrollment, while the percent-
age of its students who are economically disadvantaged has risen to an 
astonishing 98 percent by 2009, as noted above. Certainly this outcome 
is not entirely attributable to the state’s open enrollment program. Out-
migration, charter schools, and generally declining economic activity 
have all played a role. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that open enroll-
ment activity has contributed substantially to the school district’s plight 
of racial segregation and poverty. A history of the exodus of Benton 
Harbor residents to neighboring school districts is depicted in Figure 
6.2, with the most popular destinations individually identified.
Saginaw County 
Saginaw County public school districts are the third most active 
county group in terms of participation rate in the state’s open enroll-
ment program. This is so despite the nonparticipation of two of the 
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Table 6.8A  Percent African American Students Selected Districts in berrien County
District 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Benton Harbor 92.7 93.9 93.6 94.0 94.8 94.4 94.0 94.3
Coloma 18.9 16.8 14.2 14.6 15.4 14.3 15.0 12.7
Eau Claire 17.4 15.8 14.4 14.2 13.2 15.0 15.8 14.0
Bridgman 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.8 1.4
PSAs 67.1 71.3 72.8 73.4
SOURCE: MDE. PSA figures are enrollment weighted averages.
Table 6.8b  Percent of Economically Disadvantaged Selected Districts in berrien County
District 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08
Benton Harbor 84.5 80.5 79.6 86.8 89.0 74.3 87.5 92.2
Coloma 40.4 40.7 42.0 50.2 51.0 44.9 52.3 41.6
Eau Claire 51.8 54.4 56.2 58.7 67.0 51.8 27.9 27.0
Bridgman 12.9 11.9 15.2 19.2 19.0 23.6 27.0 23.8
PSAs 76.1 85.5 67.8 59.5
SOURCE: MDE. PSA figures are enrollment-weighted averages.
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county’s 13 local districts. One of the nonparticipants, Frankenmuth, 
is by far the wealthiest district in the county as measured by residen-
tial property wealth per pupil, while the other nonparticipant, Freeland, 
ranks fourth.21 A history of open enrollment in the county is presented 
in Table 6.9.
Systematic effects of the county’s relatively high rate of participa-
tion are not readily apparent from these data. For example, Carrollton, 
with the greatest proportion of nonresident students, ranks last among 
the county’s local districts in residential property wealth, just ahead of 
Saginaw City. Further, while Saginaw City School District has steadily 
lost enrollment since 1991–92 (except for a slight increase in 2002–03), 
these losses do not appear to have been exacerbated by the state’s open 
enrollment program. Saginaw Public Schools’ open enrollment history 
is presented in Table 6.10 and the district’s total enrollment history is 
depicted in Figure 6.3.
Detroit Public Schools
In absolute numbers, no Michigan school district has lost more 
students through schools of choice than Detroit Public Schools (DPS). 
Moreover, this enrollment loss has been just a part of an unprecedented 
student exodus also fueled by Michigan’s charter school program and 
general demographic trends. These broader trends and their attendant 
fiscal and political difficulties are discussed at some length in Chap-
ter 7. Here we will focus exclusively on the DPS experience with the 
state’s open enrollment program. A history of DPS enrollment gains 
and losses stemming from schools of choice is presented in Table 6.11. 
The data reveal that DPS is far from a desired educational destina-
tion for families in neighboring school districts. The schools of choice 
traffic has been almost entirely outbound. Where are the students 
going? Again, state administrative data reveal the enrolling districts for 
these residents of DPS. A 10-year history of the DPS schools of choice 
exodus is presented in Table 6.12, with the more popular destinations 
identified.
While the district’s total number of outbound students has grown 
more or less steadily since the fall of 2000, the distinction of most 
preferred destination has cycled across several neighboring districts. 
Throughout most of this 11-year period, Highland Park Public Schools 
has been the preferred destination, with enrollments from Detroit peak-
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Table 6.9  Local Districts in Saginaw County, 2004–05 through 2008–09, nonresident Enrollments
2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09
District FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE % FTE %
Saginaw City 1,007 8.7 1,006 9.2 989 10.0 1,042 10.9 1,096 11.9
Carrollton 486 29.3 512 31.7 581 33.5 646 37.2 703 39.3
Saginaw Twp. 709 13.7 780 15.1 831 15.7 863 16.0 805 15.1
Buena Vista 245 19.5 196 17.6 202 18.6 142 14.6 173 18.3
Chesaning 107 5.3 76 3.9 73 3.9 91 4.9 89 4.9
Birch Run 62 3.3 66 3.5 119 6.3 143 7.7 157 8.5
Bridgeport-
Spaulding
334 15.5 323 15.1 256 12.6 185 10.1 124 7.3
Frankenmuth 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 –
Freeland 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 – 0 –
Hemlock 90 6.1 106 7.1 103 7.1 128 8.9 115 8.4
Merrill 53 6.2 47 5.7 59 7.1 74 8.8 83 10.5
St. Charles 67 5.6 68 5.7 74 6.2 81 7.0 72 6.4
Swan Valley 298 17.1 346 19.4 341 19.3 423 23.3 438 24.5
SOURCE: MDE.
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Table 6.10  Enrollment Losses for Saginaw Public Schools Due to Schools 
of Choice, 2000–10, Fall Pupil Counts (FTE)
Year Enrollment loss Enrollment gain Net loss
2000 987.13 353.68 633.45
2001 1,004.55 450.16 554.39
2002 1,194.67 653.34 541.33
2003 1,274.31 713.78 560.53
2004 1,459.07 890.16 568.91
2005 1,605.17 1,006.82 598.35
2006 1,694.71 1,005.84 688.87
2007 1,741.05 988.74 752.31
2008 1,778.28 1,041.72 736.56
2009 1,760.66 1,096.38 664.28
2010 1,825.32 1,059.37 765.95
SOURCE: MDE.
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ing in 2008 at nearly 2,200 and more than doubling Highland Park’s 
enrollment that year. Highland Park’s Detroit enrollments plummeted 
in 2010, however, as educational and financial issues mounted in the 
district. By that time, Oak Park and Inkster had become the destinations 
of choice for Detroit residents, while the traffic to Westwood Public 
Schools reached a new high. 
These year-to-year fluctuations in cross-district student move-
ments may be explained by a host of factors, including the adoption 
of an attractive new program in a district (e.g., full-day kindergarten), 
enhanced pupil transportation service, favorable press coverage, or 
more aggressive marketing. District leadership may also choose to sus-
pend or discontinue their open enrollment programs, maintaining their 
continuing nonresident enrollments but accepting no new enrollees. 
And while it is unlikely that these annual fluctuations in nonresident 
enrollment levels are reflective of real changes in the academic quality 
of the schools involved, a steady outflow of students and revenue from 
a school or district is likely to damage the reputation of those institu-
tions, spurring more departures of students and resources and eventu-
ally inflicting real damage on the academic programs. Undoubtedly, 
this has been the case in DPS.
Table 6.11  Enrollment Losses for Detroit Public Schools Due to Schools 
of Choice, 2000–10, Fall Pupil Counts (FTE)
Year Enrollment loss Enrollment gain Net loss
2000 1,466.33 0 1,466.33
2001 3,081.86 0 3,081.86
2002 3,871.04 0 3,871.04
2003 4,005.27 0 4,005.27
2004 6,009.79 210.83 5,798.96
2005 6,587.53 363.56 6,223.97
2006 7,258.60 0 7,258.60
2007 7,605.72 0 7,605.72
2008 9,061.82 6.00 9,055.82
2009 8,606.78 11.00 8,595.78
2010 8,458.46 27.50 8,430.96
SOURCE: MDE.
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Table 6.12  Districts Enrolling DPS Residents, 2000–10, Fall Pupil Counts (FTE)






Union Westwood Inkster Other
2000 2.00 145.00 209.60 965.84 0 0 7.00 136.89
2001 306.11 344.00 225.60 1,327.06 0 15.00 146.00 718.09
2002 328.63 468.66 243.00 1,503.62 225.83 17.00 84.50 999.80
2003 354.50 612.66 483.00 606.32 270.07 44.00 40.50 1,594.22
2004 577.01 720.97 532.00 1,364.78 502.48 222.00 49.00 2,041.55
2005 747.50 670.33 492.50 1,513.38 642.34 278.00 50.00 2,193.48
2006 983.58 593.67 488.83 1,468.13 622.11 341.00 245.00 2,516.28
2007 444.77 1,418.82 467.14 1,551.56 527.00 385.15 120.90 2,691.28
2008 310.00 1,628.40 473.50 2,162.70 410.66 406.00 685.00 2,985.56
2009 330.29 1,285.28 447.50 1,504.03 296.50 337.50 1,122.70 3,282.98
2010 360.00 1,012.49 420.50 791.32 218.50 631.00 1,270.90 3,753.75
SOURCE: MDE.
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SCHOOLS OF CHOICE: ADDED vALuE OR  
ZERO-SuM gAME?
Michigan’s schools of choice program is best viewed as part of a 
broader state movement toward choice and entrepreneurship in K–12 
education, one strand in a multifaceted strategy to create incentives to 
improve public schools. And although it receives less attention than 
the state’s expansive charter school program, Michigan’s open enroll-
ment program has had a substantial impact on school enrollments and 
funding levels in metropolitan areas across the state, including those 
in Berrien, Jackson, Saginaw, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne counties.
As a school improvement strategy, however, open enrollment suf-
fers from several shortcomings. First, unlike the charter school pro-
gram, the open enrollment initiative lacks any supply-side strategy to 
encourage new school creation. Rather, schools of choice is a zero-sum 
game in which the gains of the winners in the quest for enrollments 
and revenue are offset by the losses of the other competitors. Indeed, 
for those local communities on the losing side in the hunt for student 
bounties, more than money may be lost. As families remove their chil-
dren from schools in the communities in which they live, the bonds 
between school and community are weakened. In particular, this schism 
jeopardizes public support for local schools, including support for dis-
trict millage requests for capital projects. Further, such student move-
ment threatens to polarize communities and further segment students by 
race and socioeconomic status. Evidence of such strains has surfaced in 
communities in Berrien, Oakland, and Wayne counties, among others.
Finally, the educational effects of Michigan’s open enrollment pro-
gram are not easily discernable and certainly elude the level of public 
scrutiny given to the performance of charter schools. That is, student 
achievement data are routinely reported at the school and district level, 
thereby facilitating the evaluation of charter schools but obscuring the 
impact of open enrollment on student achievement. As a result, the 
future of Michigan’s schools of choice program will likely depend less 
on evidence of educational outcomes than on ideology and political 
preferences. At this time, the long-term effects and policy implications 
of open enrollment are somewhat ambiguous. The program may result 
in the further segregation of students by socioeconomic characteristics 
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and academic achievement in metropolitan areas. On the other hand, 
the program may continue to provide some families with an opportunity 
to enroll their children in a more desirable school system without the 
need of relocating their residence. This potential benefit may suffice, at 
least in the near term, to maintain current levels of political support for 
the program. 
notes
  1. Public Act 300 of 1997.
  2. Exceptions were made for siblings of children already enrolled in the district. 
Also, a district could refuse to enroll an applicant who has been suspended within 
the preceding two years or who has ever been expelled.
  3. Sec. 380.1401 of the School Aid Act states: “Tuition for grades K to 6 shall not 
exceed 25 percent more than the operation cost per capita for the number of pupils 
in membership in grades K to 12. Tuition for grades 7 to 12 shall not exceed 
12–1/2 percent more than 115 percent of the operation cost per capita for the 
number of pupils in membership in grades K to 12 . . . The per capita cost used 
shall not include moneys expended for school sites, school building construction, 
equipment, payment of bonds, or other purposes not properly included in opera-
tion costs as determined by the state board.”
  4. Public Act 297 of 2000.
  5. At the time this proposal was being debated, data on high school graduation rates 
in Michigan were notoriously unreliable, and the list of districts falling below the 
two-thirds standard was the subject of much dispute.
  6. On July 27, 2002, in a 5 to 4 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a voucher program established by the state of Ohio for families resid-
ing in the Cleveland City School District. Many families used the vouchers to send 
their children to Catholic schools. The court ruled that the Cleveland voucher pro-
gram did not violate the First Amendment’s separation of church and state because 
the state was not providing the funds directly to the church-run schools. Rather, 
the state gave the funds to the parents who then paid them to the sectarian schools 
(Zelman	v.	Simmons-Harris 2002). Although Zelman would appear to pave the 
way for voucher programs that allow parents to choose church-run schools, such 
programs are prohibited by many state constitutions. Michigan’s constitutional 
prohibition is particularly stringent.
  7. Indeed, another reason for the unpopularity of vouchers in the United States is 
that many proposals have called for relatively small voucher amounts, falling far 
short of tuition at most good private schools. As such, these plans have been often 
viewed by the public as more of a “giveaway” to affluent families with children 
already enrolled in these schools than an opportunity for the less well-heeled to 
enroll their children. Programs targeted to low-income households, on the other 
hand, have enjoyed some measure of support in a few states. State-funded voucher 
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programs currently operate in Maine, Ohio, Vermont, Utah, and Wisconsin, along 
with a federally funded program in the District of Columbia.
  8. The term open	 enrollment has been used to refer to intradistrict public school 
choice programs, a form of choice that predates the interdistrict choice created 
by Michigan’s schools of choice program. Here we will use open enrollment to 
describe the more recent and more expansive interdistrict programs as well as 
notable intradistrict programs such as those in New York City and Chicago.
  9. In microeconomic terms, the marginal cost of educating an additional student is 
near zero and, conversely, the marginal cost reduction of losing a student is like-
wise near zero.
  10. Intradistrict choice, of course, would generally not create such a powerful eco-
nomic incentive, since districts can shift funds from school to school or change 
school attendance boundaries to compensate for enrollment shifts across schools.
  11. Because lottery winners are selected at random, winners and losers have the same 
set of background characteristics on average. Therefore, any observed differences 
in academic outcomes between lottery winners and losers can be attributed to win-
ning the lottery and not to other influences, either observed or unobserved.
  12. Economist Charles Tiebout, in a seminal 1956 article, “A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures,” described a mechanism by which individuals choose their com-
munity of residence according to that community’s combination of local taxes 
and services. If there are many localities, each with a unique tax/service package, 
individuals will be able to select their most preferred package in the same manner 
that they buy goods and services in a private market. This analogy with private 
markets suggested by Tiebout implies that resources may be allocated efficiently 
in the public sector as well as in the private sector, a proposition that had been 
previously dismissed by most economists. 
  13. In this context, “participation” refers to students attending public schools in dis-
tricts other than their district of residence. In this way, a student may participate in 
schools of choice even if his district of residence does not.
  14. A 2006 study published by the Harvard Civil Rights Project identified Michigan as 
one of four states with the highest levels of black segregation in its public schools 
(Orfield and Lee 2006). This state of affairs is not lost on the residents in many 
urban areas. As one African American student in author Addonizio’s economics of 
education class at Wayne State University observed, a district may resist the finan-
cial incentive for enrolling nonresidents in order to “keep Snoop in the hood.” 
 15. These districts experiencing relatively heavy enrollment losses included Saginaw, 
Jackson, Pontiac, Niles, Adrian, Inkster, Ecorse, and Hillsdale. Michigan’s three 
largest urban districts, Detroit, Grand Rapids, and Flint, experienced net enroll-
ment losses of less than 1 percent (Arsen, Plank, and Sykes 2000).
 16. Section 105/105C is a state program. Alternatively, local districts within the same 
ISD may develop their own interdistrict plans that operate independently of the 
state’s schools of choice program. While these cooperative programs allow some 
student movement across local district boundaries, they generally restrict such 
movement, resulting in fewer interdistrict transfers as compared with the more 
competitive state program. Notable examples of these more cooperative choice 
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programs are found in the Kent and Genesee ISDs (Arsen, Plank, and Sykes 
2000). Indeed, Kent County public schools report zero participation in the state 
program (see Table 6.3).
 17. The five-year, 2008 graduation rates for these districts, as reported by the Michi-
gan Center for Educational Performance and Information, were Vandercook Lake, 
89.0; East Jackson, 86.8; Hanover-Horton, 94.4; Michigan Center, 87.0; and Jack-
son City, 63.8. Western, with a graduation rate of 72.5 percent in 2008, is some-
what anomalous among this group. 
 18. In 2007, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that school assignment systems 
cannot be based on race alone (Parents	 Involved	 in	 Community	 Schools	 Inc.	
v.	Seattle	School	District 2007).
 19. This ruling was reflective of a general reluctance of the federal courts in the last 
several decades to insert themselves into the governance of public schools, now 
viewed as the province of state and local governments. In 1991, the U.S. Supreme 
Court began to authorize school districts to return to segregated neighborhood 
schools (Board	 of	 Education	 of	 Oklahoma	 v.	 Dowell 1991). The court issued 
two subsequent rulings that further relaxed desegregation standards. In Freeman	
v.	Pitts (1992), the court allowed school districts to terminate desegregation plans 
even though the schools had not yet become integrated. In Missouri	 v.	 Jenkins 
(1995), the court emphasized local control over desegregation as the primary goal 
of school governance.
 20. In his 50-page decision, Judge Hillman wrote, “I accept [the State’s evidence] that 
after adjusting for [socioeconomic] factors and first grade test scores, no statisti-
cally significant gap exists between the performance of white and minority stu-
dents in the Benton Harbor schools. In other words, no ‘achievement gap’ exists 
. . . that is attributable to the race of the students . . . ” Berry	v.	School	District	of	
the	City	of	Benton	Harbor (2002).
 21. In 2007–08, residential (i.e., homestead) state equalized value per pupil in Fran-
kenmuth was $243,311, far exceeding the corresponding value of $167,152 for 




The Detroit Public Schools
A Failure of Policy and Politics
As the fall of 2011 and a new school year approached, observers 
of DPS wondered if this once exemplary district had yet hit bottom. 
The district’s problems had never been more daunting: its budget deficit 
at the end of school year 2010–11 was $327 million, ballooning $108 
million (49 percent) above the 2009–10 deficit level. Moreover, this 
debt explosion occurred during the two-year stewardship of emergency 
financial manager Robert Bobb, appointed by Governor Granholm to 
staunch the flow of red ink in the district.
But the district’s problems that year went far beyond financial 
strains: emergency manager Bobb and the elected school board sued 
each other over control over DPS, Bobb fired the superintendent whom 
the board hired, the board president was forced to resign in the wake of 
sexual misconduct charges, and a debate raged over a mayoral takeover 
of the schools (Schultz 2010). 
Academic performance in the district was just as dire. Both math 
and reading achievement scores by DPS 4th and 8th graders on the 
2009 NAEP were not only the lowest in the nation, but the lowest in the 
40-year history of this national testing program.1 
Bobb, whose term ended in mid-2011, was replaced by Roy Roberts, 
appointed to the emergency financial manager position by newly elected 
governor Rick Snyder. Yet, the path forward is far from clear. Roberts, 
while joining with the governor and the superintendent to launch yet 
another wide-ranging education reform plan, still faces a serious deficit 
problem coupled with the added prospect of severe revenue shortages 
for the 2011–12 school year and beyond (see MDE [2011]). 
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A LOOK bACK: 1964–81
To fully understand and appreciate the current troubles in which 
DPS finds itself, it will help to describe briefly the roots of these trou-
bles—roots that stretch back at least 45 years to the early 1960s, if not 
further. Thus, in this section we set the stage for what will follow in the 
body of the chapter by first recounting a series of significant events that 
took place and circumstances that prevailed in the 17-year period from 
1964 through 1981. 
In our brief review of that 17-year history, we draw heavily on 
Jeffrey Mirel’s (1993) excellent and definitive history of DPS 1907–81, 
and particularly on Chapter 7, in which Mirel covers the period 1964–81. 
Mirel introduces what he saw as the impending breakdown that began in 
the early 1960s with a 1975 quote from political analyst William Serrin 
(1975): “ . . . nowhere in America can the nation’s disregard of its cities 
and the failure of the nation’s economic policies be seen so clearly as 
in Detroit.” And, as Mirel notes, Serrin could have said much the same 
about DPS, which had “ . . . slipped to the very edge of financial and 
educational bankruptcy.” In November 1972, staggered by five years 
of conflict over decentralization, desegregation, and repeated defeats of 
crucial millage proposals, the school board prepared to shut the system 
down” (p. 293).
This period of the early 1960s marked the onset of a series of social, 
economic, financial, legal, and educational forces that over the next sev-
eral years impinged mightily on DPS and, in so many ways, marked the 
beginnings of the demise of a once proud and highly respected urban 
school district. These forces included major shifts in the city and stu-
dent populations, as well as the racial and economic makeup of both. 
These same shifts, coupled with growing discontent in the black com-
munity, further fed by the devastating 1967 Detroit riots, led to rising 
demands for community control and decentralization. At the same time, 
there also arose growing dissension in the citizenry among those argu-
ing for decentralization and community control, and those supporting 
efforts to integrate the schools and the community—and decentraliza-
tion won out, for a time. Concurrently, a mounting set of financial woes 
assailed the school district, which found itself being forced to embark 
on what Mirel (1993) describes as the “road to financial ruin” (p. 313). 
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It was during this same time that Detroit’s reform school board took 
steps to initiate a financial equity suit against the state of Michigan, an 
effort that predated the famous Serrano	I case in California (Serrano	v.	
Priest 1971) but which died in its infancy with the recall of the reform 
school board as a result of its support for integration. An added set of 
forces at work in the early 1970s brought on a further array of troubles 
that saw the school district and the state of Michigan, under Milliken	
v.	Bradley	(1974) and Milliken	v.	Bradley	(1977), deeply engaged with 
the federal courts in attempts to eliminate de facto segregation in the 
city schools and surrounding districts. And, as if all of the above wasn’t 
enough, after first having been compelled statutorily in the early 1970s 
to decentralize its schools, DPS in September of 1981, bowing to an 
overwhelming vote by the people of Detroit, was forced to cast aside its 
decentralized system and move to reestablish a centralized structure to 
govern its schools.
The Exodus begins
The late 1960s marked the beginnings of a substantial and continu-
ing exodus of citizens from the city of Detroit and students from the 
city’s schools, as well as concomitant changes in the racial and eco-
nomic makeup of both populations. In the 20-year period between 1960 
and 1980, the city of Detroit lost over a quarter of its population, plum-
meting from 1.67 million to 1.2 million. In the same period, the propor-
tion of black citizens in the population grew from 29 percent in 1960 
to 44 percent in 1970 and on to 63 percent in 1980. In the schools, 
the 1963 enrollment exceeded 293,000 students, and was almost evenly 
divided between blacks and whites. Shortly after an upswing to 297,000 
in student enrollments in 1966, the bottom began to drop out. By 1970, 
the total number of enrolled students had fallen to just short of 289,000, 
and the proportion of black students had risen to 64 percent. By 1980, 
the enrollments in DPS had dipped to 214,736, with the proportion of 
black students rising to 86 percent. And, as we shall see later in the 
chapter, the hemorrhaging losses in both the city’s population and the 
DPS student population did not subside, but have continued unabated. 
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Increasing Demands for Community Control 
The loss of citizen and student populations was not the only prob-
lem facing the city and the schools in the 1960s and 1970s; Detroit was 
soon faced with a fast-growing crisis, similar to that which arose in 
many large urban districts across the nation. It was a crisis given high 
national visibility in September of 1968, when on the opening day of 
school New York City was rocked by the strike of over 50,000 pub-
lic school teachers, marking the first of three walkouts that continued 
through mid-November and kept over 1 million students out of school 
for 36 days. The New York City walkouts had their genesis in May of 
1968, when the community control board in Brooklyn’s black ghetto 
of Ocean-Hill Brownsville moved to fire several white teachers. The 
local school community superintendent, Rhody McCoy, had brought 
no charges against the teachers, but he publicly declared that he wanted 
an all-black teaching force in the district. Not surprisingly, the teachers 
union, in the person of its president, Albert Shanker, would have none 
of it; Shanker reiterated his strong belief that hiring and firing should be 
color blind. But McCoy had strong support in the local community for 
his action, a community increasingly becoming disillusioned with the 
school system and what they saw as the inattention to the overabundance 
of white teachers when it came to the education of black children.2
This dissatisfaction of black communities with their public schools was 
not limited to New York City. The movement soon spread throughout 
urban school districts across the nation, with growing cries for “power 
to the people” and “community control” of the schools. 
Detroit certainly was not immune to the growing discontent among 
black urban communities and their resultant calls for community control 
and decentralization. Well before the New York City walkouts, Detroit 
found itself in similar circumstances. In the 1965–66 school year, even 
with the election of a reform school board committed to improving 
the lot of black students, Detroit witnessed growing discontent, if not 
anger, with the schools among its black citizens. The signal event of that 
1965–66 school year was a massive walkout of students from largely 
black Northern High School, spurred on by what the students as well as 
their parents saw as a dramatic deterioration of the educational program 
that had become reduced to the situation described by Mirel (1993): 
“ . . . most of the majority black high schools in Detroit had essentially 
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become ‘general’ track institutions dominated by the philosophy that 
the less teachers demanded of students the more tractable the students 
would be” (p. 300).
The brouhaha over the Northern walkout and its later settlement, 
as well as the growing dissatisfaction of the black community, led to 
the appointment of Norman Drachler as superintendent of schools to 
replace Samuel Brownell. Despite Drachler’s Herculean efforts, the 
discontent continued apace, and into the middle of this mess came the 
catastrophic Detroit riots of 1967—six days of utter chaos in which 
“ . . . 43 people died, over 1,000 were injured, in excess of 7,000 arrested, 
over 2,500 stores damaged, looted, gutted by fire, or destroyed” (Mirel 
1993, p. 311). School buildings themselves were not affected, but many 
observers—surveyed by the Detroit	Free	Press and the Urban League—
saw the failure of the schools as a contributing factor.3
The Decentralization Experiment
The confluence of these events led to growing and increasingly ada-
mant calls for turning over control of the schools to local neighborhood 
communities. Giving up on the promises of school reform, responding 
to the growing influence of the black nationalist movement that was 
sweeping through the large urban centers of the nation, and urged on 
by the backlash that followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, there arose in Detroit an increasingly vociferous movement call-
ing for a thoroughgoing change in the power and governance structure 
of the DPS system. This movement culminated in April of 1969, with 
State Senator Coleman Young’s introduction of legislation to decentral-
ize DPS.4 
Senator Young’s bill called for two actions: the first was admin-
istrative decentralization of the district, the second was increased 
accountability for teachers and administrators. His bill would create 
7–11 regions of 25,000–50,000 students, with each region having a 
community-elected nine-member school board; each regional board 
in turn would elect one of its members to an expanded central board, 
five of whose members would be elected at large from the city. Each 
regional board would have extensive budgetary, educational, and per-
sonnel powers. These would include the right to hire and fire its regional 
superintendent, as well as employ and discharge its teachers and other 
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employees of the regional district. Young’s bill passed both houses of 
the legislature by overwhelming margins; on August 11, 1970, Gover-
nor William Milliken signed it into law. But, as we noted earlier, decen-
tralization did not last long. In a short 10 years, a vote by the citizens of 
Detroit in September of 1981 forced the recentralization of DPS. 
Continuing Financial Woes
In the early 1960s, DPS, while struggling mightily with the mount-
ing array of troubles outlined above, faced at the same time a dire finan-
cial future not unlike the financial circumstances that faced many other 
large urban school districts across the nation. In Detroit’s case, the pri-
mary causes were threefold. The first was the inadequacy and instabil-
ity of its revenue stream. The second was the increasing demands the 
district faced for new programs and services in order to meet the edu-
cational needs of mounting numbers of students in the early 1960s, a 
substantial portion of whom fell into special needs categories. The third 
was the growing demands of the teachers union for higher salaries and 
improved working conditions for its members. Detroit Public Schools, 
in effect, was fast becoming ensnared in the classic financial dilemma 
of falling revenues and rising demands.
In 1967–68, Detroit educated 14.2 percent of the students in the 
state but received only 11.4 percent of the total state school aid (Mirel 
1993, p. 321). Local financial support for schools fared little better. 
From 1960 through 1980, Detroit witnessed a fairly sharp decline in 
its property tax base. Over roughly the same period, 1963–1977, the 
Detroit Board of Education put some 18 millage proposals before the 
voters of Detroit. Only 6 of those passed; 12 went down to defeat. 
The money supply was fast dwindling, but the demands were fast 
rising. First, there were increasing numbers of students to educate, at 
least through the end of the 1960s, and increasing racial, ethnic, and 
linguistic diversity, as well as spreading poverty. More importantly, the 
rapidly changing characteristics of the student population presented the 
schools with new and growing demands for programs and services to 
meet the needs of special populations of at-risk students—the handi-
capped, the disadvantaged, the low achievers. More and more students 
with special needs were showing up on the schools’ doorsteps, and 
more and more special programs and services had to be mounted to 
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meet those needs.5 Second, the teachers union, in the form of the Detroit 
Federation of Teachers (DFT), was beginning to feel its oats as a result 
of the 1965 passage of Public Act 379, which eliminated penalties for 
public employees who went on strike. Beginning in 1965 under the 
leadership of Mary Ellen Riordan, the DFT became a significant force 
in Detroit school politics. The union, emboldened by its new leverage, 
became an insistent and strong bargainer for higher salaries and smaller 
class sizes, putting further pressures on the district and its dwindling 
resources. 
With little financial aid coming from the state, with the local reve-
nue stream suffering from declining property values and consistent fail-
ures to pass operating millages, with the rising demands for improved 
programs and services for special populations, and with the persistent 
demands of an emergent teachers union, DPS was finding itself in ever 
deeper financial hot water. By 1967, Detroit faced a budget deficit of 
$12.3 million and prospects for a $32 million deficit by the end of the 
decade, with no resolution in sight. Perhaps the major factor that kept 
DPS solvent through the late 1960s and early 1970s, as Mirel (1993) 
suggests, was the influx of federal aid under ESEA (p. 314).
Court-Ordered Desegregation
In late 1969, in the middle of the black community’s push for 
decentralization of the schools, the reform school board, mentioned 
earlier, took up the cause of desegregation with renewed vigor. In early 
1970, the board, without much fanfare, developed a desegregation pro-
posal for the city’s high schools. The proposal, once it became public, 
was met with violent reaction from a good portion of the community. 
As Mirel (1993) well put it, “On Sunday, April 5, the Free	Press and 
the News splashed the story of the board’s ‘sweeping integration plan’ 
across the front pages and all hell broke loose” (p. 340). The months 
that followed were an imbroglio of charges and counter charges, of cha-
otic meetings of the school board, of state legislative action stripping 
statutory support for the plan, and of fast-moving and ultimately suc-
cessful efforts to recall four members of the board who supported the 
desegregation plan.6
One outcome of all the uproar was the NAACP’s decision finally 
to file a much broader desegregation suit aimed not only at DPS and its 
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school board but also at the governor and the state attorney general. The 
case, Milliken	v.	Bradley	(1974), went to trial in April of 1971. On hear-
ing the case, the U.S. district court trial judge, Stephen J. Roth, issued 
one of the more sweeping desegregation orders that the nation had ever 
witnessed. Roth’s order set forth a metropolitan busing plan calling for 
the integration of three-quarters of a million students across 44 school 
districts in the three counties—Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb—that 
made up the Detroit metropolitan area. Not surprisingly, the order was 
appealed—first to the U.S. circuit court where it was supported, and 
then to the U.S. Supreme Court where it was overturned and sent back 
to Judge Roth’s district court. The high court ruled that a court-ordered 
school desegregation plan, absent segregative action on the part of out-
lying districts, could not cross school district lines in order to include 
the outlying districts. In short, in order for a multidistrict remedy to be 
ordered by a district court, the local governments of outlying school 
districts must have committed segregative acts, and in this case they 
had not. The court ruled, in effect, that the problems facing Detroit and 
other urban school districts serving large concentrations of low-income 
minority children were the responsibility of the cities, not the broader 
metropolitan community.
But Detroit was not off the hook. In remanding the case to the dis-
trict court, the high court directed it to formulate a Detroit-only remedy. 
The district court’s newly fashioned remedy consisted of a Detroit-only 
pupil assignment plan and four remedial programs: 1) remedial read-
ing, 2) in-service teacher training, 3) student testing, and 4) counseling. 
Detroit Public Schools would bear one-half the cost, and the state of 
Michigan would bear the other half. While the state did challenge the 
district court’s authority to order remedial programs, and its power to 
allocate one-half the financial burden to the state, it lost its challenge. 
The high court, in Milliken	(1977), ruled that as part of a desegregation 
decree, a district court can order remedial education and supportive pro-
grams for children who have been subjected to segregation in the past; 
and the high court further ruled that DPS could constitutionally require 
that the state of Michigan pay one-half of the cost of such remedial 
programs. The bad news was that DPS, already saddled with the twin 
bugaboos of declining revenues and increasing demands, now had the 
burden of even further demands being placed upon it. The good news, 
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at the least, was that the state of Michigan would have to pick up one-
half of the tab.
One now might ask what good has come of all of this. By 1980, 
only some 26,000 white students remained in the city’s public schools 
out of a total enrollment count of 214,736. By 1984, the count of white 
students was below 19,000, down to less than 10 percent of the district’s 
total enrollment. Now that the student population in DPS is upward 
of 95 percent African American, one would have to conclude that the 
all-consuming question of school integration in Detroit has passed its 
time—the issue is now moot. 
Return to a Centralized System 
The era of decentralization (1971–81) was a stormy and sometimes 
violent period for Detroit and its school district, marked principally by 
disputes and clashes between the boards—both decentralized and cen-
tral—and the teachers union. While salaries and class size continued to 
be major bones of contention, a new set of issues began to command 
center stage in negotiations with the union. In particular, questions of 
accountability and residency became paramount. Among the members 
of the regional boards—as well as local community members, and par-
ticularly members of the black community—there was a strong feeling 
that some students, particularly low-income and African American stu-
dents, were being educationally shortchanged and that teachers needed 
to be held accountable for the academic achievement of all students in 
the schools. If the achievement was not forthcoming, then the respon-
sible teachers should be replaced by the school principal, and all union 
contracts should contain such provisions. Given equal importance was 
the question of teacher residency. The regional boards, and the cen-
tral board, were demanding that a Detroit residency requirement be 
included in all union contracts. Some saw this demand as a black–white 
issue. Most of the 5,000 (out of more than 20,000) Detroit classroom 
teachers who lived outside of the city were white. Still, one has to won-
der, for the Detroit teaching force at the time was 47 percent black. Not 
surprisingly, the teachers union strongly denounced both demands—for 
teacher accountability and for a residency requirement. The confronta-
tion finally culminated with the DFT calling a 43-day strike in Septem-
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ber of 1973, a strike that Mirel (1993) describes as “ . . . the longest 
and most bitterly divisive strike in the history of the school system” 
(p. 363).
The strike was finally broken in November by virtue of Governor 
William Milliken, in effect, taking the accountability issue “off the 
table” with his offer to the board and the union to establish a statewide 
panel that would study the accountability issue and develop a set of 
guidelines for teacher evaluation. Both parties also agreed to submit 
the other two issues—salaries and class size—to binding arbitration. 
The strike was ended but the issues remained unresolved (Mirel 1993, 
p. 364). Moreover, the rancor and violence continued. 
As far as decentralization was concerned, it was quickly nearing 
an end. Disfavor and disappointment with the decentralized system 
were rampant throughout the city—among the media, among the sev-
eral Detroit civic and business groups, among the black community, 
among the teachers and the DFT, among the trade and industrial unions, 
and among almost everyone including members of the state legislature. 
Finally, in mid-1981, the legislature passed and the governor signed 
into law PA 96, which put the future of decentralization to a vote of the 
citizens of Detroit. The vote turned out to be overwhelmingly in favor 
of jettisoning decentralization and returning DPS to a school system of 
centralized power and governance. Thus, in late 1981, DPS was forced 
to turn its attention to the arduous task of recentralizing the school sys-
tem, one that for many at the time seemed to be broken.
A Cautionary note
In our brief recounting of a series of significant events that took 
place and circumstances that prevailed in the 17-year period from 1964 
through 1981, it is tempting to treat these as isolated incidents rather 
than what they were, namely, a series of closely related if not interre-
lated incidents and circumstances. It was not as if DPS and the school 
board could address themselves to the resolution of one problem and 
then move on to the next problem; all their problems were intertwined—
often leading to disruptive situations that would try the substantial skills 
of all participants involved in the ongoing political process in which the 
schools were enmeshed. And the participants were, and continued to be, 
abundant—board members, administrators, union executives, teacher 
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leaders, business leaders, community leaders, parent association lead-
ers, and a host of other players in the process. In many ways, the state of 
affairs in the district involved levels of anger, turf battles, and, indeed, 
internecine warfare that would try the skills and patience of a saint—or 
a bevy of saints. As the reader will see, the problems didn’t to go away 
as the years went by; if anything, they grew even larger and became 
even more intractable. 
COnTInuIng WHITE FLIgHT AnD CALLS FOR REFORM: 
THE 1980s AnD 1990s
At its peak in 1950, Detroit boasted nearly 1.9 million residents. 
Over the next 40 years, as we noted earlier, the city lost nearly half 
its population, falling to just over 1 million inhabitants by 1990. As 
Mirel (1998, p. 253) observes, “Due to the almost unrelenting exodus of 
whites since the 1950s, by 1990 over three-quarters of Detroit’s inhab-
itants were African American, most of whom lived in racially isolated 
neighborhoods. According to sociologists Reynolds Farley and William 
Frey (1994), in 1990 Detroit ranked as ‘the most segregated’ of the 
forty-seven cities [metropolises] in the United States with populations 
of a million or more.”
The city was also becoming extremely poor, with unemployment 
exceeding 15 percent in 1992, more than twice the national average. 
And, as one would expect, poverty’s burden weighed heavily on the 
lives of Detroit’s children. According to a study by the Children’s 
Defense Fund, in 1990 over 46 percent of Detroit’s children were living 
in poverty, one of the highest rates in the nation. This flight of white, 
middle-class families was prompted in large part by the aforementioned 
1974 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Milliken	 v.	Bradley (1974). In 
this decision, the court once again ruled that communities neighboring 
Detroit had no obligation to participate in an interdistrict desegregation 
plan aimed at improving educational opportunities for the city’s over-
whelmingly low-income minority student population. For Detroit, this 
ruling accelerated the ongoing student exodus. After peaking at nearly 
300,000 students in 1966, with about equal numbers of blacks and 
whites, district enrollment fell to about 170,000 by 1990, with about 90 
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percent African Americans. And more than two-thirds of these children 
came from families living in poverty (Mirel 1998, p. 242).7 
The flight of middle-class families from Detroit markedly increased 
the challenge of improving student achievement in DPS. While ele-
mentary schools showed some improvement on the California Achieve-
ment Test and Michigan’s assessments (MEAP), high school outcomes 
were generally dismal.8 For example, in 1987, the average ACT score 
in Detroit was about 14, more than four points below the national aver-
age and a Detroit	News survey found that Detroit high school students 
had the lowest average ACT and SAT scores of the 10 largest school 
districts in the nation (Mirel 1998, p. 242).9 Detroit’s high schools were 
also beset with ongoing problems of student discipline and declining 
academic standards. Regarding Detroit’s declining academic standards, 
Mirel observes:
Declining academic standards had become a chronic problem 
since the end of World War II as increasing numbers of white 
working class and black high school students in Detroit were rou-
tinely and disproportionately placed in the general track and fed 
a steady diet of watered-down academic and personal develop-
ment courses. This pattern did not change when the school system 
became majority black in the 1960s. As the nation began to raise 
graduation requirements in the late 1970s, Detroit followed suit, 
increasing the total credit hours for graduation from 160 to 200 
and increasing the number of academic courses needed to graduate 
. . . At the same time, however, school leaders doubled the credit 
hours granted for a host of non-academic courses which to some 
extent neutralized the impact of the increases in academic sub-
jects. Moreover, the system created a number of new “academic” 
courses that focused mainly on very basic skills and knowledge 
. . . In 1983, the system did put into place a basic skills compe-
tency test which when passed allowed students to graduate with an 
“endorsed,” but not a regular, high school diploma. (p. 243) 
The Erosion of Financial Control and Public Trust 
While problems with student discipline, school safety, and aca-
demic standards concerned parents and educators, the district’s deep-
ening financial crisis commanded the attention of press and public. As 
a property-poor school district, DPS was heavily reliant on state aid 
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for its operating revenue. Michigan’s general aid system, a so-called 
guaranteed tax base formula adopted in 1973–74, served Detroit and 
other districts with low or declining property values well for six years 
as the state enjoyed generally robust economic health. This prosper-
ity, however, came to an abrupt halt in the spring of 1980, when the 
nation plunged into recession. State aid fell sharply in 1980–81 and 
declined further the following year as the state remained in the grip of 
what was then the deepest and most persistent recession since the Great 
Depression.10
State aid rebounded in 1983–84 with the largest annual increase 
to date, due to economic recovery and a substantial albeit temporary 
increase in Michigan’s personal income tax rate.11 Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that Detroit voters substantially increased the district’s operat-
ing millage rate in a series of referenda stretching from 1977 to 1985, 
bringing in considerable state matching aid under the guaranteed tax 
base formula, the district’s finances remained in disarray for the entire 
decade of the 1980s.12 After balancing its 1977–78 operating budget, 
DPS closed its books the following year with a small deficit, about one-
half of 1 percent of annual spending.
 Incredibly, despite the sizable increases in operating millage rates 
and matching state aid of the mid-1980s, the district amassed 11 con-
secutive annual budget deficits, culminating in a $159 million short-
fall in 1988–89, an astounding 21 percent of budget. In 1983–84, the 
district closed its fiscal year with a $49 million operating deficit, the 
sixth consecutive annual deficit and the district’s largest since 1973. In 
November 1984, Detroit voters approved a four-mill increase for school 
operations, the third increase in seven years. This local tax increase, 
which brought the district about three dollars in matching state aid for 
each local tax dollar, could have easily eliminated the district’s deficit 
and created a fund balance for the district to protect against, and per-
haps help to stem, continuing student exodus. The DPS school board, 
however, granted teachers a 10 percent raise for 1985–86 and 7 percent 
the next year. Consequently, the district ended its 1986–87 fiscal year 
with a $26 million deficit. When the board proposed no pay raise for 
1987–88, the teachers walked out. The strike lasted three weeks, end-
ing with a contract giving teachers a 6.5 percent raise that year and 
7 percent the next. Predictably, the district’s budget deficit exploded, 
reaching nearly $160 million by the close of 1988–89 and forcing the 
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district to sell deficit bonds in 1990. As a result, Detroit taxpayers were 
strapped with 13 additional mills over 10 years to service that debt. 
Moreover, unlike the operating millage that entitled the district to gen-
erous matching state aid, these debt mills raised only local tax dollars. 
Once again, the interests of the powerful teachers union prevailed and 
the taxpayers paid the price.
How did all of this happen? In large part, the chronic budget deficits 
of the 1980s reflected a failure of the school board, the administration, 
and the teachers union to place the public interest before their own. 
Each party needed to sacrifice in order to contain costs and improve 
school quality. Failure to sign affordable collective bargaining agree-
ments and build fund equity to protect the school system’s financial 
future undoubtedly fueled the continuing exodus of those families who 
could afford to leave. The teachers union would not hesitate to order a 
walkout, local voters would approve millage increases, and the school 
board would yield to union demands that, despite the millage increases, 
exceeded the district’s ability to pay. Throughout this period, the state 
essentially stayed on the sidelines. 
It was not until 1990 that the legislature passed the Local Govern-
ment Fiscal Responsibility Act (PA 72 of 1990). This legislation explic-
itly empowered the state to declare a financial emergency in any unit 
of local government, including school districts. Evidence of such an 
emergency, as enumerated in the new law, includes the failure of the 
local government to eliminate an existing deficit in any fund within two 
years or the projection of a local government’s general fund in excess 
of 10 percent. If the superintendent of public instruction determines that 
a school district has a financial emergency, the governor appoints an 
emergency financial manager, with the advice and consent of the sen-
ate. The manager’s powers are broad and substantial, including author-
ity to renegotiate existing labor contracts. Sec. 43 of PA 72 reads, in 
part: “The school board shall comply with orders issued by the emer-
gency financial manager . . . ” No longer would the state tolerate a local 
school board’s chronic budget deficits. 
HOPE: The Rise and Fall of grassroots Reform
The district’s chronic inability or unwillingness to balance its bud-
get despite substantial millage increases approved by district voters 
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gave rise to a very promising but ultimately unsuccessful reform move-
ment: the HOPE campaign to wrest control of the school board from the 
bungling incumbents. This reform group of board candidates included 
Frank Hayden, an African American city employee who chaired the 
School-Community Relations Organization; David Olmstead, a white 
Harvard Law graduate and former member of the Michigan School 
Finance Commission; Larry Patrick, an African American attorney who 
cochaired the Group of Organized Detroiters for Quality Education 
(GOOD); and Joseph Blanding, an African American who worked as 
an international representative of the United Auto Workers. This reform 
group enjoyed broad support, with backers including the Greater 
Detroit Chamber of Commerce, the Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO, the 
DFT, New Detroit, Inc., both major daily newspapers in the city, and 
all other major news outlets. Mirel (1998) succinctly summarizes their 
broad reform goals and vision: “ . . . the themes the HOPE candidates 
stressed in their campaign echoed those that dominated Progressive 
politics in Detroit in the 1910s and 1920s—the moral integrity of the 
reformers, their desire to restore public confidence in the school board 
through their commitment to the wise stewardship of funds, their abil-
ity to get the school system’s fiscal house in order, their promise to run 
the schools more efficiently and effectively, and their plans to introduce 
corporate structural and management innovations” (p. 249).
The 1988 election, one of the most highly publicized in Detroit his-
tory, was a resounding victory for all four HOPE candidates and a sting-
ing repudiation of both the incumbents and their so-called financial res-
cue plan, a proposed 6-mill tax hike and $160 million bond issue. Upon 
taking office, the new board was faced with state demands to eliminate 
the district’s chronic budget deficit and hire a superintendent as a condi-
tion of continuing the state loan. In August 1989, the board appointed 
John Porter as interim superintendent. The highly regarded Porter had 
served as president of Eastern Michigan University and state superin-
tendent of public instruction, the first African American to hold that 
post. Porter soon presented his financial plan for the district: a 6-mill 
increase for school operations and a $150 million bond issue, requiring 
an additional 1.5 mills for debt service. Although nearly identical to the 
former board’s financial plan, which had been opposed by major Detroit 
organizations and repudiated by voters, Porter’s plan was endorsed by 
the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce, the Detroit Association of 
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Black Organizations, Black Parents for Quality Education, and New 
Detroit, Inc., and both requests were approved by more than 60 percent 
of the voters. The 6-mill operating increase was particularly important, 
generating a 3-to-1 state aid match for the local property tax revenue 
and allowing the district to close a budget deficit that had persisted for 
11 years.
The HOPE Team’s Reform Agenda
Beyond the financial rescue, the HOPE reformers pressed for two 
major reforms: empowered schools and schools of choice. Both ini-
tiatives were bold and controversial, but the former proved far more 
combustible, precipitating the downfall of the HOPE team. The history 
and details of these proposals and the controversy surrounding them 
have been fully chronicled by Mirel (1998). This brief summary of the 
pivotal school empowerment controversy draws from Mirel’s account.
In their 1988 campaign literature, the HOPE team characterized 
empowered schools as exercising “greater decision-making authority 
through a process in which the principal establishes regular and mean-
ingful opportunities for representatives of students, parents, community 
administrators, instructional and noninstructional staff to have input 
into the selection of areas and/or problems which are addressed and to 
suggest the solutions and strategies to be used.” The process was volun-
tary, requiring the support of the principal, 75 percent of the teachers, 
55 percent of the support staff, 55 percent of the parents, and 55 percent 
of the students voting in favor of their school becoming “empowered.” 
Following such a vote, the board allocated 92 percent of the district’s 
per-pupil allocation to the school to be spent at their discretion. Non-
empowered schools received only about 70 percent of their per-pupil 
allocation. Each empowered school would be run by an elected coun-
cil of educators and parents. The council’s authority would extend to 
virtually all aspects of school operations, including faculty assign-
ments, class scheduling, curriculum, and length of school year. Fur-
ther, empowered schools were free to purchase supplies and services 
from any vendor, not just DPS central administration. Central office 
would require all DPS schools to maintain balanced operating budgets 
and meet the district’s student achievement standards, but empowered 
schools would decide how best to accomplish those basic goals. This 
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arrangement, the HOPE team contended, would improve decision mak-
ing and performance not only at each school, but in central office as 
well, as the DPS bureaucracy would have to compete with private ven-
dors for school contracts (Hula, Jelier, and Schauer 1997). 
Following a promising start with 15 empowered schools, the board 
sought to expand the prerogatives of these schools, including the right 
to unilaterally waive provisions of the union contract and allow the 
schools to select their own teachers and pay higher salaries to “lead 
teachers.” At this point, union opposition to school empowerment rose 
precipitously, and on August 31, 1992, just before the scheduled school 
start, the teachers walked out. Detroit Federation of Teachers Presi-
dent John Elliot argued that the waivers demanded by the board would 
negate collective bargaining rights at those schools, including teacher 
tenure, and were unacceptable. The teachers’ union was joined in this 
opposition to empowerment by the Organization of School Adminis-
trators and Supervisors, which viewed the principals’ new managerial 
discretion as a distraction from their role as educational leaders.
The strike lasted 27 days, with recriminations escalating after the 
board went to court for a back-to-work order that the union ignored 
(Bradley 1992). The new contract allowed the board to increase the 
number of empowered schools but greatly reduced their discretion. 
Moreover, the agreement included salary increases over the next two 
years that threatened to return the district to a deficit position despite the 
substantial millage hike approved by the voters just two years earlier. 
By 1995–96, the district’s fund balance would be essentially depleted 
and turn negative the following year.
The 1992 election and HOPE’s demise 
Lingering bitterness over school empowerment led the DFT and 
the Detroit AFL-CIO to actively campaign against the four HOPE team 
members’ reelection bid in 1992. Union opposition proved critical in 
the campaign. Despite an impressive record, including improved stan-
dardized test scores and a remarkable financial turnaround that included 
the closure of a $160 million budget deficit in 1989 and a modest but 
rising surplus in their three ensuing years, only one of the four mem-
bers, Republican Larry Patrick, was retained by the voters. In October 
1993, Deborah McGriff, hired as superintendent by the reform board in 
1991 to implement the HOPE policy agenda, announced her resigna-
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tion following a brief but tumultuous tenure. David Snead, principal of 
Cass Tech and a longtime DPS educator, was hired to replace her. Many 
DPS observers interpreted Snead’s appointment as the effective end of 
the HOPE grassroots reform effort and a return to the heavily union-
influenced status quo (see Hula, Jelier, and Schauer 1997).
Why did HOPE fail? The demise of the HOPE team so soon after 
their stunning electoral victory signaled to many observers, includ-
ing some powerful state leaders, the impossibility of meaningful DPS 
reform from within and a likely return to the chronic budget deficits and 
poor academic outcomes of the pre-HOPE era. Mirel (1998) observes,
. . . the HOPE reformers drew some of their inspiration for 
empowered schools from the decentralization and school-based 
management experiments in Chicago, Miami, and Rochester. But 
the HOPE initiative differed from these experiments in one very 
important way—unlike them it did not draw its power or authority 
from a stable, dependable base. The Chicago reforms were “top 
down,” mandated by the state legislature, while those in Miami 
and Rochester were “bottom-up,” initiated mainly by the union. 
The Detroit reformers, on the other hand, had drawn their power 
and authority from more volatile sources, namely the coalition that 
supported them in the 1988 election, and the voters who put them 
in office. (p. 260)
Mirel asserts that the HOPE team misinterpreted its electoral man-
date. Voters elected the team to rescue the district from its chronic bud-
get deficits and, in the process, punish the incumbent board members 
for their profligate spending on out-of-state travel, chauffer-driven cars, 
and other indulgences that infuriated many Detroiters. Voters were 
not particularly interested in empowered schools or schools of choice. 
More importantly, the HOPE team underestimated both the power of 
the DFT and its resistance to change. The union understood the HOPE 
team’s electoral appeal and their potential to sell a substantial millage 
increase to the voters. Beyond the financial rescue, however, the DFT 
leaders had little interest in the team’s education reforms.
One participant has characterized this impasse and subsequent fight 
to the finish between the union and the reform board as the inevitable 
consequence of the city’s “dysfunctional civic structure.” He observes, 
“People don’t know how to talk with one another on the basis of the 
problem . . . the civic language of Detroit is the old style of labor nego-
Detroit Public Schools: A Failure of Policy and Politics   213
tiations. I mean in your face, side deals, don’t trust anybody, you know, 
what can I get for myself, and the only way I can get for myself is 
by pushing somebody else down—very, very win-lose, very dysfunc-
tional” (Hula, Jelier, and Schauer 1997). It was precisely this unwill-
ingness of Detroit’s educational “cartel,” including longtime board 
members, union leaders, school administrators, and school activists, to 
change the organizational culture and policies of the district, combined 
with the city’s waning influence in the state legislature, that was to give 
rise in the decade of the 1990s to the state’s assertion of its constitu-
tional power over public schools, with DPS its principal target.13
The Waning of Local Control
In the 1990 gubernatorial campaign, Republican candidate (and 
later three-term governor) John Engler promised property tax relief 
and education reform if elected. Once elected, Governor Engler and the 
Republican-controlled Senate made a substantial property tax cut their 
top legislative priority. Aided by a dramatic tax cut proposal from State 
Senator Debbie Stabenow, herself a Democratic gubernatorial candi-
date at the time, Governor Engler and the legislature enacted Public Act 
145 of 1993, Michigan’s historic measure that eliminated entirely local 
property taxes for school operations. With nearly two-thirds of Michi-
gan’s public school funding wiped out—some $6.5 billion in total—the 
governor and legislature set for itself a deadline of December 31, 1993, 
to rebuild the finances of Michigan’s public schools. And they fully 
intended to reform education policy and governance as well. 
When Engler signed the property tax cut into law in August of 
1993, he predicted “stunning improvements” in public education result-
ing from the forthcoming school finance and education policy reforms. 
His prediction, of course, was based on an ideology that favored edu-
cational choice and school competition. Little reliable social science 
research evidence existed at that time to either support or refute his 
claim. His subsequent recommendations, refined and passed with 
bipartisan legislative support, included the replacement of Michigan’s 
20-year-old guaranteed tax base general aid formula and numerous 
categorical grants with a foundation grant system, an expansive char-
ter school program, and, in 1996, interdistrict public school choice. 
Clearly, state political leaders were intent on reforming more than the 
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school funding system; they sought an alignment of school finance and 
education policy that would raise achievement levels across the state. 
With the state now financing 80 percent of school operating costs, set-
ting school operating millage rates for every district, and giving fami-
lies new school choices, local control of the public schools was clearly 
on the wane.
The assertion of greater state leadership in K–12 public education 
had begun in earnest in 1990, when the legislature enacted a set of sys-
temic education reforms. Public Act 25 of 1990 called on all Michigan 
schools to undertake a formal school improvement process, initiate an 
accreditation process for each school building, provide the public with 
a yearly status report on local education performance levels and reform 
efforts, and provide a core curriculum for all students. The centerpiece 
of these reforms was the core curriculum. The new law directed the 
SBE to promulgate a model core curriculum, and the school aid appro-
priation provided a small fiscal incentive for local districts to adopt one 
core curricular area each year.14
By taking control of school tax and spending decisions, setting 
school curriculum standards, and opening avenues to school choice 
beyond local district boundaries, the state began exercising powers it 
had long held, but little used, as a matter of constitutional law. The 
courts have consistently held that authority over education resides with 
state government. The pervasiveness of this power is made clear by a 
Michigan decision that states “[t]he legislature has entire control over 
the schools of the state . . . The division of the territory of the state 
into districts, the conduct of the schools, the qualifications of teachers, 
the subjects to be taught therein, are all within its (the state’s) control” 
(Child	Welfare	Society	of	Flint	v.	Kennedy	School	District 1922).
Alexander and Alexander (2005), in their authoritative volume 
American	Public	School	Law, observe, “In holding that education is a 
state function, the courts maintain that the state’s authority over educa-
tion is not a distributive one to be exercised by local government, but is 
a central power residing in the state. The legislature has the prerogative 
to prescribe the methods of education, and the courts will not intervene 
unless the legislation is contrary to constitutional provisions. 
Michigan’s assertion of state authority over the public schools in 
the early 1990s would impact DPS even more dramatically later in 
the decade. Gone were the laissez-faire days of the late 1970s and the 
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1980s, when DPS concluded 11 consecutive fiscal years with budget 
deficits and the state just watched. For the new Republican leadership 
in Lansing, such local independence was seen as intransigence and ir-
responsibility, and given Detroit’s waning political influence in the leg-
islature, it would no longer be tolerated.
Prelude to the 1999 State Takeover
In the late 1980s, state officials had threatened the DPS board with 
a takeover if they could not resolve the district’s financial problems. 
In 1989 Mayor Coleman Young called for the abolition of the elected 
board and direct mayoral control as a means of stabilizing the district’s 
finances (Mirel 1998). Nevertheless, the district did manage to end its 
1989–90 fiscal year with a small fund balance and maintain small bal-
ances through 1993–94. While Proposal A of 1994 shifted the bulk of 
K–12 finance from the local property tax to state tax revenue, still DPS, 
which had little property wealth itself and had long been reliant on the 
state for most of its operating revenue, depleted its fund balance in 
1994–95 and actually fell into deficit the following year.
The district fund balance recovered in 1996–97 and grew over the 
next two fiscal years, peaking in 1998–99 at $115 million, or about 9 
percent of operating expenditures. Nevertheless, despite the district’s 
relatively strong balance sheet and the solvency of the great majority of 
Michigan’s school districts, Governor Engler, in his January 1999 State 
of the State address, renewed an earlier call for a state takeover of aca-
demically failing school districts. Citing Illinois legislative action giv-
ing Chicago Mayor Richard Daley authority to appoint the city’s school 
board and chief executive, Engler proposed that the legislature give 
Michigan’s mayors authority over schools (Franklin 2003). Although 
the initial takeover bill allowed for the “reconstitution” of any district 
that fell short of specific academic and fiscal standards, subsequent 
amendments created a Detroit-only bill, a result then DPS Superinten-
dent Eddie Green attributed to anti-Detroit politics (Green 1999). The 
DPS board also pushed back, accusing the governor of concealing his 
real motive. Detroit School Board President Darryl Redmond charged 
that Engler’s real purpose for urging the takeover was not improved stu-
dent achievement but control of the district’s $1.5 billion school bond 
referendum approved by district voters in 1994 (Detroit	News 1999). 
216   Addonizio and Kearney
Redmond’s charge was considered outlandish or dismissed as political 
hyperbole by most observers in Lansing and around the state, but his 
remarks reflected the deep distrust of state Republican leadership on the 
part of many Detroiters. 
The Senate bill introduced by Republican Majority Leader Dan 
DeGrow and three colleagues, two Republicans and a Democrat, would 
amend the state school code but apply only to Detroit. The bill empow-
ered mayors in cities with school districts enrolling at least 100,000 
students (a convention used elsewhere in the school code to single out 
DPS for special treatment) to appoint a five-member reform school 
board, each of whom would serve a four-year term. The board would 
hire a CEO. The duties and powers of the elected school board would be 
suspended. The new governance system would remain in effect for five 
years. At that point Detroit voters could petition for a referendum on the 
continuation of the mayoral appointed board or a return to an elected 
board (Michigan Senate 1999).
A racial divide 
A 1999 poll published in the Detroit	News showed a majority of 
Detroiters believed the public schools were in need of reform, but sen-
timent over the proposed takeover legislation split along racial lines. 
About three-fourths of white respondents backed the proposal while 
more than half of African Americans polled opposed the legislation 
(Franklin 2003, p. 102). A reluctant Dennis Archer, the city’s second 
African American mayor, came to support the takeover bill following 
a bipartisan deal negotiated by Senator Virgil Smith, the only African 
American member of the Detroit legislative delegation supporting the 
takeover, which would boost the district’s annual state aid by $15 mil-
lion (McConnell and Christoff 1999).
The Republican-majority House passed its own takeover bill with 
bipartisan support. Under this plan the governor would appoint a moni-
tor to run the schools while retaining the elected Detroit Board of Edu-
cation in an advisory role. The monitor’s term would expire in 2003, 
when new board elections would be held and the local board’s authority 
would be restored. The six Detroit Democrats who supported the House 
bill claimed that it, unlike the Senate version, protected the voting rights 
of Detroiters and placed responsibility for reform clearly on the gover-
nor (Franklin 2003).
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Franklin (2003) asserts that this support of the House bill also 
stemmed from the House Democrats’ dislike and distrust of Mayor 
Archer. One caucus member, Representative Lamar Lemmons, in an 
interview with the Detroit	 Free	 Press, explained his preference for 
Governor Engler over Mayor Archer as takeover leader: “If you want 
a plantation analogy, it’s African Americans’ experience that overseers 
are often worse than dealing with the master” (Bell 1999). The House 
bill was also a tactical response to the Senate version. The minority 
Floor Leader of the House Democrats, Detroiter Kwame Kilpatrick, 
called the bill a “strategic move” to frame negotiations with the Repub-
licans (McConnell 1999).
The legislative compromise
In response to the House version, the Senate amended its own bill. 
The proposed school board was increased to seven members, with six 
appointed by Mayor Archer and the seventh seat given to state school 
superintendent Art Ellis or his designee, representing the governor. The 
board would hire the CEO, but the governor’s representative was given 
unique veto authority over this crucial appointment.15 The elected Board 
of Education would serve in an advisory capacity (Bell and Christoff 
1999). The bill passed in both the Senate and the House with immediate 
effect, despite the opposition of all 13 House members from Detroit. 
Governor Engler quickly signed the bill, and Mayor Archer appointed 
Detroit’s school superintendent, Eddie Green, as acting CEO until the 
new reform board selected a permanent chief executive. 
Policy or Politics?
What prompted the singling out of DPS for takeover? Was it the low 
academic achievement of the students, the concern raised most often by 
proponents of the move and cited in the statute? As correctly noted by 
the opposition, DPS students were outperforming students in a number 
of other urban districts. If Detroit’s achievement levels were so unac-
ceptable to political leaders in Lansing as to prompt the takeover leg-
islation, why were districts with lower achievement scores, including 
Inkster, Benton Harbor, Highland Park, Grand Rapids, Pontiac, Flint, 
and Muskegon not also targeted?
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Was state concern over the district’s finances behind the state’s 
action? In fact, the district’s financial position appeared to be steadily 
improving over the three years preceding the takeover. After closing 
the 1995–96 fiscal year (the first year under Proposal A) with a $2.7 
million deficit, the district’s year-ending fund balance rose steadily 
over the next three fiscal years, peaking at $115 million at the close of 
1998–99.16 The takeover was justified by political leaders on academic 
grounds, but passage of the Detroit-only measure clearly reflected the 
city’s declining political influence in Lansing. Franklin (2003) notes,
Between 1950 and 1990 Detroit’s population fell from about 1.8 
million to just over 1 million. As a result, the city has lost mem-
bership in the state House of Representatives from thirty seats in 
1950 to twenty in 1970, to thirteen in 1999. Declining population 
had also affected Detroit’s voting power. In the 1958 gubernato-
rial election, about 25 percent of the votes came from Detroit. In 
1978, the city accounted for 11.5 percent of the votes, and in the 
1998 election for 7.5 percent of the votes. And recently passed 
term limit legislation would soon force the most senior members 
of the Detroit legislative delegation, whose tenure and experience 
provided them with the greatest influence, to leave office. (pp. 
110–111)
In political terms, the takeover did more than reflect Detroit’s weak-
ened position in Lansing. It also exposed a fissure in the city’s Dem-
ocratic power structure between Mayor Archer and his critics in the 
Michigan House, who felt he was too conciliatory toward Governor 
Engler during the takeover negotiations. Did Archer concede too much 
to Engler in this process, or did he correctly assess what was a politi-
cal fait	accompli given the votes in the legislature and then success-
fully back the amended Senate bill that empowered him, not the House 
bill that would have frozen him out? The latter seems more plausible. 
Archer viewed his power to appoint the school board members as an 
opportunity to improve school policy and administration while, at the 
same time, burnishing his resume as a future contender for statewide 
political office. Archer’s decisions in the takeover process made sense 
as good policy and good politics.
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The Appointed board 
The appointed board’s first major task was appointing the CEO, 
a position empowered by the takeover law, Michigan Public Law 10, 
to fire teachers and principals, waive provisions of union contracts, 
and reorganize failing schools.17 When the board could not agree on 
a candidate acceptable to the governor’s designee, they appointed for-
mer Wayne State University president David Adamany as interim CEO. 
Although the takeover legislation was ostensibly motivated by concerns 
over students’ academic achievement, district finances always remained 
a focus of the debate. Early in his tenure, Adamany ordered a financial 
audit of the district. This audit, the first such examination in a dozen 
years, uncovered widespread shoddy accounting practices, and charges 
of embezzlement were brought against three former bookkeepers. 
Further, 15 high school principals were cited for missing funds, unre-
corded ticket revenue, and the use of school funds for personal expenses 
(Harmon 2000).
On January 18, 2000, the governor’s designee, state Treasurer 
Mark Murray, who had replaced Ellis as the governor’s representa-
tive, and the board’s only white member, exercised his unique veto 
power to block the appointment of John Thompson, superintendent of 
the Tulsa, Oklahoma, schools, to succeed Adamany as the permanent 
CEO of DPS (Piliawsky 2003).18 On May 4, 2000, the reform board 
selected Detroit native Kenneth Burnley, then superintendent of Colo-
rado Springs Public Schools, as the district’s first permanent CEO. The 
appointment was time limited. A sunset clause in the takeover statute 
required that Detroit voters decide in 2005 whether to continue mayoral 
control of DPS or return to the elected board. Public debate of the gov-
ernance issue never subsided. New mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, elected in 
2001, campaigned to continue the mayor’s authority to select the CEO 
and establish an elected but advisory board of education. Kilpatrick, a 
former middle school teacher in Detroit and later Democratic state rep-
resentative and minority leader of the Michigan House, became, at age 
31, one of the nation’s youngest mayors. While he was House minority 
leader, Kilpatrick opposed the idea of an appointed board (Mirel 2004). 
But he also opposed a return to the pretakeover system, a position he 
articulated to the American	School	Board	Journal in 2004: “A return 
to the old board system runs the very high risk of undoing the progress 
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that’s been made, condemning ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the 
past, and forcing future generations to pay the price. That cannot hap-
pen” (Cook 2004).
Detroiters go to the polls (Proposal E of 2005)
Following the legislature’s rejection of a Kilpatrick plan for con-
tinuing mayoral control of the public schools, the mayor decided to 
place the question before the Detroit voters in the November 2005 elec-
tion. City leadership was divided on the issue. Supporters included the 
Detroit Chamber of Commerce, the Detroit Urban League, and the Black 
Slate, the political arm of the church Shrine of the Black Madonna. 
The opposition included the Detroit branch of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Keep the Vote, and a group 
called the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration Rights 
and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Rich 2009, p. 158).
Kilpatrick, whose political career would be derailed three years 
later in a notorious text-message scandal and related perjury convic-
tion, found himself embroiled in controversy during his November 
2005 campaign for Proposal E and his own reelection.19 Controversy 
arose over the lifestyle of the “hip-hop mayor,” focused on the lease 
of a sport utility vehicle for his family. Kilpatrick won reelection, but 
Detroit voters hammered Proposal E by a 65 to 35 percent margin and 
approved the reinstitution of an elected school board. In 2005 Governor 
Granholm signed legislation rescinding the 1999 DPS takeover. 
ASSESSIng THE TAKEOvER yEARS
Governor Engler signed the original takeover bill in March of 1999. 
Mayor Archer appointed then Superintendent Eddie Green as acting 
CEO, and the new reform board selected David Adamany interim CEO 
in the fall of that year. In May 2000, the board selected Kenneth Burn-
ley as the permanent CEO. During the first two years of the takeover, 
DPS enjoyed some measure of success in terms of both district man-
agement and student achievement.20 For example, Adamany launched 
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a successful building repair program and initiated the installation of an 
upgraded payroll management system. Both initiatives were applauded 
by labor and management alike. Another important reform, however, 
drew labor’s wrath. Acting at Adamany’s behest, the Republican- 
controlled legislature passed a law prohibiting principals and assistant 
principals from joining unions. The new law, which made principals 
middle managers and applied only to DPS, was unsuccessfully chal-
lenged by the DFT in federal court.
Year one of the takeover was marred, however, by an ominous sign: 
the loss of more than 6,000 students. Although DPS enrollment had 
declined in each of the three previous years, the loss sustained in 1999–
2000, precipitated by a teacher strike voted by the union on August 30, 
dramatically accelerated the downward trend. The student losses con-
tinued to mount the following year, Burnley’s first full academic year, 
with a drop of nearly 5,000 in the fall pupil count. District enrollment 
was relatively stable over the next two years, with a net loss of about 
800 students, but the worst was yet to come.
burnley’s tenure 
During his five-year tenure, Burnley made district finances and the 
capital program top priorities. Inheriting a massive $1.5 billion bond 
program approved by Detroit voters in 1994, Burnley directed the con-
struction of 21 new schools and the renovation of many others. Other 
accomplishments included the installation of the new payroll system, 
outsourcing the management of the food service and school mainte-
nance programs, and the purchase of 400 new school buses. And better 
yet, student achievement rose, with 4th grade reading scores reaching 
70 percent proficiency on the MEAP (Rich 2009, p. 156).
The district’s financial position, however, began to deteriorate by 
Burnley’s third year, largely the result of collapsing enrollment. The fall 
2003 pupil count plummeted a stunning 11,503 students from the prior 
year, and another 10,577 were lost the following year. These losses, the 
first of a longer-term collapse of DPS enrollments that has continued 
unabated to the present day, drastically reduced the district’s operating 
revenue. Unable to reduce spending commensurately, the district spent 
its fund balance, which fell from $104 million at the close of 2001–02 
to a deficit of $49 million in 2003–04 and a mere $4.7 million balance 
at the 2004–05 book closing.
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The difficulties in managing such a decline in enrollment and rev-
enue cannot be overstated. Noninstructional spending can be lowered 
through privatization, competitive bidding, and generally improved 
management. But eventually the classroom can no longer be protected. 
When the takeover commenced in 1999, DPS employed just over 8,000 
classroom teachers. By the fall of 2005, at the takeover’s end, the dis-
trict’s teaching force had dwindled to just over 4,600 (Michigan Depart-
ment of Education n.d.). Due to seniority privileges in the DFT col-
lective bargaining agreement, however, the teacher layoffs were aimed 
at the newer, lower-salaried teachers. As a result, the average teacher 
salary in the district rose from $42,774 in 1999–2000 to $69,379 in 
2004–05. At the same time, the district’s per pupil operational spending 
soared from $8,269 to $10,957. 
Nevertheless, despite the severe financial problems triggered by 
plummeting enrollments and exacerbated by collective bargaining con-
straints on his management options, Burnley deserves generally high 
marks for his financial stewardship of DPS, particularly over his first 
three years as he rebuilt the district’s crumbling infrastructure, shored 
up management controls, and maintained a respectable fund balance. 
Certainly, the problems multiplied during his last two years as students 
fled the district at an increasing rate. Still, Burnley managed to rebuild 
a modest fund balance during his final year, and while that year was 
a difficult one, the district’s problems only accelerated following his 
departure.   
An Elected board Returns and the Decline Accelerates
In 2005, the newly elected board extended the appointment of 
William F. Coleman, a former deputy superintendent in Dallas, Texas, 
as DPS superintendent. On August 28, 2006, a little over one year into 
Coleman’s tenure, the teachers’ union voted to strike. This walkout 
lasted two weeks and proved a political and financial disaster for the 
district. With charter schools and schools of choice options available to 
Detroit families, DPS enrollment plummeted to 117,568, a staggering 
loss of more than 14,000 students. After two weeks, the parties agreed 
to a one-year pay freeze with small increases in the following two years. 
Four months later, Virginia Cantrell defeated Janna Garrison, leader of 
the ill-fated strike, for the presidency of the DFT (Rich 2009, p. 160). 
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The 2006 strike contributed to the superintendent’s demise as well. Fol-
lowing a dispute between Coleman and board members over financial 
irregularities, on March 8, 2007, the board terminated Coleman’s con-
tract and appointed the district’s chief labor relations officer, Lamont 
Satchel, interim superintendent.
Following a hurried search that attracted a weak applicant pool, 
the board appointed Connie Calloway, then superintendent of the 
5,700-student school district in Normandy, Missouri, to be the new DPS 
superintendent. Calloway took office on July 1, 2007, the district’s sixth 
superintendent in 14 years. On that date, the district began its 2007 fis-
cal year with a miniscule but positive fund balance of just over $7 mil-
lion. Calloway and her administration sought to shore up the district’s 
balance sheet, proposing a central office reorganization that would pur-
portedly save nearly $1 million annually and inviting outside auditors 
to examine the district’s finances. The reorganization plan, which called 
for a smaller central office staff, was approved by the board in October 
2007. 
The report of the outside auditors, however, was not embraced by 
the board. The report was highly critical of past district leadership, cit-
ing decades-old management problems, including deficits masked for 
years by short-term borrowing and interfund transfers. The auditors 
also found more than 600 teachers on the payroll but not in the bud-
get. This report embarrassed board members, and relations between 
Calloway and the board were further strained by very public confusion 
over the district’s financial status, with a report by Calloway and district 
CFO Joan McCray of a projected FY 2009 budget surplus, followed 
quickly by a revised projection of a $408 million deficit. This alarm-
ing projection prompted State Superintendent Mike Flanagan to recom-
mend to Governor Granholm that she appoint a review team to examine 
the district’s finances under the authority of Public Act 72 of 1990, the 
state’s Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act. The review team, 
which by law consists of the state superintendent, state treasurer, state 
budget director, and nominees of the speaker of the Michigan House 
and the senate majority leader, has 30 days to examine the district’s 
finances and report its findings to the governor as to whether a financial 
emergency exists in the district.
Meanwhile, the student exodus continued unabated, with the fall 
2007 count showing a loss of about 11,400 pupils from the prior year, 
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followed by the loss of about 10,800 the next year (see Figure 7.1). The 
associated revenue losses proved disastrous, with the district closing 
the 2007–08 fiscal year with a $140 million deficit and the 2008–09 bal-
ance sheet with $219 million in red ink (see Figure 7.2). The inability of 
Calloway’s administration to come to grips with the district’s deteriorat-
ing finances, combined with board sensitivity over the public airing of 
the district’s financial laundry, proved her downfall. Calloway was fired 
by the board on December 15, 2008, two months after Flanagan’s trig-
gering of the Public Act 72 review process and less than 18 months after 
taking office. District General Counsel Teresa Gueyser was appointed 
chief administrator pending the appointment of an interim superinten-
dent. The district now had its 10th chief executive in 20 years, going 
back to John Porter’s appointment in 1989.
The Financial Emergency
By early 2009, with the review team’s report in hand, State 
Superintendent Flanagan and Governor Granholm had determined 
that a financial emergency did indeed exist in DPS. On January 26, 
2009, Granholm, under authority of Public Act 72 and with the advice 
and consent of the state senate, appointed Robert C. Bobb Emergency 
Financial Manager for the district. He brought to the job an impres-
sive resume, including service as the president of the Washington, DC, 
Board of Education, an elected position, and city manager and deputy 
mayor of the district. He had also served as city manager for Oakland, 
California; Richmond, Virginia; and Kalamazoo, Michigan; among 
other posts. His one-year appointment in Detroit commenced on March 
2, but would be extended an additional year, to March 1, 2011.
The Freefall Continues
The Michigan statute governing the appointment of an emergency 
financial manager, providing as it does for a one-year appointment, sug-
gests the emergency manager’s role is not unlike that of an EMS team 
director at a disaster site. The carnage, one hopes, is mostly concluded, 
and the team’s task is to staunch the bleeding and treat the injured. 
But in DPS, the carnage was far from over when Bobb assumed the 
financial reins. In the very short run, he was unable to halt the exo-
dus of students from DPS or cut spending at a pace to offset revenue 
D
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losses. After three months on the job, Bobb’s administration closed the 
books on the 2008–09 fiscal year with a $219 million deficit. When 
classes resumed in September, enrollments continued their precipitous 
slide, falling more than 10,000 from the prior year. The appointment 
of an emergency financial manager failed to boost public confidence 
in DPS and stem the outflow of students to charter schools and schools 
of choice. Moreover, DPS operating expenditures in 2009–10 actually 
rose by 10.3 percent from the prior year, to more than $1.34 billion, and 
the district’s deficit soared to $332 million.21
gOIng FORWARD: A RETuRn TO MAyORAL COnTROL?
By most accounts, the 1999 mayoral takeover of DPS was a fail-
ure, but not entirely of the district’s making. With the state’s launch 
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of aggressive charter schools and schools of choice programs, DPS 
enrollments plunged and finances deteriorated. Most important, student 
achievement stagnated after an early bounce and high school gradua-
tion rates remained alarmingly low. Further, the five years of mayoral 
control did not establish a foundation for the successful return to an 
elected board. To the contrary, the district’s academic performance and 
financial condition have worsened significantly since the restoration of 
the elected board. Indeed, by any valid measure of district performance, 
DPS is in a more perilous position today than it was in 1999. However, 
while an argument on the merits for mayoral control may be persua-
sively made in 2010, the issue has become politicized in the extreme. 
Opponents of the 1999 takeover, including union leaders, elected board 
members, school administrators, and local school activists, managed to 
deflect attention away from the district’s academic and financial defi-
ciencies and, instead, portray DPS as the victim of an undemocratic 
state usurpation of local autonomy and voting rights. Nevertheless, the 
perilous condition of DPS, the embarrassing escapades of the elected 
board, and the imminent departure of the emergency financial manager 
well before the emergency is over have led some state and local leaders 
to call for an advisory vote of the city’s electorate on the mayoral con-
trol question. Such a move has enjoyed a measure of success in other 
U.S. cities.
Mayoral Control in urban Districts
The notion of running urban school districts out of city hall has gained 
popular support in recent years. In the 2006 Gallup poll, 29 percent of 
respondents favored mayoral control. By 2007, this figure had risen to 
39 percent, and to 42 percent among parents. By 2008, nearly two-thirds 
of the states had passed legislation authorizing either the city or the state 
to govern and manage school districts that are underperforming (Wong 
2009, p. 64). Wong et al. (2007) analyze 104 big-city school systems 
across 40 states and standardized achievement data from thousands of 
schools, comparing districts run by elected boards with those under may-
oral control. They find that mayoral control has a statistically significant, 
positive effect on student achievement and also improves school district 
management and financial administration. However, city hall has gener-
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ally not succeeded in narrowing the achievement gap between the high-
est—and lowest—performing schools (Wong 2009, p. 65).
At the same time, while the researchers found that city hall makes 
a difference, they offer two important caveats: first, a mayoral takeover 
may require a couple of years for improvement in districtwide achieve-
ment results, and second, the absence of any restrictions on whom the 
mayor appoints to the school board seems to dampen student achieve-
ment. Accordingly, Wong recommends that a system of mayoral control 
include a nominating committee that provides the mayor with a slate of 
candidates from which to select board members. He also cautions that 
evaluations of these systems allow at least two years for improvements 
in districtwide achievement results (Wong 2009, pp. 69–70).
Structure and context matter
While research tells us that mayoral control can boost school perfor-
mance, it is no panacea. Previous district achievement remains strongly 
predictive of current achievement in takeover districts, and achievement 
gaps between high- and low-performing schools remain exceedingly 
difficult to close, at least in the short run. Indeed, the evidence suggests 
that takeover mayors have worked to maintain “lighthouse” schools to 
anchor middle-class neighborhoods in their cities. In this way, mayoral 
control has actually been associated with greater achievement strati-
fication, as the lowest performing schools do not improve as much as 
some of the highest performers. As the mayors see it, their cities need to 
maintain a strong, middle-class population, and lighthouse schools are 
necessary to attract and keep those families in the city.
In keeping with a vast amount of previous research evidence, Wong 
and colleagues find a significant and negative correlation between a 
school’s percentage of low-income, Hispanic, and African American 
students and academic achievement, particularly among high schools. 
The researchers conclude that “while mayors can produce significant, 
positive change at the high school level, it is evident that deeper chal-
lenges remain for a school system hoping to overcome underperfor-
mance” (Wong 2009, p. 83). 
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Financial management 
Mayor-led districts do not spend more than board-led districts but 
they spend differently, outsourcing noninstructional services such as 
transportation, food service, safety services, and information technolo-
gies, and reallocating resources to instruction and instructional support. 
Most notably, mayors have been more able than elected boards to con-
trol labor costs, effectively leveraging cooperation and, on occasion, 
concessions from school employee unions. Such success in control-
ling labor costs, sometimes abetted by the enabling legislation grant-
ing mayoral control, has resulted in higher school district bond ratings 
and improved public satisfaction with the schools. Chicago is a notable 
example. The 1995 legislation barred any teacher strike during the first 
18 months of mayoral control, contributing to both labor peace and a 
balanced district budget. This led, in turn, to an improved district bond 
rating from Standard & Poor’s, enabling the appointed board to raise 
billions to finance districtwide capital improvements (Wong 2009, p. 
83).
Mayoral control: Why it works 
On the basis of their extensive research, Wong and colleagues find 
that mayoral control has generally raised student achievement and 
improved program administration and financial management. Why this 
success? The researchers see the mayors assuming a stronger mandate 
to improve school district outcomes than do elected school boards. 
The mayor’s office has more juice than the board office. Wong (2009) 
observes, 
As an institution, the office of the mayor can play an instrumental 
role in improving district performance. The institutional form of 
charisma does not depend on a charismatic person for its founda-
tion. Instead, “corporate bodies—secular, economic, governmen-
tal, military, and political—come to possess charismatic qualities 
simply by virtue of the tremendous power concentrated in them” 
(Shils 1965, p. 207). Because the office of the mayor carries stat-
ure and respect independent of the particular person who occupies 
the position, mayoral involvement can add substantial value to the 
school reform process. (p. 85)
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WHAT’S nExT FOR DPS?
While the emergency financial manager’s appointment expired on 
March 1, 2011, the district’s financial emergency most assuredly did 
not. The superintendent of public instruction, as expected, called for the 
appointment of a new emergency manager, this time by a new governor. 
Beyond that, little is certain. The elected board, which reportedly pre-
pared to resume control of the district upon Robert Bobb’s departure, is 
now reduced to the role of onlooker. A return to mayoral control of DPS 
is unlikely in the foreseeable future given the present dearth of political 
support.
So what is more likely to happen with DPS in the near term? The 
district has lost its status as Michigan’s only Class 1 school district as a 
consequence of falling enrollment, thereby losing statutory protection 
against the opening of community college–authorized charter schools 
within its borders. Detroit Public Schools enrollments will continue to 
decline, perhaps at an accelerating rate, while charter school enroll-
ments continue to climb. This trend will result in a hybrid system of 
public education in the city, comprised of traditional, DPS schools and 
charter public schools, some run by the district and a majority managed 
by private companies, including for-profit firms. And DPS will con-
tinue to lose children through schools of choice. This evolving system 
of public education will continue to provide parents with choices, and 
school leaders will be expected to open new schools and close those 
that fall short of achievement goals set by government. The system will 
be both market driven and government regulated, with all schools sub-
ject to increasingly stringent state and federal achievement standards. 
These market and regulatory structures, of course, are driven more 
by politics and ideology than by solid evidence, and their success is far 
from assured. Indeed, the history of DPS presented here is marked by 
general socioeconomic decline; unproductive and, at times, destructive 
political conflict; financial mismanagement; revolving-door leadership; 
and educational silver bullets that have missed the mark. Can the long-
awaited educational renaissance often promised but never delivered 
come to pass? Possibly, but much more than educational reform will be 
required. The essential building blocks of real and lasting improvement 
for schools and students remain unchanged: socially and economically 
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stable families; strong and consistent leadership for the schools; and 
the capacity and willingness of government, business, and community 
leaders to cooperatively shape and support the city’s evolving educa-
tional system. 
notes
 1.  Detroit was one of the 18 large urban school districts participating in the 2009 test-
ing program as part of the NAEP’s Trial Urban District Assessment. The district’s 
participation was recommended by both national education experts and DPS offi-
cials to better evaluate the district’s academic programs and student achievement 
on a national level (Bouffard 2010). 
  2. Richard Kahlenberg, “Ocean-Hill Brownsville at 40,” Taking	 Note,	 A	 Cen-
tury	Foundation	Group	Blog, April 21, 2008. http://takingnote.tcf.org/2008/09/
ocean-hill-brow.html (accessed July 21, 2011).
  3.  Mirel (1993) offers a telling quote from one survey respondent: “The teachers 
don’t teach a damn thing . . . They don’t give a damn if you don’t learn or nothing, 
you know . . . Man, I didn’t learn —— until I hit the 12th grade” (p. 312).
  4. Coleman Young, at the time, was the leader of the black delegation in Lansing, and 
later was to become the elected mayor of the city of Detroit.
 5.  For a more broad perspective on the changing characteristics of public school 
children in large U.S. cities during the 1960s and the educational policies and 
programs designed to serve them, see Nelson (2005). 
 6. For the reader interested in a more detailed account of these happenings, we sug-
gest a full reading of pp. 338–345 in Mirel (1993).
  7. Mirel (1998) notes that the court-ordered busing program, which expired in 1989, 
was not the sole reason for the student exodus from Detroit. The perceived poor 
quality of education in most of the city schools also played a role. A 1990 sur-
vey conducted by the Detroit	 Free	 Press found that 14 percent of all African 
Americans in the city (and 25 percent of blacks with incomes over $20,000) sent 
their children to private or parochial schools. The figure was 43 percent for white 
Detroiters (Gilchrest 1990).
  8. For more discussion of academic outcomes in Detroit schools during this period, 
see Mirel (1998, p. 242).
 9. The ACT/SAT survey data are reported in Snider (1989).
 10. For a discussion of Michigan school finance during this period, see Phelps and 
Addonizio (1983).
 11. This tax increase, passed by the legislature and signed by Governor Blanchard in 
1983, triggered the recall of two Democratic senators and a shift to a Republican 
majority in the Senate, elevating then little-known Senator John Engler to Senate 
Majority Leader. Seven years later, Engler would narrowly upset Blanchard in his 
quest for a third term.
 12. Detroit voters were very generous toward their public schools during this time. 
Between September 1977 and November 1985, voters approved eight of nine tax 
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renewals or increases. The only defeat, an August 1980 rejection of a 3.5 mill 
increase, was reversed by voters three months later (Mirel 1998, p. 245).
 13.  The phrase public	school	cartel was coined by Wilbur Rich in Henig and Rich 
(2004).
 14. The legislature refrained from mandating the core curriculum because of a provi-
sion in Michigan’s 1978 constitutional tax limitation (Headlee) amendment, which 
requires the state to fully fund all new mandates imposed on local governments.
 15. As the Detroit	News put it, the “lawmakers handed [Governor Engler] a trump card 
over Mayor Archer in the selection of Detroit’s school reform czar” (Piliawsky 
2003).
 16. Had the district failed to balance its operating budget in consecutive years, the 
state could have invoked the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act (Public 
Act 72 of 1990) and appointed an Emergency Financial Manager for DPS. That 
trigger, in fact, would be pulled 10 years later with the 2009 appointment of Rob-
ert Bobb as DPS financial czar.
 17. Mayor Archer appointed Freeman Hendrix, his deputy mayor, as chair. Other may-
oral appointees were New Detroit president Bill Beckham, Marygrove College 
president Glenda Price, community activist Marvis Coffield, Mexican Industries 
CEO Pam Aguirre, and Daimler Chrysler vice president Frank Fountain. State 
superintendent Art Ellis represented the governor.
 18. The other board members supported Thompson’s appointment by a five to zero 
vote, with one abstention (Piliawsky 2003).
 19. Kilpatrick’s primary opponent was Freeman Hendrix, former deputy mayor to 
Kilpatrick’s predecessor, Mayor Dennis Archer, and Archer’s selection to chair 
the appointed school board. Hendrix was not reappointed to the school board by 
Mayor Kilpatrick.
 20. This brief summary draws from Rich (2009).




Reflections on the Limits of Policy
As we neared the final chapter of this book, we began to reflect on 
our descriptions and discussions of the reforms, and attempts at reform, 
proposed and undertaken in Michigan over the past 40 years. We asked 
ourselves how we might make some coherent sense out of all of them. 
What framework or analytic schema might be helpful in organizing 
our reflections, might best serve to bring these endeavors together in 
reasoned and meaningful fashion? After some thought, we settled on 
a framework based on four predominant policy values that have long 
undergirded American education and certainly Michigan education: 
1) equity, 2) adequacy, 3) efficiency, and 4) choice. Our initial ques-
tion then became, to what extent have the policy reforms of the past 40 
years, described in the preceding chapters, addressed these values and 
with what effect? And, ultimately, based on these reforms viewed in the 
light of these values, what have we learned and what might the future 
hold for Michigan public education?
First, a word about the four values. Equity is not necessarily equal-
ity, although sometimes it calls for equality. Equity is concerned with 
justice and fairness. It raises the question of whether the policy reforms 
have led to a system that is just and fair to the citizen taxpayers who 
have the responsibility of providing the resources necessary to develop 
and offer quality education programs in our public schools. It also 
raises the question of whether the policy reforms have been just and fair 
in their allocation of these resources among the more than 500 school 
districts, the more than 3,000 public schools, and the more than 1.5 mil-
lion public school students in the state of Michigan. And, perhaps most 
importantly, equity raises the question of how just and fair the policy 
reforms have been in actually delivering a quality education to each 
and every child and young person who goes through our public school 
systems. In our descriptions and discussions in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 7, 
we attempted to address each of these three questions. 
The second value, adequacy, is a two-sided coin. The first side deals 
with the availability of resources and asks whether the revenue streams 
that the reform policies have put in place, principally state and local, 
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are providing funds sufficient to deliver a quality education to each and 
every child and young person, and also asks the question whether these 
revenue streams are strong and stable enough to provide the necessary 
funds in both good and bad economic times. The second side of the 
adequacy coin raises the question of whether these same resources are 
sufficient to ensure that a quality academic program is offered in each 
and every public school and public school district. In short, adequacy 
concerns itself with the volume and stability of the revenue stream, as 
well as with the sufficiency of those revenues to the task of delivering 
a sound basic education from grades 1 to 12 to every public school 
student. In our discussions in Chapter 2, we addressed the first side of 
the adequacy coin, the question of the yield and stability of the state’s 
revenue stream. In Chapter 4, which addressed the academic outcomes 
of schooling, we began to look at the other side of the adequacy coin, 
namely, whether the revenues are sufficient to provide a quality educa-
tion, a sound basic academic education, to all the students in our public 
schools. In Chapter 7 we looked specifically at how DPS has fared, and 
is faring, in terms of the volume and stability of its revenue stream, as 
well as how successful the district has been in providing a quality edu-
cation to its students. 
Efficiency is a value near and dear to the hearts of most Americans 
and most Michiganders. It asks the question of whether the schools are 
making good use of the resources being provided them, whether we as 
citizens and taxpayers are getting “the best bang for the buck,” whether 
money is making a difference, whether the schools are indeed being 
held accountable for student performance. We spoke to these ques-
tions initially in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we spent a good deal of time 
describing and commenting on past and particularly more recent efforts 
to develop a state accountability system for the schools of Michigan—
so that citizens can be assured, in the words of the U.S. Congress and 
the U.S. Department of Education, that no child is being left behind, 
and that all children, all schools, and all school districts are making 
adequate yearly progress in bringing all students to acceptable levels 
of academic proficiency. In Chapter 4, we described at some length 
an important corollary to efficiency and accountability—the 40-year 
effort to develop and implement both a state assessment program and a 
national assessment program aimed at assessing the academic achieve-
ment levels of the students in our public schools, and then publicly 
Reflections on the Limits of Policy   235
reporting that information to the citizenry. In Chapter 7, we focused 
again on the dreadful failure of DPS to bring its students to acceptable 
levels of academic proficiency, as measured either by the MEAP or the 
NAEP.
Choice, the last of the four values, also has two dimensions. The 
first dimension, and the one that usually comes to mind, is choice of 
school for both students and parents. It is to this dimension that we 
devoted Chapters 5 and 6; in Chapter 7 we also turned the lens of choice 
on Detroit. Parental voice and parental choice, as well as student voice 
and student choice, became the cause	 célèbre of many national and 
state-level reform efforts beginning in the early 1990s. We have wit-
nessed across the nation, and certainly here in Michigan, policymakers 
paying increasing attention to parents’ and other citizens’ power or right 
to choose the type and the setting of the schooling that will be provided 
to their children. In Michigan, this increasing attention led to the legis-
lature’s 1993 establishment and the rapid growth of charter schools, or 
public school academies (PSAs), as described and discussed at length 
in Chapter 5. The Michigan legislature in 1996 further enhanced paren-
tal and student choice in its adoption of the schools of choice program 
examined at length in Chapter 6.
The second dimension of choice, as applied to public education, 
usually goes by the name of local control—the extent to which educa-
tional decisions are left at the local school district level or centralized 
at the state level, or for that matter at the federal level. This dimension 
of educational choice is reflected in Richardson’s (1976) comments, 
made some years ago but still relevant today: “The selective devolu-
tion of spending authority and of the responsibility of program planning 
and implementation can make American government more responsive 
and responsible to the American people . . . By moving authority and 
resources outward [maximizing choice at state and local levels], we can 
make more of American government accessible to public scrutiny and 
to public participation” (pp. 4–5).
In viewing policy reforms in public education of the past 10–20 
years, one would have to conclude that the tide has turned and is now 
running strongly in the other direction. This, of course, raises the ques-
tion of how much authority and decision making actually has moved 
upward and outward from the local district level to the state level and 
on to the federal level as a result of the education policy reforms and 
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attempts at reform. While we do not address this dimension of choice 
directly in the preceding chapters, with the exception of the focus on 
Detroit in Chapter 7, our views are somewhat implicit, if not explicit, 
throughout our descriptions and discussions in all of our chapters. It 
would seem that there is no question but that recent years have seen 
an upward and centralizing movement of authority and decision mak-
ing in American public education. Yet in Detroit, this movement has 
been something of a ping-pong phenomenon—first the decentralization 
effort of the 1970s, then the recentralization of the 1980s followed by 
the state takeover of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, then the return 
to an elected board in 2005 followed shortly after by the appointment of 
an emergency financial manager in 2009, and now the rising call begin-
ning in 2011 for mayoral control of the schools.
A word of caution is in order for the reader. While we will attempt 
to proceed in orderly fashion and base our reflections on these four 
values, we will not necessarily succeed in treating them in sequential 
order; these values tend not only to be closely interrelated but they also 
compete with one another. As we have noted elsewhere: 
. . . the underlying values, demands and interests that drive public 
policy decisions are often mutually incompatible—in short, they 
compete with one another. These values, demands and interests—
all vitally important to us as American citizens—include equity, 
adequacy, efficiency and choice . . . But when taken together, they 
all cannot be given equal weight. An answer to one will influence 
the answer to another. But that is inherent in the nature of the pub-
lic policy process in our nation and state. Coming to an acceptable 
balance among these competing values, demands and interests is 
the continuing task before the citizens of the state and their elected 
representatives. (Kearney and Addonizio 2002, pp. 64–65) 
EQuITy
Equity for Taxpayers
In reflecting on the policy reforms put in place in 1993–94 under 
Proposal A, one has to conclude that, with certain reservations, the 
reforms resulted in substantial improvement in equity for property tax-
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payers. Under Proposal A, total property taxes were reduced by about 
26 percent. For homeowners the reduction was about 32 percent, and 
businesses enjoyed a cut of about 13 percent. In addition, homeowners 
who remain in their homes over a period of years benefit from Proposal 
A’s introduction of a cap on annual increases in their residential prop-
erty values. However, the cap is a mixed blessing—only homeowners 
who choose to stay in their homes over a long period of time actually 
benefit from the cap, since on resale the property is reassessed at 50 per-
cent of market value, the normal assessment ratio. This circumstance 
has led over time to considerable disparities in assessed values among 
houses of comparable market value—resulting in significant differ-
ences in the property taxes paid by current owners of these houses. 
Yet both sets of owners enjoy the same level of school, municipal, and 
county services. This particular situation is neither fair nor just for the 
set of homeowners who are more mobile, who are less permanent in 
their primary residences.
The significant reduction in property taxes brought about by Pro-
posal A also is a mixed blessing to the taxpayer in another way: it 
resulted in a significant reduction in property tax revenues, particularly 
in local tax revenues that had to be replaced through state taxing mecha-
nisms. The revenue hole, in large part, was filled by an increase in the 
retail sales tax rate from 4 to 6 percent, rather than an increase in the 
personal income tax rate. Most would argue that the retail sales tax is, 
at the least, inherently but moderately regressive—that is, the lower the 
income of a family, the higher the percentage of its income that will 
go to pay the tax. This further reduces the equity characteristics of the 
overall tax structure that currently supports public education in Michi-
gan. The retail sales tax also generally is a less stable tax, meaning its 
yield is more subject to fluctuations in the economy than is the property 
tax or the personal income tax.1 We have more to say about this in our 
subsequent discussion of adequacy.
Before we leave our discussion of equity for taxpayers under the 
1994 school finance reforms, we must note one problem that was com-
pletely ignored. Today in Michigan, no state school aid is provided for 
capital outlay financing. Local school districts are obliged to fund their 
capital needs from cash reserves, building and site sinking funds, or the 
sale of bonds. In the instance of both building and site sinking funds 
and bond sales, the local district must rely exclusively on its local tax-
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payers to provide the funds necessary to retire the debt. Since no equal-
ization aid is provided by the state, considerable inequities accrue for 
both taxpayers and pupils due to the continuing large differences among 
school districts in their property tax bases. The sole assistance given 
by the state is through the School Bond Loan Program, wherein the 
local district can borrow from the state to help meet its annual principal 
and interest payments on its bonds. Again, we have a situation that is 
neither fair nor just for property taxpayers residing in property-poor 
school districts. Detroit, in particular, with its relatively low property 
tax base, suffers demonstrably from the lack of any state equalization 
aid for capital outlay financing. For example, when it comes to meet-
ing capital outlay needs, Detroit would have to levy a property tax rate 
eight times the rate levied in neighboring Bloomfield Hills to generate 
the same amount of revenue for capital purposes. 
While Michigan property taxpayers today are in a much more equi-
table situation than they were prior to the adoption of Proposal A, still, 
as retail	sales taxpayers their situation has to be considered less equi-
table, particularly for those taxpayers in low-income households who 
feel the brunt of the tax’s inherent regressivity. 
In addition, the present precipitous downturn in the Michigan econ-
omy, coupled with rising rates of unemployment, has directly affected 
retail sales tax collections and contributed mightily to the current short-
fall in state school aid revenues. What is the likelihood that Michigan 
citizens will see changes in the retail sales tax in the years to come, and 
subsequent improvements in the equity— as well as the adequacy—of 
the tax structure? If change is to come, what appears to be most advan-
tageous is not a move away from the retail sales tax, but rather a move 
to broadening the base of the tax to services while at the same time 
moderately reducing its rate to, say, 5 percent or so. On the one hand, 
this would result in increased revenues, and on the other hand a lesser 
tax burden on lower income families.2 But, as Ballard (2010) points out,
The politics of sales-tax reform are very difficult. Lobbyists fight 
hard to maintain the privileged status of the services that currently 
get preferential treatment. And yet the economics of sales-tax 
reform are absolutely and completely solid. Extending the sales 
tax to services is a slam dunk, both in terms of fairness and in 
terms of economic efficiency. If we create a level playing field by 
taxing goods and services in the same way, our tax system will be 
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both fairer and more efficient. If we continue with the current sys-
tem, which taxes some activities at 6 percent while other activities 
get special treatment, the long-term effect will be the continued 
erosion of the tax base. This will perpetuate economic inefficiency 
and an unfair tax system, and it will damage our ability to pay 
for public services in Michigan. (pp. 184–185, emphasis in the 
original)
The foregoing discussion and comments on equity for taxpayers 
offer an ideal segue into a discussion of adequacy. But before we do 
that, we want to remain focused for a moment on notions of justice and 
fairness, and raise questions about the effects of Proposal A on equity 
for students. 
Equity for Students
Did Proposal A lead to a more just and fair distribution of resources 
among the public school districts, public schools, and public school 
students of Michigan? When examining equity for students under the 
Proposal A reforms, it is useful to employ three definitions of equity. 
The first, which we call horizontal	 equity, calls for “equal treatment 
of equals,” with the goal being to minimize the spread among districts 
in the distribution of basic programs and services or, as more often 
is the case, the spread in the distribution of dollars needed to pay for 
those basic programs and services. The second definition of equity, fis-
cal	neutrality, calls for no variation among districts in basic or special 
programs and services as a result of factors considered suspect, such as 
local property tax wealth. The third, vertical	equity, calls for “unequal 
treatment of unequals,” with the goal being to provide for pupils with 
special needs, such as the handicapped or disadvantaged. Under this 
third definition, unequal dollars need to be made available for special 
programs and services for these pupils.3
At first blush, horizontal equity, a just and fair distribution of 
resources for all students, has improved appreciably as a result of the 
Proposal A reforms. Prior to the adoption of Proposal A, there were 
tremendous inequities in the distribution of basic program resources 
among Michigan’s public school districts and public schools. In 1993–
94, revenues per pupil, the usual measure employed in examinations of 
resource equity, ranged from a high of $10,377 per pupil in the Bloom-
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field Hills school district to a low of $3,261 per pupil in the Onaway 
school district—a difference of $7,116 per pupil! Even the doubters 
might agree that in this case money did indeed make a difference. 
By school year 2000–01, the policy reforms enacted under Proposal 
A had changed Onaway’s numbers significantly and Bloomfield Hills’ 
numbers only moderately. Bloomfield Hills had grown slightly—some 
10.4 percent over the seven years—to $11,854 per pupil. Onaway had 
grown significantly—some 48.5 percent over the same period—to 
$7,303 per pupil. While there still was a sizable difference, the differ-
ence had been reduced to $4,551 per pupil. In effect, very low revenue 
per pupil districts such as Onaway had been raised at a rapid rate over 
the period, while high revenue per pupil districts such as Bloomfield 
Hills had been held to lesser rates of increase over the same period. The 
goal wasn’t equality, but rather equity, i.e., reducing the differences to 
what the legislature saw as just and fair given the circumstances; in 
effect, to put an acceptable foundation floor under each school district. 
By 2000–01 all Michigan school districts had been brought to at least 
that acceptable foundation floor and then were frozen in their relative 
positions, with each district increasing annually its revenue per pupil 
by identical amounts, and maintaining in the following years up to the 
present time the approximate $4,500 difference between the highest and 
lowest revenue per pupil districts. This leveling up process achieved 
what it was designed to do, i.e., narrow the gap between the high and 
low revenue districts. It certainly wasn’t perfect equality, but it was a 
definite improvement in horizontal equity, fairness, and justice. 
At first glance, it would appear that the 1993–94 reforms also 
brought about considerable improvement in fiscal	 neutrality. In past 
years, a district’s property tax base—a suspect factor in terms of our 
definition of fiscal neutrality—was a major reason for the wide differ-
ences that existed among Michigan school districts in the dollars per 
pupil available to support basic programs and services. Under Proposal 
A’s new foundation program, this strong connection was broken, at least 
in theory. Reliance on local property tax revenues has been reduced 
considerably; local revenues now account for only roughly 20 percent 
of total school revenues as opposed to their previous mark of better than 
60 percent. 
Still, vestiges of the past structure remain. In part, these are attribut-
able to three decisions the legislature made in enacting the new founda-
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tion program. First, rather than move all districts in which the 1993–94 
per pupil revenues were under $5,000 up to the $5,000 starting point 
immediately, the legislature chose to move these districts up gradually. 
Second, the legislature chose not to bring all remaining districts down 
to the $5,000 per pupil starting point in 1994–95. Rather, it chose to use 
each individual district’s 1993–94 revenue per pupil level as the starting 
point and increase that level on a sliding scale, at least in the first year of 
the program. Third, the legislature chose not to “level down” but rather 
to “hold harmless” those districts in which 1993–94 per pupil revenue 
levels exceeded $6,500, as long as voters in those districts were willing 
to tax themselves at a commensurate rate in addition to the required 18 
mill levy. 
Because of these decisions, the past negative effects of large vari-
ances among school districts in their taxable property values per pupil 
remain to a considerable extent in the present arrangements. One might 
say they constitute residual	effects that have yet to be removed. In fair-
ness, the legislature may have had no other choice. To “level up” all 
districts would have placed an impossible demand on state revenue 
sources and undoubtedly was out of the question. To “level down” high 
spending districts very likely would have been politically impossible.
What of vertical	 equity under Proposal A’s new school finance 
program? The answer to this question is much more difficult. On the 
one hand, we know that the legislature, in its finance reform package, 
increased substantially its commitment to funding programs for at-risk 
youngsters. A new categorical program provided some $230 million in 
additional funds in 1994–95 to school districts whose 1993–94 revenue 
per pupil was below $6,500 and that had a high incidence of children 
coming from poverty circumstances. This was accomplished by adding 
11.5 percent (a 1.115 per pupil weighting) to the foundation allowance 
of those school districts that were eligible. Eligibility was determined 
on the basis of numbers of pupils eligible to receive free and reduced-
price lunches in those districts whose 1993–94 per pupil revenues were 
below $6,500. This $230 million at-risk money was a part of the total 
of $1.3 billion that the legislature appropriated in 1994–95 for special 
and categorical programs. By 2002–03 funding for the at-risk program 
had risen to $314.2 million but has since leveled off and dropped a 
bit to $310 million in 2009–10. The federal government also provides 
another $1.5 billion earmarked for special needs. Undoubtedly, local 
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school districts also direct some of their general fund dollars to support 
special needs programs. Thus, we can argue that all three levels—local, 
state, and federal—acknowledge and provide for “unequal treatment of 
unequals,” that vertical equity is taken into account in Michigan’s cur-
rent public school finance arrangements. 
On the other hand, we have no good way of determining whether 
these needs are being fully met. Furthermore, some contend that until 
we fully achieve horizontal equity and fiscal neutrality, our attempts to 
provide for vertical equity result largely in reducing differences in rev-
enue per pupil caused by suspect factors rather than increasing, as they 
should, differences based on justifiable factors such as a high incidence 
of disadvantaged children. They argue, for example, that districts like 
Detroit or Grand Rapids, which have a high incidence of such pupils and 
do indeed receive substantial additional dollars per pupil under both the 
state “at risk” and other categorical and federal compensatory education 
programs, still lag far behind districts like Bloomfield Hills in total rev-
enues per pupil. The attempt to address vertical equity concerns through 
categorical aid serves mainly to reduce somewhat the large initial gap 
in available revenues (and expenditures) per pupil between a Detroit 
or a Grand Rapids and a more revenue rich school district like Bloom-
field Hills. In theory, if the system were working properly, and the three 
principles of horizontal equity, fiscal neutrality, and vertical equity all 
were coming fully into play, one would expect to find in Detroit or in 
Grand Rapids, when compared to Bloomfield Hills, a higher rather than 
lower level of total revenues per pupil and, subsequently, a higher rather 
than lower level of current operating expenditures per pupil. The reader 
might conclude that this is an interesting but undoubtedly impractical 
argument, at least for now.
ADEQuACy
The Strength and Stability of the Revenue Stream
We next turn our attention to a consideration of adequacy, and 
address first that side of the adequacy coin that deals with the strength 
and stability of the revenue stream. This, in our view, is the most press-
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ing policy problem now facing Michigan public education. To put it 
bluntly, inadequacy is a better word to describe the current Michigan 
tax structure. For a number of reasons, the current tax structure is not 
delivering the revenues needed to adequately support essential public 
services, including but not limited to public education. Most observ-
ers argue that the Michigan tax structure is broken, well beyond short-
term fixes, and now demands a substantial if not total restructuring. 
At the time of this writing, the state is facing a $1.6 billion shortfall in 
2011–12, and the outlook for the next budget year is even more dire and 
very likely will extend into future budget years unless corrective action 
in the form of increased revenue, spending cuts, or a combination of 
the two is soon taken. Yet both houses of the legislature, as well as the 
governor, throughout the past several years continued to procrastinate, 
wrangling about short-term fixes rather than attending to the task of 
reforming the tax code and establishing new policies that would ensure 
the strong and stable revenue streams needed to support public educa-
tion and other essential public services. In contrast, the new Republican 
administration and Republican legislature, voted into office in 2010, 
have moved rapidly to enact a new series of wide-ranging budgetary 
measures. Unfortunately, these measures do not bode well for the pub-
lic schools, which now face further reductions in state aid and conse-
quently further reductions in personnel and programs.
At the present time, sources of tax revenue for the state of Michigan 
include revenue from the state income tax, the sales and use taxes, the 
6 mill state education property tax, the business tax, the transportation 
tax, the lottery, and miscellaneous other taxes, plus revenue from fed-
eral agencies. The Michigan Constitution has established a general fund 
plus several special funds to be used as depositories for these revenues, 
and from which the legislature draws as it annually appropriates dollars 
to the different units of state and local government. One of these special 
funds is called the School Aid Fund (SAF), to which the legislature 
turns for the dollars it appropriates to help support the annual operation 
of Michigan’s public schools. The revenues in the SAF now come from 
a number of sources but principally from the retail sales tax, the biggest 
contributor to the SAF, and those revenues account for approximately 
46 percent of the total funds in the SAF. On the passage of Proposal 
A, the retail sales tax increased from 4 percent to 6 percent, with the 
increased revenue earmarked entirely for the SAF. By prior action, the 
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Michigan Constitution already required that 60 percent of the revenue 
generated from the existing 4 percent retail sales tax rate be deposited 
in the SAF. Thus, 60 percent of the revenue generated from the first 4 
percent tax on retail sales, plus 100 percent of the revenue from the 
additional 2 percent tax on retail sales, are constitutionally dedicated 
to the SAF. The retail sales tax revenue, while not the only factor, is 
clearly the most important factor in ensuring the adequacy and stability 
of the revenue stream going to support the public schools. 
However, even though this is a sizable amount, it does not cover the 
entire sum needed by the legislature to fund the State School Aid Act. 
Consequently, other state revenue sources—or portions of them—also 
are earmarked for the SAF. Two other major contributors to the SAF are 
the personal income tax, which makes up about 19 percent of the SAF, 
and the 6 mill state education property tax at about 14 percent.4 Thus, 
almost 80 percent of the funds in the SAF are dependent on tax rev-
enues from three principal taxes: 1) the retail sales tax, 2) the personal 
income tax, and 3) the 6 mill state education property tax. A downturn 
in any one or all of these sources means trouble for the public schools. 
As we have noted elsewhere, the heavy dependence on the retail sales 
tax is particularly problematic:
The substitution of sales tax revenue for property tax revenue is 
likely to impair the long-run stability of school revenue in Michi-
gan. It is well established that sales tax revenue is more income-
elastic than property tax revenue and thus more volatile over the 
economic cycle. As an illustration, during the 20 years from 1972 
to 1992, property tax assessments in Michigan grew at an annual 
rate of 7.1 percent, while the replacement revenue sources, consist-
ing largely of sales tax revenue, grew only 6.6 percent annually. 
Moreover, during the economic downturn from 1989 to 1992, prop-
erty taxes rose 8 percent annually, while the replacement revenues 
increased a mere 3.6 percent annually. (Kearney and Addonizio 
2002, p. 40)
From 2007–08 to 2008–09, earmarked revenues from the three main 
taxes that are the major contributors to the SAF dropped significantly. 
Retail sales tax revenues dedicated to the SAF declined from $4.9 billion 
in 2007–08 to $4.6 billion in 2008–09, a 6.1 percent decrease, followed 
by a slight uptick of $30 million in 2009–10—a total decrease over the 
three years of 5.5 percent. Personal income tax revenue dedicated to 
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the SAF dropped by 6.7 percent in 2008–09 and another 2.5 percent 
in 2009–10—a total decrease of 9.1 percent over the three years. The 
6 mill state education property tax was off by 2.5 percent in 2008–09, 
and dropped another 3.6 percent in 2009–10—a total decrease of 6.1 
percent over the three-year period (Michigan Department of the Trea-
sury 2009). All of this has led and will continue to lead to increasing 
shortfalls in state aid for Michigan public schools—shortfalls that can 
be made up only by reductions in educational programs and other oper-
ating expenditures, or by dipping into fund balances—a one-time only 
source of funds. 
The reduction in educational programs has substantial implications 
for the other side of the adequacy coin, namely, the question of whether 
the level of resources, now and in future years, is sufficient to ensure a 
quality academic program for each and every student in each and every 
public school and public school district. However, before we turn to 
this question, we first offer a final thought on the inadequacy of the cur-
rent tax structure. Whether the answers lie in extending the retail sales 
tax to services and reducing the rate, or increasing the rate of the per-
sonal income tax or moving to graduated rates, or increasing the 6 mill 
state education property tax to, say, 8 mills, or some combination of 
the foregoing, we leave to those with more expertise in tax policy. We 
argue simply that Michigan needs to restructure its tax system without 
delay. To do otherwise will have deleterious consequences for our pub-
lic schools and the future of the state of Michigan. There is, of course, 
a complementary argument, that is, the need to also cut costs. However, 
in our view, the argument for further cost cutting needs to acknowledge 
the reality that a lot of cost cutting already has taken place, and that 
many districts are now “down to the bone.” 
Resources Sufficient to Support a Sound basic Education 
It is now widely believed that a school finance system should pro-
vide all local districts a level of revenue adequate to allow all students 
to achieve high standards of academic performance, generally mea-
sured by state assessments of student achievement. This belief leads to 
two interrelated questions: What is an adequate educational program, 
and what does it cost? In Chapter 2 we noted that the focus of recent 
school finance litigation has moved from equity to adequacy, from con-
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cerns about relative property wealth per pupil and spending levels per 
pupil to the more fundamental matter of student achievement. One of 
the more recent writers in this area, Michael Rebell, an ardent advocate 
of litigation in support of achieving “educational adequacy,” offers the 
following observation: 
I think the term ‘sound basic education’ is the best phrase available 
for the concept that often is described as ‘educational adequacy.’ 
Sound basic education connotes that students need a core, funda-
mental level of education in order to succeed in the contemporary 
world and that to be sound this basic level of education must allow 
them to	function	competently	as	citizens	and	to	compete	effectively	
in	the	modern	economy [emphasis added]. (Rebell 2009, p. 21)
The question remains, of course, what are the components that 
should constitute “a core, fundamental level of education”? In Chap-
ter 3 we noted that there were substantial disagreements back in the 
1950s and 1960s among the many voices calling for the reform of the 
American high school. On the one side were those who subscribed, 
and still do, to the views expressed by James B. Conant, who strongly 
favored strengthening the comprehensive high school and its central 
theme of curricular differentiation, providing students of differing abili-
ties with a wide range of courses and programs attuned to their interests 
and abilities. On the other side was a sizable group of advocates who 
championed the views of Arthur Bestor, who called for more rigor and 
academic focus in the schools and more demanding curricular require-
ments in the academic subjects. Bestor’s view has prevailed of late. 
Reading, writing, and mathematics, along with science and moder-
ate social studies, have become the central focus of state assessment 
programs such as the MEAP and certainly the NAEP. However, there 
already is some evidence that nationwide the pendulum may be moving 
back toward Conant’s (1959b) view. In Chapter 3, we cited the recent 
advocacy of campaigns such as A Broader, Bolder Approach to Educa-
tion (2011), championed by a group of education notables who suggest 
that we should begin to move beyond attention “not only to basic aca-
demic skills and cognitive growth narrowly defined, but to develop-
ment of the whole person, including physical health, character, social 
development and non-academic skills . . .” (p. 2).
How will these competing arguments likely play out? And how 
will they contribute to fashioning clear statements of what Michigan, 
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or any other state for that matter, ought to set forth as the components 
of a sound basic education? A few short months ago, the powers that 
be in Michigan might have responded that this already had been done, 
that a clear statement of what constitutes a sound basic education is set 
forth in the standards of academic performance on which the MEAP 
is based. In effect, they might argue that those standards, along with 
their accompanying subject matter and grade level expectations, quite 
clearly defined what constitutes an adequate education—a sound basic 
education—in Michigan. And under the MEAP and the Michigan Merit 
Exam (MME) we now have extensive information on how Michigan 
schools and students are doing vis-à-vis these academic standards and 
grade level expectations. In Chapter 4, we discussed at some length 
current statewide results on the MEAP and the MME, laying out the 
percentage of students achieving proficiency in a range of subject mat-
ter areas and at different grade levels. And we contrasted these results 
with similar results on the NAEP, noting very large differences between 
the two sets of results. 
Judging Michigan schools only on the basis of their MEAP scores 
paints a much rosier picture than judging them on the basis of their 
NAEP scores. By Michigan standards, fully 74 percent of the state’s 
combined 4th and 8th graders were proficient in reading in 2007; but 
when using NAEP standards that figure fell to 33 percent—a drop of 
over 40 percentage points. Almost identical differences were seen in 
combined 4th and 8th grade math scores. And perhaps more telling and 
greater cause for concern is Michigan students’ decline over time in 
performance on the NAEP when compared with other states. As we 
noted in Chapter 4, Michigan’s rank among participating states in 4th 
grade reading fell substantially from 1992 to 2007, as did its ranking in 
8th grade mathematics over the same period. Particularly alarming was 
Michigan’s decline in 8th grade math scores for African American stu-
dents, with Michigan ranking next to last in 2007 among 41 reporting 
states. Even more alarming yet were the dreadfully low NAEP math, 
reading and science scores for 4th and 8th grade students in DPS.5 
Why are there such differences between Michigan students’ MEAP 
and NAEP performances? Has Michigan set the bar too low? Do the 
Michigan tests lack rigor? Has the NAEP set the bar too high? Are the 
NAEP tests too rigorous? And, at root, are the comparisons between the 
MEAP and the NAEP results truly valid comparisons? Many experts 
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argue that it is with considerable risk that one undertakes comparisons 
of the MEAP and NAEP results, and that such comparisons at best 
should be used with extreme caution. Still, such comparisons, driven 
largely by NCLB, have become widespread and continue to be made, 
and public school personnel, as well as state and national policymakers, 
are forced to address them. 
In Chapter 4 we noted that the SBE recently attempted to address 
this issue, at least in part, by taking action to raise the bar on the MEAP 
by setting the cut scores at higher levels. We also noted that some con-
tend that even better answers lie in the nation’s schools moving to a 
common set of content and performance standards, and a common set of 
achievement measures. And recently we have seen considerable move-
ment toward developing a common set of nationwide content standards, 
as well as toward building a common set of nationwide achievement 
measures based on those standards (Cavanaugh 2009; Lewin 2010).
But even if the problems of comparability of standards and assess-
ments are resolved, as well as the matter of clearly defining what actu-
ally constitutes a sound basic education, the question of what such an 
education would cost still remains. That is, what level of resources will 
it take annually to provide an education that will ensure all students 
have the opportunity to achieve at a high level of academic perfor-
mance, to truly attain a sound basic education? 
Very little has been done in Michigan to address this question. In 
effect, decisions about how much it will take to annually fund the pub-
lic schools are often made, in Michigan and many other states, through 
what Rebell (2006, p. 467) has characterized as “ad hoc political deal-
making processes,” rather than through a rational decision-making 
process. Accordingly, in our judgment, Michigan should give serious 
consideration to undertaking an education adequacy study, or what is 
commonly called a “cost study.” There is an argument that the SBE is 
the proper body, and has the responsibility, to undertake such a study. 
Under Article VIII, Section 3 of the Michigan Constitution, the SBE is 
charged with “leadership and general supervision over all public educa-
tion.” In that same section, the board is also charged with a responsibil-
ity to “advise the legislature as to the financial requirements in connec-
tion therewith.” 
While the SBE annually may well offer the legislature its advice 
on the education budget and state aid to the schools, to our knowledge, 
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with one exception, more than 40 years ago, it has never undertaken a 
comprehensive study of the costs of an adequate public education in 
Michigan, nor offered advice to the legislature based on such a study.6 
We suggest that such an effort by the SBE is long overdue. We are not 
suggesting that Michigan’s relative decline in NAEP performance or 
the achievement shortcomings of individual districts, schools, or stu-
dent groups are primarily attributable to insufficient funding. We do 
assert, however, that school resources do matter and that Michigan’s 
education leaders and policymakers should more carefully assess these 
resource needs, particularly in light of the declining resources sustained 
by most Michigan districts over the past six or seven years.7 
EFFICIEnCy
Efficiency as Accountability
In Chapter 3, we described and discussed state accountability sys-
tems and equated the term efficiency with the term accountability—
holding that in many ways they were interchangeable terms. In fact, we 
argued that perhaps a better and more publicly accepted understanding 
of the term accountability, particularly as it is applied to public educa-
tion, comes from educational historian Raymond Callahan’s linking of 
accountability and efficiency (Callahan 1964, p. 234). Efficiency asks 
whether the schools are being held accountable, whether they are mak-
ing good use of the resources provided to them, whether we as citi-
zens and taxpayers are getting “the biggest bang for the buck,” whether 
money is making a difference. Callahan identifies efficiency as the 
maxim often claimed to be the basic premise of American manufactur-
ing, namely, “the finest product at the lowest cost.” A state account-
ability system, at root, is designed to demonstrate whether the public 
school system is turning out “the finest product,” whether all students 
are achieving expected or desired levels of proficiency in the several 
academic subjects being offered, and whether the schools themselves 
are performing adequately when it comes to such measures as the 
employment of highly qualified teachers, student retention rates, and 
high school graduation rates. 
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We also traced in Chapter 3 the long history of accountability sys-
tems, or parts of such systems, particularly in Michigan. This history 
began with the University of Michigan’s Secondary School Accredi-
tation Program instituted in 1871, moved on to John Porter’s Six-
Step Accountability Program of the early 1970s, then to the legisla-
ture’s accountability framework enacted under Act 25 of 1990, and 
more recently to Tom Watkins’s EducationYes! adopted in 2002. We 
described this last program at length, along with the proposed revisions 
of that program, namely, MI-SAS and MI-SAAS—the latter slated to 
be implemented in school year 2011–12, and most recently the new 
legislated requirement for the evaluation of teachers and administra-
tors—with individual teacher evaluations linked to student academic 
performance.
While few appear to be opposed to accountability as such, many 
appear to question the design and implementation of the state account-
ability systems established under the requirements of NCLB.8 In Michi-
gan we find considerable concern, if not outright skepticism, about the 
requirements of EducationYes! as well as the requirements being pro-
posed under MI-SAS and MI-SAAS. Not the least of these concerns, 
as we pointed out in Chapter 3, is what will happen in 2013–14—the 
school year the final bill comes due—if Michigan has failed to meet the 
NCLB and AYP goal of 100 percent proficiency based on its own stan-
dards, i.e., those measured by the MEAP, and, even more likely, those 
measured by the NAEP.9 
Much uncertainty remains in fashioning answers to these questions, 
which is considerably exacerbated by the fact that NCLB itself may 
be subject to major revisions depending on what the Congress may or 
may not do in the pending reauthorization of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act and its component Title I and NCLB programs. 
Whatever may come out of the reauthorization, we can be fairly cer-
tain that any significant changes in the law and its requirements will 
be largely driven by the Obama Administration’s education agenda as 
articulated by Arne Duncan, the current U.S. Secretary of Education 
(see, for example, Dillon [2011a]).While it may be naïve, if not foolish, 
to predict what the likely outcome of the Congressional reauthorization 
effort will produce, particularly in light of the substantive changes in 
the U.S. House of Representatives resulting from the 2010 midterm 
elections, it seems we can be somewhat assured that it will contain the 
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four key elements in the Secretary’s Race to the Top program. These 
include an emphasis on charter schools, the use of achievement test 
scores based on so-called value-added approaches in teacher evalua-
tion, merit pay systems based on these results, and encouragement of 
local districts to dismiss entire staffs of failing schools. The last three 
of the four fall neatly into our category of policies strongly oriented 
toward the value of efficiency or accountability. Judging from all of 
this, it probably is quite safe to say that state and federally mandated 
school and school district accountability systems are here to stay. What 
remains are the questions of what likely will be the shape, content, and 
emphases of these systems. At this point in time, we do not know (see, 
for example, Jennings [2010/2011]). We choose only to repeat the ques-
tions offered at the conclusion of Chapter 3, namely, will existing or 
redesigned accountability systems truly lead to increased academic suc-
cess for students? In the words of John Porter, do they hold promise of 
providing “ . . . the guarantee that all students without respect to race, 
income, or social class will acquire the minimum school skills neces-
sary to take full advantage of the choices that accrue upon successful 
completion of public schooling . . . ” (Kearney 1971, p. 5)? Then, what 
happens, and where do we go, if we find that all this effort is for naught?
CHOICE
The first of the key elements in Secretary Duncan’s Race to the Top 
program is an emphasis on charter schools, which offers a convenient 
segue into our fourth category of policies, namely those based on the 
value of choice. 
Michigan parents and students today enjoy three choices in their 
selection of public schools. The first choice is to attend a traditional 
public school, the kind with which we all are familiar, and which by 
far enroll the vast majority of Michigan’s public school pupils. For 
decades, this was Michiganders’ only public choice, and for those liv-
ing in poorly performing districts and unable to afford private school 
tuition or a residence in a more desirable school district, no choice at 
all. Accordingly, Michigan lawmakers created additional choices. Thus, 
the second choice is to attend a charter school, as described in Chapter 
252   Addonizio and Kearney
5. The third choice is to leave the home school district and to attend a 
traditional school in a neighboring district, an option provided under the 
schools of choice program summarized in Chapter 6. 
Michigan’s Charter Schools 
We turn first to the second choice mentioned above and reflect on 
Michigan’s charter schools, known administratively and legally as 
public school academies (PSAs). As we noted in Chapter 5, the initial 
advocates of charter schools argued that subjecting public schools to 
market forces would compel them to be more responsive to parents 
and students. The advocates viewed traditional public schools as non–
market driven; the resources—including steady and increasing sala-
ries—continue to flow irrespective of performance. In a market-driven 
school, on the other hand, they argued that the principal and the teach-
ers would become accountable for the performance of the organiza-
tion since the resources and reward structures would be tightly linked 
to performance. The bottom line would become “no performance, no 
resources.” Thus, central to their idea of the market-driven school 
was the notion of competition, which, in turn, would ensure account-
ability and quality. In the long run, good schools would drive out bad 
schools. In order to continue to receive resources, schools would have 
to respond to the demands of the consumers. 
For many of their early champions, charter schools represented a 
“silver bullet,” not only to right what was wrong with public educa-
tion, but also to provide the impetus for radical reform of the schools. 
Back in 1994–95, Governor John Engler, as well as the Republican 
Senate and many legislators of both parties, viewed the introduction 
of a market-driven mechanism into public education as the sine	qua	
non	of any meaningful reform—a view supported by many in the busi-
ness community. Indeed, Governor Engler spoke of the creation of liter-
ally hundreds of charter schools. As he publicly stated, “With charter 
schools, I predict nothing less than a renaissance of public education in 
Michigan” (Kearney 1994). However, as we noted in Chapter 5, Michi-
gan’s charter school program has been neither an unqualified success 
nor a disaster. Some PSAs are excellent, many have waiting lists, some 
struggle with poor management and poor outcomes for students, and 
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some have been closed. They neither have become as good as they were 
expected to be, nor as bad as their opponents claimed they would be. 
In many ways, one might say they have proved to be pareto	supe-
rior, that is, they have made some students better off without harm-
ing others. There is growing evidence that, when it comes to academic 
achievement on the MEAP, many PSA students are doing as well as, if 
not even a little better than, the regular public school students in their 
host districts in the elementary and middle school grades. Certainly 
when compared to all students across Michigan, we find a consider-
able lag in PSA achievement scores. But then we often find the same 
lag in the schools in the host districts. And, we would argue, the host 
districts provide the more valid basis for comparison as their students 
more closely match their PSA peers in important socioeconomic char-
acteristics and community influences.
In Chapter 5, we also noted that there are two unresolved policy 
issues that serve to hinder the effectiveness if not the efficiency of char-
ter schools in Michigan. The first centers on the lack of authority pres-
ent statutes afford the superintendent of public instruction to effectively 
oversee the authorizers and call them to task on their responsibilities 
for overseeing the PSAs they charter. The second concerns the inability 
of the PSA boards to effectively oversee the educational management 
organizations they hire to help run their schools. Both of these issues, 
and a number of other related issues spelled out in Chapter 5, need to be 
resolved if the PSAs are to succeed over the long run. If that happens, 
and there is continuation of financial support, there is considerable hope 
that the PSAs will continue to mature and will become a fixture among 
Michigan public schools, that indeed they will come to represent a rea-
sonable if not promising alternative to the traditional public school.10 
As Weiss (1990) and Glenn (1989) have argued, there also are quite 
appropriate and compelling reasons for promoting parental choice, 
aside from or in addition to improved educational outcomes. One of 
these reasons centers on the long-cherished notion of the value of per-
sonal choice that “ . . . each person ought to have the opportunity to 
control the conditions of his life, and in concert with others, the condi-
tions of life in his or her community” (Richardson 1976, p. 5). Thus, 
one might well argue that the efficacy of PSAs and broadened edu-
cational choices in Michigan should not be judged exclusively on the 
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question of whether they lead to improved academic achievement, or 
for that matter the achievement of other educational outcomes. It may 
be enough that PSAs will restore to parents and students, and perhaps 
to teachers, a legitimate role in deciding the nature and quality of public 
schooling in their immediate community.
Michigan’s Schools of Choice
The third choice mentioned above provides Michigan parents and 
students an opportunity to attend school in a neighboring district, pro-
viding the neighboring district’s school board has made the decision 
to accept nonresident students—and many of them have. Currently 
there are nearly 80,000 Michigan students participating in the schools 
of choice program. As we noted, this tends to be a winning situation 
for the student as well as for the nonresident or receiving district, and a 
losing situation—at least financially—for the sending district. For the 
student (and his or her parent), there are any number of positively per-
ceived outcomes, including a broader if not richer educational program, 
particularly at the high school level, a more desirable if not more (or 
less) diverse mix of fellow students, and a more convenient location 
near the parent’s place of work, to name a few. For the receiving dis-
trict, assuming it has the seats available, the greatest boon is its receipt 
of a state foundation allowance for each incoming student with the 
accompanying likelihood of little or no additional cost or expenditure. 
Unfortunately, the sending district is left in the lurch. It loses receipt of 
the student’s foundation allowance but with little or no lessening of its 
costs and expenditures. Thus we have a “win-win” situation for the par-
ent and the student as well as for the nonresident or receiving district. 
For the sending district, it’s clearly a “lose-lose” situation.11
But there is another concern that should receive continuing atten-
tion from the legislature—the possibility that social equity may be a 
problem, particularly if schools of choice leads in some situations to 
further segregation by race and class and unequal opportunities for stu-
dents. In Chapter 6 we raised that possibility, noting instances of sort-
ing that have occurred in some areas of Michigan where the schools 
of choice program is in effect. The most notable examples we offered 
were in Berrien County, where three neighboring school districts are 
involved—Benton Harbor, Coloma, and Eau Claire—and in Detroit, 
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where their pupil losses have been particularly high. In Berrien County, 
there appears to be considerable movement of students from the Ben-
ton Harbor public schools to the public schools in Coloma and Eau 
Claire, with some considerable evidence that a “creaming” effect is 
taking place. The data suggest that the Benton Harbor public schools 
increasingly are becoming even more segregated on the basis of race 
and economic disadvantage, while the other two districts are becoming 
more diverse on both counts. In Detroit, between 2008 and 2010, its 
public schools have lost 8,500–9,000 students to surrounding subur-
ban school districts. The question then becomes one of balancing the 
positive effects of a desirable policy—providing increased parental and 
student choice—against the negative social effects of the same policy.
The upward and Centralizing Movement of Educational  
Decision Making 
In our initial comments on the value of choice, we identified a sec-
ond dimension of choice—the extent to which educational decisions are 
left at the local school district level or centralized at the state level, or 
for that matter at the federal level. 
For a long run of years dating back to the 18th century, local con-
trol of the public schools was a cherished value. As Will (1962) puts 
it: “Centralizing tendencies in administration strike at the very roots 
of laissez-faire concepts that have led many persons to believe that the 
local governments and private entities permitted to function within a 
state under constitutional and statutory law can [and should] do as much 
as they please without interference from State administrative agencies 
. . . They see central administrative authority as the embodiment of all 
the ‘isms’ that are alien to democratic government.”
The “folklore” of local control didn’t die easily, but beginning in 
the 1960s it began to fade slowly away under a continuing onslaught of 
reform efforts initiated at the state level and national level. In Chapter 
4, in our discussion of the early development of the MEAP, we dis-
cussed at some length the gauntlet of opposition this effort faced from 
administrators and teachers, as well as state legislators representing 
local constituencies. A similar experience faced the early developers of 
the NAEP—from both local educators and state officials. In Chapter 3, 
where we addressed state accountability systems, we traced the devel-
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opment of a multitude of policy reforms beginning in the 1970s, at both 
state and federal levels, all of which led not only to a further centraliza-
tion of power at the state level but also and principally at the federal 
level. As of this writing, a new force has recently arrived on the scene, 
namely, the aforementioned federal Race to the Top program, funded 
at $3.5 billion. These funds, distributed under a competitive grant pro-
gram, have gone to those states that agreed to undertake a series of 
tightly focused and federally mandated school reform initiatives. As 
noted earlier, successful competitors will be expected to increase the 
number of charter schools in their state, use standardized test scores 
in evaluating teachers, establish merit pay systems, and dismiss entire 
staffs of failing schools. We also noted that it is not just the actions 
of state and federal governments that are exercising pressures toward 
centralization; there also are forces for change emanating from nation-
wide or national nongovernmental sources. Witness the current efforts 
of the coalition of national organizations behind the push for common 
national standards, with the National Governors Association and the 
Council of Chief State School Officers overseeing the “common core” 
effort. And recently, we have the report of the Strategic Management of 
Human Capital project calling for states and school districts to overhaul 
how they recruit, prepare, evaluate, and compensate teachers (Odden 
2011). 
We now see ample evidence of the slow but steady movement of 
educational decision-making power and authority upward and outward 
away from the local level. However, as we noted earlier, Detroit seems 
to go back and forth on this issue—from decentralization in the 1970s, 
to recentralization in the 1980s, to state control in the late 1990s, back 
to local control in 2005, then on to the governor’s appointment of an 
emergency financial manager in 2009, and now in 2011 to expanded 
powers for the emergency financial manager and rising calls for may-
oral control of DPS. The question before us has become whether this 
increasing centralization and outward movement of educational deci-
sion making is a good thing or a bad thing. Will the concept, or folklore, 
of local control of educational decision making truly be put to rest? 
Should we accept the movement away from the highly decentralized 
system that characterized American public education in the 1950s and 
prior years, with the local school district reigning supreme, the state 
legislature funding the system but essentially adopting a hands-off pos-
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ture, the state education agency following a low-key supervisory role, 
and the federal government remaining largely a nonplayer? Or do cur-
rent times demand something quite different and closer to our present 
arrangements? 
There is, of course, the old maxim of the golden rule: “He who 
gives the gold makes the rules.” We have seen that play out over the 
past 20 years, with the states increasingly taking on responsibility for 
a larger share of the costs of public education. Across the nation, the 
states on average currently are covering some 47.3 percent of the costs, 
the local level 43.7 percent, and the federal government 9 percent. This 
would seem to make a strong argument for more state control. But with 
the federal government now dangling another $3.5 billion in front of 
the states, the Golden Rule comes even more strongly into play, and 
increasingly favors the federal level. 
At root this is a question about federalism. As we noted in Chapter 
3, under the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution education is a 
matter left to the states. Still the federal government appropriately gets 
into the mix on the basis of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion—Congress’s authority and responsibility to “provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” To what extent 
will citizens in the separate states accept, or even tolerate, further fed-
eral inroads into deciding what subjects and what content ought to be 
taught in our public schools? Are these properly decisions that should 
be reserved to the separate states, and to local school districts, respect-
ing the long-held value of local control? Or is it more properly a matter 
of the nation’s general welfare, if not its common defense? We simply 
pose the questions; the answers will be fashioned within and among the 
nested tiers of the policy-making process as it operates at local, state, 
and federal levels.
THE LIMITS OF POLICy
The public policies that we have written about and reflect upon 
throughout this book address a broad range of educational issues— 
governmental, fiscal, administrative, organizational, instructional, pro-
fessional and lay, parental and student, local and state, state and federal, 
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and many more. But what is public policy and what are its limits? While 
there are any number of definitions of public policy, the one that appeals 
to us holds that public policy deals with “the authoritative implementa-
tion of scarce resources.” This particular definition is further made clear 
in a metaphor fashioned some years ago by Thomas Green, a professor 
at Syracuse University. Green called it his paradise	metaphor. In para-
dise, all values can be pursued simultaneously and without limit, but 
paradise is destroyed by either of two conditions: inadequate resources 
or irreconcilable interest or goals—that is, scarcity and conflict. Thus, 
the essential meaning of the term policy arises from its role in resolv-
ing these two fundamental human conditions of scarcity and conflict 
(Green 1994).
Green’s metaphor makes abundantly clear that public policy—both 
in its development and in its implementation—is bounded by these two 
demanding constraints. First, policymakers most often must function in 
circumstances and settings marked by scarcity, whether it be scarcity 
of human resources, financial resources, or knowledge, including reli-
able evidence that particular policies will achieve stated goals. Second, 
policymakers also must function in circumstances and settings marked 
by the competing values, demands, and interests espoused by their con-
stituencies, whether they be taxpayers, educators, school supporters, 
school critics, lay organizations, parents, or students. There is seldom 
consensus, at least initially, on how to build and maintain quality sys-
tems of public education, and seldom are there sufficient resources to 
achieve the desired ends. Policymakers are forced to operate continu-
ally in an environment marked by scarcity, uncertainty, and conflict. As 
a consequence, policy is often fueled more by ideology than evidence, 
and, on occasion, more by desperation than inspiration.
The fashioning and successful implementation of effective educa-
tion policies necessitate that policymakers somehow accommodate the 
ongoing tensions arising from scarce resources and the irreconcilable 
interests and goals of their constituencies. This is no easy task. Further, 
policies adopted at the state or national level often fail to penetrate the 
“black box” of the classroom. That is, the crucial interaction between 
students and teachers is often unaffected by state or federal attempts 
at “remote control.” There are indeed limits to policy, to what can be 
done, to what can be accomplished. In wrestling with this ever present 
conundrum, we would only hope that all those involved in the process 
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be guided by the sentiments ascribed to a noted scholar in the early 
twentieth century: “What the best and wisest parent wants for his own 
child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other 
ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon it destroys our 
democracy” (Dewey 1907, p. 19). 
notes
 1. However, there is mounting evidence that property tax revenues also are experi-
encing a significant downturn as a result of the economic recession that began in 
2008.
 2. However, judging from the proposed budget and tax plan being offered by Repub-
lican Governor Rick Snyder, the likelihood of increasing and spreading the sales 
tax seems highly unlikely.
 3. We are indebted to Berne and Stiefel (1984), for their clear exposition of many of 
the underlying concepts contained in this section.
 4. The remainder is covered by a number of smaller taxes including the lottery trans-
fer, the use tax, tobacco taxes, real estate transfer taxes, casinos tax, the liquor tax, 
a transfer from the general fund, and other miscellaneous taxes. 
 5. In December 2009, both Detroit newspapers made headlines with their reports 
that 69 percent and 77 percent of Detroit 4th and 8th graders, respectively, scored 
below basic on the NAEP math assessments, which is bad enough. As we noted 
in Chapter 4, the NAEP does not include the basic category in its definition of 
proficiency. Only the two top NAEP score categories, proficient and advanced, are 
included. Thus, by NAEP standards only 3 and 4 percent of Detroit’s 4th and 8th 
graders, respectively, achieved proficiency in math. The later release of Detroit’s 
4th and 8th grade reading scores in early 2010 and science scores in early 2011 
were no better.
 6. The exception to this statement is that in the late 1960s the Michigan legislature 
appropriated funds to the MDE, at the behest of the SBE, to undertake a compre-
hensive study of elementary and secondary education in the state of Michigan. 
The department engaged J. Alan Thomas of the University of Chicago as execu-
tive director of the study. While not a “cost study” in the present sense of the term, 
the study certainly can be seen as a forerunner of the state cost studies that are 
becoming increasingly prevalent across the nation (see Thomas [1968]).
 7. A two-stage remedy is one approach that has been suggested. In stage one, it 
would be the responsibility of the SBE to “cost out” an adequate education; in 
stage two, it would be the responsibility and obligation of the legislature to act on 
the board’s advice, and determine from where the monies will come to “maintain 
and support an adequate education.”
 8. Interestingly this concern is now being raised at the federal level by none other 
than Arne Duncan, President Obama’s Secretary of Education. On March 9, 
2011, Secretary Duncan told the Congress that “more than 80,000 of the nation’s 
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100,000 public schools could be labeled as failing under No Child Left Behind 
. . . This law is fundamentally broken, and we need to fix it this year” (see Dillon 
[2011a]).
 9. The state is unquestionably destined to fail, given the State Board of Education’s 
recent decision to raise the cut scores on the MEAP.
 10. As reported in the New	York	Times	(Winerip 2011), Robert Bobb, the emergency 
financial manager appointed by the governor to run DPS, is proposing to convert 
the entire district to charter schools. Is this is an attempt to provide a better educa-
tion for Detroit students or to help resolve the district’s $327 million deficit? In 
2010, DPS lost 8,500 students to neighboring districts under the schools of choice 
program along with the $7,300 in State Foundation Aid that went with each stu-
dent. As the New	York	Times article further notes, “Supporters say this [charter 
schools] could generate significant savings, since charters are typically non-union 
and can hire young teachers, pay them less and give them no pensions.” 
 11. See note 10 above.
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